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I.
In a real sense, the years 1848-1856 are remarkable as 
being the dividing line in the history of the 19th century, 
especially in the sphere of international relations. With the 
revolutionary year the relations of Great Britain and the con- 
tinent entered on a new phase. It heralded the break-up of the 
old order in Europe and marked the beginning of that clash of 
national aspirations which was to lead to the creation of a 
German Empire and a United Italy, and to culminate in our own 
day in the Great War. Up to the year 1848 the settlement of 
1815 had remained almost unaltered. Except for the formation 
of the kingdoms of Belgium and Greece, and the transfer of the 
French crown from the elder to the younger branch of the Bourbon 
family, the continent remained practically in the condition in 
which it had been left by the Congress of Vienna. It was still 
subject to the artificial restraints imposed for their own pro- 
tection by the conquerors of Napoleon^ Germany was still com- 
posed of a number of governments, more or less despotic, ruling 
over small states and with the influence of Austria predominating; 
Italy was still divided among the Austrians, the King of Sardinia 
the Grand Dukes, the King of Naples and the Pope.
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The difference in political atmosphere in 1856 is con- 
siderable, for what we regard as the essentially 19th century 
Europe is beginning to shape itself. Austria is discredited 
and friendless; Prussia is feeling after a policy that shall 
lead her to eventual triumph; Sardinia has become a great power; 
Russia is at last finding her most imperative interest in in- 
ternal reforms; while Prance is once more and for the last time 
in the century the mistress of Europe. The foreign relations 
which were now inaugurated were to last down to 1875 at least, 
and in the case of Great Britain to 1906.
For these years, 1848-1856, came after a generation of 
almost unbroken peace, and introduced an epoch of violent inter- 
national and civic disturbance which resulted in a reshaping of 
the European system. The effects produced by the French revolu- 
tion and the Napoleonic wars had been too sweeping to last. They 
had resulted in a reaction equally powerful and thirty years 
after the Congress of Vienna ; its work remained almost intact. It 
inherited a legacy of strife from the 18th century and its task 
was to find a settlement of Europe and,as rapidly as possible, 
to secure peace. It was therefore natural that the spirit of 
the 18th century and the political conditions of the 18th century 
should dominate the settlement. In fact so thoroughly had Europe
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been settled by its efforts, that outwardly at any rate, it was 
more immune from the possibility of revolution in 1847 than in 
1788, and the extinction of the Republic of Cracow in 1846 seemed 
to show that the reactionary forces were not weakening* Then 
with astonishing swiftness, the reaction, which had lasted for 
thirty years, collapsed. For a whole year Revolution dominated 
the continent, and though, at thje end of that year, reaction was 
once more to triumph and the old settlement to be restored, yet
 
in the end the peace of Europe was to be completely ruined through 
its unsolved problems.
We must recognise that what Europe most needed in 1815 was 
peace, and the Holy Alliance "for the preservation of all things 
lawfully existing" did at least promise an organisation which 
would effect universal stability and quiet. Yet its work was in- 
creasingly threatened by the emergence of a number of problems 
of considerable perplexity which the congress had failed to settle 
or which it had deliberately ignored. The sentiment of nationality 
aroused during the War of Liberation, was entirely ignored, and 
the only foundation of the ultimate settlement was the re^tablish- 
ment of the traditional public law and the old dynastic rights 
which the Revolution had overthrown. What idea of nationality 
existed in the minds of British as well as Austrian statesmen was
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based on the old legal conception of a 'nation' as the people 
owing allegiance to a state - a concpstion which could not pos- 
sibly form a permanent basis for peace under the circumstances 
of a new century. But peace could not have been secured by 
substituting one revolutionary principle for another, and it is
 
futile to blame the statesmen of that age for not realising the 
strength of the new factor introduced by this sentiment. The 
settlement was to break down ultimately because it took little 
or no heed of this and other problems, and it is the special 
interest of the years under discussion that they witness the 
inevitable break up of the general stability of Europe, and the 
outbreak of a Great European War in which all the great nations 
were more or less actively involved and which inaugurated the 
centuries storm-period of 1854-1871.
T,7e shall examine in this essay the relations between Great 
Britain and Russia during these years, and in them we shall find 
perhaps the most powerful single factor which determined the course 
of the history of Europe at this time. The most active political 
ideas of the time were three: the national principle, the liberal 
or constitutional principle, and imperial expansion. By the mid- 
dle of the century, Great Britain and Russia had come to stand out 
not only as rival Empires but as representatives and champions of
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two rival political systems. Yet the differences which held the 
two countries aloof until the beginning of the 20th century had 
their origin not only in differences as to political ideas and 
customs, but in competing Imperial ambitions which impelled the 
two Empires to continual rivalry not only in Europe but in Asia. 
In addition Russia had in Nicholas a Tsar who abounded in all ' 
the qualities of leadership and the international situation of 
the time finds its centre round Russia as it did round Germany 
in the time of Bismarck.
II. THE FOREIGN POLICY of GREAT BRITAIN.
The foreign policy of Great Britain during these years 
was directed by Lord Palmerston, Foreign Secretary from 1830 to 
1841, and again from 1846 toB51; Home Secretary from 1852 to 
1855 with an all-powerful interest in foreign affairs, and Prime 
Minister practically from 1855 till his death in 1865. His is 
the outstanding political figure in Great Britain throughout 
these years. He was long in the public eye, for his political 
career went back to the time of the wars with Napoleon, and his 
intensely vital personality impressed itself strongly on the 
public imagination both at home and abroad. The legend about 
him most popular on the Continent is summed up in Metternichs
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description of hin as "Lord Firebrand". He typifies the British 
spirit of aggression which sees and even seeks in the troubles 
of Europe, England's opportunity, as well as the insular spirit 
of self-satisfaction v;hich loses no chance to dictate to, and 
interfere with others. That he was "British" there is no doubt 
and it was just this characteristic which created his great popu- 
larity with his own countrymen and gave strength to his egression 
of their foreign policy. His reputation has suffered in recent 
years, and the tine may yet be coming when a true judgment of his 
character and policy will be possible.
He was not exactly a great man, but he had certainly the 
valuable gifts of plain-speaking and commonsense. He was conspic- 
uously deficient in that foresight which accurately sees the forces 
which are to make the future. But he dealt with the hand of a master 
with the definite crisis and the affair of the moment. In politics he 
was a good radical abroad, whatever he might be at home. He sympa- 
thised openly with the aspirations for national independence and 
constitutional liberty at this time astir on the Continent, and he 
was prepared to give them support so far as this might .tot be incon- 
sistent with the interests of Great Britain which were to him the 
last court of appeal. He was in the habit in his despatches of giving
directions to foreign potentates as to the best course of action for
them to
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adopt, based on the happy experience of his own land. But it 
was not his habit to lay down in public general principles as 
applicable everywhere, at all times, in all circumstances and 
to be applied at any cost. In a word he was no doctrinaire ; and 
was ready to sacrifice principle to the necessity of the moment.
For the method of his diplomacy he has been universally 
censured. He was for the most part of this period, on the worst 
possible terms with the Court, and this is vividly reflected in 
Queen Victoria's Letters and Sir Theodore Martin's Life of the 
Prince Consort. Greville's Memoirs leave us the record of a 
considerable body of the best public opinion on his doings. Sub- 
sequent historians, Spencer Walpole and Herbert Paul, with the 
writers of the great political biographies of Palmerston's op- 
ponents jare Gladstonians and temperamentally antipathetic to his 
character and policy. In truth he was no careful or patient 
diplomatist. "Palmerston wasted the strength derived by England 
from the great war by his brag" was Granville's harsh opinion of 
his activities later (Fitzmaurice, Vol.2, p.63). There is an 
element of truth in the accusation that his needlessly offensive 
manner was a weakness to his policy at home and abroad. The Prince 
Consort considered that the country was in serious danger of the 
consequences of the hatred borne to him by all the governments of
- 7 -
Europe (Letters, Vol.2, p.243). The Manchester School objected
ftStyboth to his policy and his methods because i4 kept Great Britain 
on the brink of war with now one and then another of the Powers, 
and so would necessitate huge armaments and a heavy burden of 
taxation. Yet Mirritationcaelhis manner should not blind us to
^
the motives and aims of British international policy at this 
time.
The main principle of his statesmanship lay in the main- 
tenance of the Balance of Power. He thus adhered to the old 
British tradition in foreign policy that had inspired the struggle 
against Napoleon. At the same time he had a great deal of sym- 
pathy with the newer political ideas which then were in process 
of reshaping Europe. The attempts to combine these ideas with 
the traditional policy not unnaturally laid him open to a sus- 
picion of double dealing and to the charge of hypocrisy. His 
action often seemed based on no discernable principle. How re- 
concile a policy which encouraged the Italians to throw off the 
Austrian yoke with one which steadily refused to recognise the 
claims of Hungary to independence? How reconcile his treatment 
of Greece, with its assertion in the crudest form of British 
rights, with the principles he never failed to put before Austria 
and Naples' This element of seeming political inconsistency has
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caused a cloud to rest on Palmerston's character and policy. On 
the continent it was believed that by encouraging revolutionary 
movements abroad, England was merely pursuing her supposed tra- 
ditional policy of stirring up strife on the continent in order 
to have a free field for her own commercial expansion and profit.
In England public opinion was from the first stirred 
in favour of oppressed nationalities struggling to be free and 
Palmerston shared in this sentiment, but he did not allow this 
to blind him to the greater issue involved in the maintenance of 
the balance of power, the essential foundation of the treaties 
of 1815. No political idea was in greater disrepute in some 
quarters before the war of 1914 than the doctrine of the balance 
of power. It is therefore worth notice that wliat we call the 
balance of power in 19th century ia. Europe was a distribution of 
forces, military as well as political, which from end to end of 
Europe guaranteed f as well as possible f the respect of existing 
treaties with the territorial arrangements and political rights 
they established. It was an order of things such that all the 
powers were compelled to respect each other, and so that one of 
them could not impose its domination on the others. Nothing like 
it existed at the opening of the century when Europe was subject 
to the Empire of France. The Balance of power was thus a political
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ideal, realised as much by the rivalry of the powers as by their 
agreement ^ and regarded as being in the interests of the community 
of nations and especially of the independence of the smaller 
powers. This ideal is the one eternal element in. British policy.
It is impossible to find any consistency in British for- 
eign policy simply in terms of either intervention and non inter- 
vention in the affairs of the continent. Both policies have in 
fact been adopted, but only as a means of expressing the national 
policy and neither has completely dominated it. If we examine 
British policy for a short period of years it is not impossible 
to recognise its changes and inconsistencies. But looked at a 
century at a time, its fundamental consistency is its most strik- 
ing characteristic. The determined policy of Great Britain 
through the centuries has consisted in demolishing one after 
another every government and every people which has tried, or 
even threatened to try, to treat the rest of Europe as a con- 
quered country. That is in practical action what is meant by 
the policy of maintaining the balance of power, which John Bright 
denounced because he found it difficult to recognise in it either 
consistency of purpose or continuity of action. There has even 
been about this policy a permanence and power greater than the 
will" of the particular statesmen who from time to time have
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directed it, though it has varied under the influence of their 
views. In a democratic system, of course, the same obvious 
consistency in foreign affairs, characteristic of an autocracy 
like Russia, is perhaps not to be found. Statesmen live for the 
immediate present and sometimes unconsciously have to keep in 
the background the most vital aspect of the interests involved, 
in order to carry with them a people ignorant of the great 
factors in international relationships. Yet it is possible to 
see in the balance of power one abiding principle which has 
dominated our foreign policy. England can only be safe even 
behind the Channel so long as no power arises strong enough to 
dominate the continent and its coasts,and so be in a position 
to dispute the mastery of the seas. So Great Britain has been 
forced into the position of protector of this conservative basis 
of the European state-system.
It is important to realise that while purely British 
interests have dictated this policy, the moral authority of 
Great Britain in Europe has been founded upon it, because in 
most respects British interests and those of the continental 
peoples have been identical. It has made Great Britain the 
champion of the rights of the weaker states and of the sanctity 
of treaties by which these ri^its were secured, and while the
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pursuit of this policy may at times have involved war, it has 
been the opposite of a warlike policy. This moral aspect of 
British policy was to be revealed during these years. It is in 
its own way, one of the most striking facts in tt*e. 19th century 
history that Great Britain dominated the politics of Europe, 
worked for nationality and liberty, proclaimed its oivis Romanus 
doctrine, and reaped the honours of Palmerstonian diplomacy with 
a military force that could never have seriously challenged any 
considerable power. We can see in this fact partly a splendid 
game of bluff backed by the prestige gained in the Napoleonic 
wars, partly an instructive realisation of the value of sea-power, 
and partly the result of a clever diplomacy which gave the de- 
cisive power to the minority vote- But we must add that there 
was an interlude between the fall of Napoleon and the rise of 
Bismarck when moral arguments prevailed unsupported by physical 
force, or, at least, lent force to British influence and inter- 
vention. The power of Britain during these years was out of all 
proportion to its military strength, and was all the stronger as 
she alone among the nations succeeded in solving her internal 
problems while her great neighbours were constantly plunged into 
revolution^or lived in fear of its outbreak.
Canning had summarised the principles of British foreign
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policy as "respect for the faith of treaties; respect for the 
independence of nations; respect for the established line of 
policy known as the balance of power; and last, but not least, 
respect for the honour and interests of this country" . Palmer- 
ston was his political heir. Perhaps the best description of 
his idea of foreign policy is to be found in a speech he made 
in 1848 in answer to an unbalanced attack made upon him by 
Urquhart -
"I hold with respect to alliances that England is 
a power sufficiently strong to steer her own course and 
not to tie herself as a necessary appendage to the policy 
pf any other government ........ Therefore I say that itis a narrow policy to suppose that this country or that is to be marked out as the eternal ally or the perpetual 
enemy of England. We have no eternal allies and we have 
no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and per- 
petual, and those interests it is our duty to follow. 
And if I might be allowed to express in one sentence the 
principle which I think ought to guide an English minister, 
I would ad9pt the expression of Canning and say that with 
every British minister the interests of England ought to be the shibboleth of policy". (Ashley, Vol. 2, p.62).
Palmerston saw truly that the statesman is primarily the 
trustee of the interests of his own country and that he has no 
moral right to sacrifice those interests to the pursuit of purely 
ideal ends, though he would be equally false to his trust if he 
failed to realise that the interests of his country could not in 
the end be opposed to that of the whole community of nations . 
Also we must recognise that he cared little for consistency in
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comparison with success, or for means in comparison with ends. 
It may not seem the highest ideal of statesmanship but it is the 
only statesmanship that accomplishes the practical thing. By it 
Italian unity was secured by Cavour, not by Mazzini; German unity 
by Bismarck not by the liberals of the Frankfurt parliament. Men 
like Palmerston, Cavour, and Bismarck are alike in being of neces- 
sity opportunists; they claim to be judged only by results, not 
by adherence to political principle or policy. It is often dif- 
ficult to make out from Palmerston 1 s despatches and public utter- 
ances any more definite system of action than that his country 
should get the better of any struggle she might happen to en- 
counter or provoke. So he was at one time the ally of Prance, at 
another of Russia, aiding revolution in Italy, discouraging it in 
the Austrian dominions. He was for the greater part of his career 
opposed to two men, Metternich and the Tsar Nicholas, who were 
dominated by rigid systems of political action, who outlived the 
time when pure conservatism was a benefit to Europe,and were 
doomed to see the almost complete overthrow of their systems in 
the stress of revolt and war. In opposition to this doctrinaire 
view of policy was the foreign statesmanship of Palmerston, bent 
on making the best of whatever materials were at hand.
But however liberal and humane his ideas might be, however
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frankly his sympathies were enlisted on the side of oppressed 
nationalities, however incautiously he expressed his opinion on 
the course of events in Europe, he was still the Foreign Secre- 
tary, the heir of Canning, and in that capacity his chief duty 
was the maintenance of the Balance of power. For this reason he 
realised the value of an understanding with France, which he 
would have made the basis of an alliance, including a constitu- 
tional Spain and Portugal, to be directed against the three 
absolutist powers - Russia, Prussia and Austria. This was the 
keynote of his policy and in spite of differences which now and 
again brought the two countries to the verge of war, the force of 
circumstances and a common point of view as to broad principles
Hfftl*
of policy w&ft always drawing the countries together. Europe was 
in fact divided into two camps, the Western powers against the 
Eastern, a division recognised by the Convention of Munchengratz 
in 1833. The alliance with France, the fear of Russian prepon- 
derance, and the measures taken by Palmerston in the interests of 
the foreign policy of this country ; make up the diplomatic and 
international history of this period.
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III. EARLIER RELATIONS of GREAT BRITAIN and RUSSIA.
It is perhaps not easy to realise the position of Europe 
from the burning of Moscow to the campaign in the Crimea, and 
the position which Russia and the Tsar Nicholas occupied in the 
eyes of other European monarchs and statesment The youthful 
Queen Victoria records in a letter to the King of the Belgians the 
impression which the great Emperor made when he visited England 
in 1844. She is much impressed by "this greatest of all earthly 
potentates", "on whom the weight of his immense power and position 
weighs heavily and painfully" (Letters, Vol. 2, p.12). The Duke
n
of Argyll, then present, (Autobiography, Vol. i, p.426-428) re- 
cords that never had he felt himself in the presence of such a 
king of men. The Tsar was the type of man in a world of action, 
and his whole expression was that of conscious will, of energy 
and of power. He was the very ideal of an autocrat over millions 
of the human race, full of a sense of his great position and of 
the habitual exercise of its immense and insupe rable authority. 
His predominant expression was that of resolute will, always 
fearless and sometimes fierce. He was Russia. Other countries 
might be represented by ministers whose opinions and policy were
sure to be followed, but Russia was the Emperor Nicholas. The 
personal will of the sovereign was paramount and supreme.
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Influencekylittle by argument and persuasion, he would evidently 
never yield to menace but would be hardened by it into more de- 
fiant determination.
These descriptions are worthy of notice because the per- 
sonal character of the Tsar was one of the most important factors 
in the events which followed. The unforgettable part which Russia 
had played in the closing years of the Napoleonic war invested him 
with a strength he was far from possessing. This was especially 
true of those in political society or the army who belonged to a 
generation which had been accustomed to think of Russia as the 
greatest of our allies in that great controversy. Yet when the 
time of questioning came,it was realised that the real Russia was 
unknown and her enormous area, her untold millions of fanatically 
loyal serfs, the incomprehensible Slavonic character - these were 
the aspects of Russia which began to leap to the mind of the 
Western peoples. There seemed something non-European about this 
Empire, and it was believed that the West was threatened sooner 
or later to fall under the yoke, or at least the direct and ir- 
resistible influence of the Tsar. Such opinions only repeated 
Napoleon's famous prophecy that before the end of the century 
Europe would be either Cossack or Republican. That this prophecy 
was still potent may be seen in the fact that vhen Louis Napoleon
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proposed an Anglo-French alliance to Lord Derby's ministry in 
1852, he urged that in the then disturbed state of European 
politics "if his Uncle's prophecy respecting the Cossacks was 
not physically realised it would be so morally". (Malmesbury: 
Memoirs, Vol. 1, p.390).
Such ideas though exaggerated found some justification 
in the existence of the Pan-Slav movement, in which sometimes the 
racial,sometimes the religiouSjand sometimes the political element 
was most prominent, but always all three were in some degree 
present. It was truly felt that those ties of race, sentiment 
and tradition which were the links in the chain of Slavonic 
national unity were far closer and far more subtle and irresist- 
ible than those in any other European race. The movement began 
to shape itself from the time of Peter the Great. Russian 
nationalism was set up against the evils of Western civilisation^ 
and the racial and religious affinities between Russia and the 
Christians of Turkey became important in the field of internation- 
al politics. In this movement there were certain mystical or 
religious elements bound up with the Orthodox Church and the
ancient imperial traditions of Byzantin*T. The Orthodox Church
»
had preserved the Russian people in its primitive virtue ,and 
Constantinople was destined to be Russian,not only as a climaK
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to imperial ambitions but as the metropolis of Orthodoxy. Russia, 
as the head of the Orthodox faith, must demand the great city, 
indispensable to a Slav Federation,not only as a city of the past, 
but as containing in Santa Sofia the symbol of the common Eastern 
Christianity. Such ideas were of course exploited by Peter and 
his successors for political ends, and in aid of the imperial 
policy of territorial expansion, with the result that there grew 
up a Russian policy which enforced a ruthless system of autocracy 
and repression at home, supported extreme reaction in Europe, and 
at the same time championed the oppressed races of the Balkan 
peninsula. It was this combination of the religions, with the 
political, imperial,and even commercial ambitions in thfe.move- 
ment which made it all-powerful with the people of Russia, but at 
the same time made it an object of increasing suspicion to the 
Western peoples now that greater knowledge of the country, its 
people, and its religion,became widespread with the advance of the 
century.
The personal character of Nicholas is also of importance 
because the British tradition of general friendliness with Russia 
suffered a great check with his accession. Till the end of the 
18th century this country had manifested no ill feeling toward 
the remarkable progress of Russia, and had even welcomed it,
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especially commercially,as an exporter of raw materials and a 
considerable importer of English goods. The first visit of a 
Tsar of Muscovy to this land in the person of Peter the Great 
in 1697 is vividly described by Macaulay (Gh.23). His mingled 
glory and squalor, his queer occupations and the rumour of his 
grandiose designs excited curiosity but nothing more. England 
had as yet nothing to hope or fear from his vast Snpire. The 
elder Pitt was a strong advocate of a Russian alliance. He des- 
cribed himself as "altogether a Russian". Fox was in power when 
Catherine annexed the Crimea, and declared that Russia was the 
power in Europe with whom the cultivation of friendship, commer- 
cial and political, was most natural and of the greatest conse- 
quence to this country. The younger Pitt was the first English 
statesman to appreciate the real and intimate concern of Great 
Britain in the affairs of the Near East and to perceive that 
those interests might be jeopardised by the expected ultimate 
accession of Russia to Constantinople. In 1790, he got the 
Cabinet to agree to the sanding of an ultimatum demanding the 
surrender of Oczakov, but the debate ; even in a subservient Par- 
liament, showed that public opinion was not prepared for a reversal 
of the traditional policy, and the whole incident is now only 
memorable as giving a date for the first symptom of those changes
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of national feeling which were to lead to war. The increasing 
weakness of the Turkish Empire, and the continue! advance of 
Russia still seemed without significance to the majority of 
English statesmen >, The Napoleonic wars secured this point of 
view for at least another generation, and with the exception of 
a"short interval under the Tsar Paul in 1800, cordial relations 
continued till 1806. The fate of Turkey exercised the mind of 
Alexander I, and in 1804 he enlarged to Pitt on the grievances 
of the subject races,and suggested for the first time that Great
*t*Jl Ku^blo.
Britain^should concert beforehand dn the measures to be taken in
j 
the event of the break up of the Turkish Empire. The Compact m
Tilsit in 1807 indicated the adoption of an anti-British policy, 
but this ended in 1812, and the last years of the great War of 
Liberation were notable for the most cordial British relations 
with the greatest of the allied sovereigns on the continent.
But this co-operation was destined to end with the diver- 
gence of policy with regard to the operations of the Holy Alliance, 
and particularly with the end of all semblance of liberalism on 
the death of Alexander, and the accession of his brother, the 
supreme representative of the old Muscovite spirit. Nicholas was 
par-excellence the autocratic Tsar, devoid of all leanings towards 
liberalism and nationalism; much less "Western" in outlook than
- 21 -
Alexander, and champion of Orthodoxy and Reaction. Yet by 1848, 
all that had happened in Europe had taken place without an outward 
break in our friendship with Russia ;and in 1844 the Tsar was re- 
ceived in this country as the embodiment of a power with which we 
had long been in close and honourable alliance.
The Russian Diplomatic Study on the causes of the Crimean 
War - "Gorchakov f s political legacy" - has a suggestive chapter on 
the causes of the gradual destruction of the traditional friend- 
ship of the two countries between 1815 and 1850. It is there des- 
cribed as due to the successive departures from the treaty of 1815 
proposed by France and supported by Great Britain, but systematic- 
ally opposed by Russia, thus deserted by her natural ally. To the 
Russians, the arrangement of 1815 possessed not only a political 
but a military character. It was a strategic combination against 
France in which Austria was the advance guard in Italy and Prussia 
on the Hhine, while Russia was the rearguard to maintain the status 
quo in the East. The first blow at the settlement was struck in 
the foundation of the Belgian monarchy, succeeded by the sympathy 
popularly offered to the Polish insurrectionists ; and by increasing 
divergence on the Eastern Question after the Treaty of Unkiar 
Skelessi in 1833,all of which led to an entente cordiale with France 
with the object of isolating Russia. On the other hand the Russian
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Tsar was convinced of the vital importance of maintaining the 
provisions of the treaties,and did what he could to reunite the 
conflicting interests of the two countries ; both in the negotia- 
tions of 1840, and by his visit in 1844,which showed that he 
realised that the growing enmity was due to the state of things 
in the East as well as in Central Asia.
There is a great deal of truth in this description of the 
trend of British policy in the 19th century as based on an un- 
willingness to bind this country to old and obsolete conditions, 
on a reversal of our earlier attitude to Prance, and marked by 
a divergence in Eastern policy since 1833. In the history of 
British foreign policy as directed by Palraerston the treaty of 
Unkiar Skelessi (Annual Register 1854, p.475) is all important. 
Russia had intervened to save the Sultan, but the price paid was 
heavy, and went further than any other treaty towards subjecting 
Turkey to Russia by practically placing the Ottoman Empire under 
her military protectorship in return for the simple closing of 
the Dardanelles to the ships of war of any other power but Russia ; 
which was to have a free passage for her warships through the 
straits (Separate Article). In effect this treaty made Russia a 
naval power in the Mediterranean,securing to her a great Soolt of 
those strategic advantages which made her possession of Constan- 
tinople feared. It also broke up the "ancient rule of the Ottoman
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Empire" which closed the Straits to all foreign vessels in time 
of war, and in view of the unceasing advances of the Russian 
Empire on the shores of the Black Sea,and the increasing naval 
armaments she maintained there ( would have given her in time of 
war an immense advantage. The object of the negotiations was to 
induce the Sultan to trust absolutely in the support of Russia, 
and to neutralise British and French influence by making it clear 
that the sole object of the Russian intervention was to preserve 
the Ottoman Empire.
This was the master stroke of Russian diplomacy, and marks 
her greatest advance, but it had as its result that it revealed 
the trend of Russian policy as resolved on securing her interests 
in Turkey if not by territorial absorption, then by maintaining
fat,5ultArv
H in practical vassalage. Prom this time Palmerston was defin- 
itely and decidedly anti-Russian in policy. He joined with the 
French government in a vigorous protest against the proposed vio- 
lation of the neutrality of the straits, and when the next crisis 
in the Turkish Empire occurred,he arranged a joint intervention 
of the Powers of -. Europe ,and the provisions of 1833 were never put 
into force.
British fears as to the mind of Russia were increased by 
the alliance of the three absolutist powers three months later 
in the Convention of Munchengratz, and by growing suspicion of
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Russian designs on the Indian Empire. Russia under Nicholas was 
extending in three directions; in the Caucasus, in Central Asia 
and in the Far East. Hitherto its vast extent had been marked 
off by clearly defined barriers. The Caucasus between Russia and 
the Turkish and Persian Empires and the deserts of Central Asia 
made her an isolated and self-contained Empire except on the side 
of Europe. Now the impulse toward expansion carried her even over 
these barriers into relations with the weak, isolated, and self-
*
dependent principalities on her borders. The conquest of the 
Caucasus begun in 1802 brought her into a position where she could 
increasingly threaten the Turkish Empire from the East as well as 
the West. Her influence was growing with the Persian Empire. Her 
advance over the barrier of the Kfrght(z deserts into Central Asia 
brought her into direct contact with Afghanistan where Russian 
agents were at work before 1840, and through their intrigues 
Great Britain was involved in the Afghan War of 1838-1842. The 
shadow of the vast power looming over Persia and over the mountain 
frontiers of India was the direct cause of the advance of the 
British frontier from the Indus over North West India till at 
length it rested on the natural positions of the mountain ranges.
*
Perofski's expedition to Kh$va in 1839 was executed at the same 
time as the English expedition to Afghanistan. These appearances
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of Russia in the Khanates and in Afghanistan were to have con- 
siderable importance on the attitude of our government to Russia 
at this time. The chain of influence is seen in this letter of 
Lord Palmerston.
"Auckland seems to have taken a just view of the 
importance of making Afghanistan a British and not a 
Russian dependency, since the autocrat has determined 
that it shall not be left to itself. If we succeed 
in taking the Afghans under 9ur protection ....... we
shall regain our ascendency in Persia. But British 
ascendency in Persia gives security on the eastward 
to Turkey and tends to make the Sultan more indepen- 
dent and to place the Dardanelles more securely out 
of the grasp of Nicholas. Again our baffling on so 
large a scale the intrigues a,nd attempts of Kussia 
cannot fail to add greatly to the moral weight and 
political influence of England and to help us in many 
political questions." Ashley, Vol.I, 396, 398.
Russian advance in the Far East in this connection is only 
important in that the vast Empire of the Tsar,though thinly popu- 
lated,now formed by far the most vast and continuous area ever yet 
under single rule and the thought of this colossal fabric of power 
was not te- fee without tts influence on the apprehensions of the 
West.
But Nicholas had not lost hope of coming to an understanding 
with Great Britain and watched attentively the relations between 
that country and France which from 1834 became steadily worse,
owing to the vehement assertion of French claims to supreme in- 
fluence in the Mediterranean and the near East by Thiers. He
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indicated his intention of not seeking for the renewal of the 1833 
Treaty and came to an understanding with Great Britain, Prussia 
and Austria, when the Turkish Empire in 1839 was on the point of 
collapsing before the attacks of Mehemet Ali,supported by France. 
In the negotiations which followed,Palmerston's diplomacy obtained 
a decisive victory which once more recognised the "ancient rule 
of the Ottoman Empire" that the straits should be closed to the 
warships of all nations, and required the Sultan to enforce it. 
France in the end proved glad to enter what proved to be a Concert 
of Europe ; and Hussia no longer attempted to control the Dardanelles 
as an advanced Russian poft. The Bosphorus and Dardanelles were 
to be closed to foreign ships of war when the port was at peace: 
"So long as the Porte is at peace, His Highness will admit no 
Foreign ship of war into the said Straits" (Convention of the 
Straits July 13, 1841 between the Five Powers and Turkey; Hertslet 
Vol. 2, 193).
The negotiations of 1841 gave permanent expression to a 
new and united policy regarding the affairs of the East of Europe - 
that the fate of the Turkish Empire was a matter of European con- 
cern and that all the powers were to acknowledge it to be the 
subject of mutual consultation, and. if need be, of collective 
action. The diplomatic form of this principle was now stated
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for the first time as "the integrity and independence of the 
Turkish Empire". Of course neither integrity nor independence 
. were considered in 1840, an^ more than in 1829- But the expres- 
sion meant that the Turk could only exist even nominally; on con- 
dition of the Europe<»APowers agreeing to abstain from separate 
at tacks ; and acknowledging a common obligation. This was the 
greatest triumph of Palmers ton's career at the Foreign Office, 
approved by all parties laoluaing Aberdeen, and destined to be 
all important as laying down the maxim of policy which G-reat 
Britain was to follow when next the Eastern ^ueation was raised.
Palmerston had cleverly used the dispute with France ; which 
brought us to the verge of war, to secure the tearing up of the 1833 
Treaty. He followed the principle which Canning had laid down in 
the case of the Greek insurrection, that Russia must not be permit- 
ted to regard the affairs of the East as her own exclusive concern. 
In doing so, he followed the abortive policy of the younger Pitt in 
realising that Great Britain was equally interested in the fate of 
the Ottoman Empire to which Egypt belonged, "yftio is master of Egypt 
is master of India" was Napoleon's saying, and Egypt was a portion 
of the Ottoman Empire. Russian policy toward that Empire had hither- 
to been one of unbroken aggression ;which could only end, either in
its political annihilation, or its preservation as a practical de- 
pendency of
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Russia. The latter alternative was the policy of 1833, and its 
complete failure to win the approval or even the countenance of 
Europe may have disposed the Tsar to acquiesce in Palmerston's 
victory of 1840. But was this an indication that the Tsar intend- 
ed to revert to the older and more drastic policy? At least we can 
say that one thing he had learnf*was that if Russia was to be 
successful in finding a satisfactory solution of the Eastern 
Question,she must come to some agreement with England.
For this purpose the Tsar made his unexpected and uninvited 
(Martin, Vol. 1, 213) visit to the Queen in 1844 whe*k he won a 
great personal success. Palmerston was no longer Foreign Secre- 
tary, and to his successor Lord Aberdeen, to the Prime Minister 
Sir Robert Peel, and to the Prince Consort he opened his mind 
freely on the Eastern Question. He was ready to refrain from all 
advance into the Hhanate's of Central Asia and to leave them as 
a neutral zone between the possessions of Russia and the Indian 
Snpire. The views he expressed in conversation he was at pains 
to embody in a written memorandum which his Chancellor ( Nesset}rode, 
sent to our government afterwards,and which was received without 
comment. It is given in Annual Register 1854, p.482. The gist
of it was that the maintenance of Turkey in territory and independ- 
ence
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is a great object of European policy; that,to preserve it ; the 
powers of Europe should abstain from demands made on it in their 
selfish interest, or in an attitude of exclusive dictation; that 
all the powers should urge on the Porte the duty of conciliating 
its Christian subjects and should use all their influence to keep 
those subjects to their allegiance; that in the event of any un- 
foreseen calamity befalling the Turkish Empire, Russia and Great 
Britain should agree together as to the course that should be pur- 
sued.
Nothing could be more inocuous, reasonable^or friendly and 
we must give the Tsar credit for a frank attempt to find a solu- 
tion to a problem hitherto insoluble. The Queen's opinion was 
that he was perhaps too frank (Letters, Yol. 2, p.15), and his 
desire that Great Britain and Russia should agree together was 
nine years later to take the form that they should divide the 
Turkish dominions between them. Was he in 1844 preparing the way 
for a course that was a direct reversal of the policy both countries 
had agreed on in 1841? We cannot tell, but he was temperamentally 
subject to the dominance of fixed ideas one of which was that 
Turkey was in a moribund state and must soon fall to pieces. As 
to this the members of the English government did not agree with 
him, and if he came over with the hope of securing their concurrence
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in some definite scheme in the event of a Turkish catastrophe, he 
signally failed. But another of his fixed ideas was that such 
conversations and personal understandings were suitable forms of 
diplomatic activity, and it is not unlikely that he deceived him- 
self on this subject. There can be no doubt that the personal 
relations established by the Tsar with English statesmen and par- 
ticularly with Lord Aberdeen predisposed him to anticipate with 
excessive confidence a peaceful issue to any difficulties that 
might arise. The Tsar had drawn the erroneous inference from his 
conversations that under no circumstances,so long as Aberdeen 
controlled its destinies would Great Britain use armed force
;
against him. And Lord Aberdeen, Foreign Minister in 1844^3 
Prime Minister in 1852 when the inevitable Eastern Question was 
next raised. But it was Palmerston and not Aberdeen who most 
truly represented the national attitude to Russia and whose sus- 
picions had not been removed. For Palmerston never saw the Tsar.
Finally we may note in this summary of British relations 
with Russia in the first half of the century, that in 1848 the 
situation was definitely to change for the worse. Hitherto fear
*
of Russia had been a politic'anls fear of Russian aggrandisement, 
directed against Turkey in particular,and perhaps against the
borderlands of our Eastern Empire. But from 1848 a situation was 
to arise which ,while endorsing and underlining^ all these suspicions
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as to the Tsar's ultimate aims, was to be embittered by the rise 
of the underlying antipathy between the spirit of the two peoples. 
The great events of 1848 did not occur in England nor did the 
English people have any immediate concern in them. But Europe was 
sufficiently a unity for the events of this and the succeeding 
years to be all-important in the development of national feelings.
It was the Tsar's attitude as "the sword drawn against 
revolution" that caused popular animus against him to be added to 
the long-standing suspicion of his plans in the East of Europe. 
The reaction that he led was so powerful as to provoke the liberal 
sentiment of Europe to greater activity which was only to end when 
Europe was freed from the shadow of absolutism. ?rom 1848 we see 
the Tsar's greatest personal trimnph and predominance in Europe ; 
but we find his relationship with Great Britain so much altered 
for the worse^that when the old question once more arose,Palmer- 
ston found himself with the solid backing of the whole British 
nation.
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IV. THE RUSSIANS IN THE PRINCIPALITIES.
The most significant facts in the history of tfee nineteenth 
century Europe were connected with the conversion of absolute 
monarchies to constitutionalism, and the awakening of latent nation- 
alities to consciousness and unity. In this double process the 
year 1848 is important as marking a new beginning ;and it witnessed 
an explosion of political violence unknown since Waterloo which 
resulted,in the end ^ ia the destruction of the treaties of 1815. 
In this year Liberalism challenged the rival spirit in its strong- 
holds in Italy, in Germany, even in Austria,while the national 
spirit which had been fostered by the Napoleonic strife made a 
great attempt to assert itself.
The two countries which least felt the effects of the 
struggles of this year were Great Britain and Russia, for in April 
the Chartist demonstration had ended tamely and in Russia the Tsar 
was immediately on his guard. He v/rote at once to Queen Victoria 
pointing out that Great Britain and Russia alone remained standing 
and that it would be their united task to save the world (Letters, 
Vol.11, p.166).* The credit for this state of things the Whig 
leaders were disposed to give to the moderate and constitutional 
government which Great Britain enjoyed. Such was the opinion of
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Lord John Russell (Letters, Vol.II, p.170).
Even before the outbreak in France,Palmerston had written 
to Lord Ponsonby,our Ambassador at Vienna,"If Metternich takes upon 
himself the task of regulating by force of arms the internal 
affairs of the Italian states there will infallibly be war, and 
it will be a war of principles which beginning in Italy will spread 
over all Europe      in that war England and Austria will cer- 
tainly not be on the same side." (Ashley, Vol.11, p.63).
But in Russia the same result was credited to the opposite 
principle. Although the French Grovernment speaking through Lamar-
Yvtide's famous manifesto disclaimed all aggressive intentions, it 
was the view of Nicholas that the mere existence of a republic in 
France would bring the whole European system to ruin. Iftien Europe 
was in chaos Russia remained the sole armed force at the service 
of the principles of the Holy Alliance. The role of soldier of the 
Counter-Revolution the Tsar accepted without hesitation. At home 
he took the most vigorous measures to prevent the propagation of 
liberal ideas. In foreign affairs he resolved to maintain the 
status quo, political and territorial, of 1815. He at once tried 
to secure that Prussia should refuse to recognise the Revolution- 
ary Government and concentrate a strong army on the Rhine. But 
this plan of taking the place of his brother Alexander at the head
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of the leagued armies of Europe against France had to be given 
up when revolution broke out in March in Berlin. Soon he was to 
see his hereditary allies disappear or weaken,and the attempt 
made to create in their place states which would have been his 
declared enemies. He was thus concerned for his own sphere of 
influence, and he actively interfered in two places - in the
/
Danubian Principalities, and in Hungary. In each case his inter- 
ference was to bring him before the end into a contest with the 
government and people of Great Britain.
The Revolutionary spirit was active in the two principal- 
ities of Wallachia and Moldavia which at this time were governed
yby the ''reglement organique" drawn up in consequence of the pro- 
visions of the Treaty of Adrianople and in operation since 1831. 
It involved the perpetual right of Russian interference. Russia's 
consent was necessary for the deposition or resignation of the 
Hospodars or Princes, and Russian Consuls had the right of exert- 
ing their influence in internal affairs. The power of the hospo- 
dar was balanced by the power of the boyars or nobles, for there 
was elected an assembly of nobles with the privilege of bringing 
complaints against him to the suzerain (the Sultan), or to the 
protecting power (Russia) while the Prince could appeal to these 
two Imperial guardians of his principality against the assembly.
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Russia was thus not lacking in grounds for interference and 
for the right of protection. The sole remaining ties between 
the Sultan and the principalities were the investiture of their 
princes, and the payment of tribute, while it was the claim of 
Russia that no change could be made in the organic statute with- 
out her consent as well as that of Turkey. In addition to this 
special right in the Principalities,Russia claimed a general 
rigfrt to protect Christians in Turkey.
When the revolutionary movement broke out in 1848 ; George 
Bibescu was Prince of Y/allachia, and Michael Sturdza; Prince of 
Moldavia. Both were on bad terms with the nobility who accord- 
ingly found their support in the activities of the Russian Consul. 
It was against this constant interference of this foreign power 
in their affairs that the Balkan J5dition of the revolution was 
specially directed, for the national spirit of the country had 
immensely developed since the authorization of the organic statute 
in 1831. The glories of the past had been taught in Colleges and 
Schools, and a generation had been prepared for its vigorous as- 
sertion. So when the revolution passed over Europe, it did not 
stop at the Carpathians.
In Moldavia the revolution broke out on April 8th and was 
suppressed by the Prince without the aid which Russia was eager to
- 36 -
offer, for an attack was made on the Organic Statute and the 
Russian protectorate,and on behalf of a movement to unite the 
Principalities. But in Wallachia on June 23rd ; a popular rising 
took place in Bucharest, the troops refused to act, and the Prince 
was forced to sign a constitution which annulled the Organic 
Statute, granted universal suffrage, and declared the eligibility 
of all T7allachians for the office of Hospodar. The Russian consul 
successfully protested -and the Prince was forced to leave the 
country. The provisional government was soon overwhelmed with 
difficulties ; and the Russian government claimed that,according 
to the Treaty of Adrianople, it was its duty to maintain order in 
the Principalities if occasion should arise. Thus the immediate 
consequence of the Bucharest rising was the sending of an invita- 
tion by Bussia to the Sultan proposing a joint occupation by 
Russian and Turkish troops. The Turks agreed to what proved a 
dangerous step, and occupied Wallachia establishing a government 
by a Turkish Commissioner. The Russian government next demanded 
a judicial enquiry into the circumstances of the rising in which 
a Russian general should assist the Turkish commissioner. The 
demand led to an outburst of popular feeling in which the flrganic 
Statute was publicly burnt before the Bcussian consulate,and the 
Russians took advantage of this and other disturbances to threaten
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to occupy the principalities.
In this strait, the Turkish ministers appealed for advice 
to the British ambassador to the Porte, Sir Stratford Canning, 
theriip taking up his fifth residence at Constantinople. By his 
force of character, and commanding presence he had acquired im- 
mense personal influence over the feeble mind of the Sultan, and 
was named "the Great Elck/i" - the .Ambassador par eminence. He 
was the most distinguished envoy ever employed in the British 
diplomatic service, belonging to the older school when communica- 
tions from the Home Government were long in reaching their destin- 
ation; and when ambassadors"necessarily took a great deal of res- 
ponsibility on themselves. Personally he was noble/ stately and 
dignified, implicitly trusted by the Turks, always honourable and 
straightforward. Tennyson was later to honour him as the "Voice 
of England in the East" and the title was well deserved.
He shall find that the personality of the great ambassador 
was to be an important factor in the course of later events, and 
we may note here that he entered on his work at the embassy with 
two main convictions - the one that it was to the interest of Great 
Britain to watch with a jealous eye every scheme of Russia; the 
other that it was his duty to urge and even to compel "the Porte to 
carry out internal reforms and to take its place among the civilised
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powers of Europe. This was his own policy ; which he was ready to 
pursue undisturbed and uncontrolled by the home government ; and 
the very strength of his character was more than once to be a 
serious embarassment to the politicians in London. It so happen- 
ed that this was the first time that the great diplomatist found 
himself in complete antagonism to Russia, for at his first resi- 
dence France had been the enemy and Russia the ally, and at his 
second England, France and Russia were united on the question of 
Greece. Nicholas never did a worse thing for himself than when 
he refused to accept Canning as British ambassador to Russia soon 
after his accession, but it so chanced that Canning had been 
absent from Constantinople on the occasion of Russia's greatest 
advances in 1828 and 1833. From 1842 Great Britain's influence 
predominated at the Porte, where her ambassador exercised un- 
disputed sway till 1858.
In the episode of the Principalities and his defence of 
Turkey's interests, we shall find a foretaste of the Canning policy 
which was to end at Sebastopol ; for he saw in the needless invasion 
of the Principalities one more step in the road which everyone 
believed led to Constantinople. The sequel of the revolutionary 
rising in Bucharest was to bring the Eastern Question into promin- 
ence for the first time since its settlement by a united Europe in 
1841.
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The Eastern Question is in brief the series of problems 
created by the appearance and disappearance of the Turkish Empire
»
in Europe. Since Suleiman the Turk had gained a footing in Europe 
in 1356 such a question had existed. But till the loss of Buda- 
pest in 1686, the Turk was an aggressive force in Europe, and but 
for the efforts of Austria would have carried his conquests 
beyond the Balkans,whose populations he had successfully enslaved. 
With the 18th century Turkey was an active menace no longer, and 
the Treaty of Gorlo^itz (1699) restored nearly the whole of 
Hungary and Transylvania to Christian rule. The Treaties of 
Passarovitz (1718) and Belgrade (1739) drove her beyond the Car- 
pathians and the Save, which still in the middle of the 19th 
century constituted her northern frontier. But to the North East 
she lost still more territory, for the treaty of Jassy (1792) 
advanced the Russian frontier at her expense from the Bug to the
PrDniester, the Treaty of Bucharest (1812) advanced it to the Sftuth 
and over Bessarabia to the Kilia (north) mouth of the Danube, 
while the whole delta became Russian at the treaty of Adrianople 
in 1828. Yet in spite of these losses Turkey in 1848 was one of 
the largest European states.
The next cession of territory might be expected to be that 
of the Principalities,owing to the military preponderance of Russia 
on the borders, and to the interest which since the days of Peter
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the Great, the Tsars had always taken in the inhabitants. That 
interest was not so much racial, because the majority were Rou- 
manians and not Slavs, as geographical and ecclesiastical,and when 
the Russian Empire began to extend its sway along the coasts of 
the Black Sea a difficult situation was created, for the geogra- 
phioal formation,of the principalities,bounded by the Danube and 
its great tributaries, and in a crescent round the Austrian 
Empire ; as well as on the direct road to Constantinople, suggested 
strategical possibilities of great significance. Russia occupied 
the principalities with her armies during the war with Turkey in 
1736 and again in 1774, restoring them according to the provisions 
of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji only on condition of better 
government and general toleration for the Christian religion. The 
Russian consulate was then first established in both the capitals 
and a policy of peaceful penetration began. T?hen they were not 
in fact under direct Russian military occupation, a semi-protector 
ate by Russia, such as was secured in the Organic Statute was con- 
tinued.
The fear of the Turkish government that serious intentions 
were behind the Russian proposals for their pacification in 1848 
had therefore some justification, and those fears were shared by
Canning. His advice to the Porte was to treat the Wallachians not 
rebels but as constitutional reformers, and that therefore the
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despatch of an army waw not necessary. The Turkish government 
however sent a force of 4,000 men to accompany their commissioner 
into TCallachia, with the result that an equal number of Russians 
entered Moldavia from the North. As the hereditary protector of 
the oppressed Christians under Turkish rule, the Tsar had no in- 
tention of leaving the Turk to act by himself.
Cannings advice even now was to adopt mild measures, to 
grant amnesties, to liberalise the constitution, but above all to 
get rid of the Russian troops as soon as possible. (Lane-Poole, 
Vol. II, p.78). But the Tsar's intentions were quite otherwise 
and he demanded the severest punishment of the revolutionary 
leaders, the repudiation of all free institutions, and a prolonged 
joint occupation to secure law and order. Here, in epitome, was 
arising the old contest between the principles of the Holy Alliance 
and the liberal policy of the Cannings. It cannot be pretended 
that Cannings influence,indicating the interference of Great Brit- 
ain in an affair which the Tsar considered concerned no one but 
himself and the Sultan, was welcome.
Canning's task, as he himself described it in a letter to
t
Palmerston of the same date, was:-
"to keep the peace and to respect the treaties on 
one side and to sustain the Forte's courage and to lay 
the foundation for real improvement in ^allachia."
(Lane-Poole. Vol. 2,180).
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He had the support of General Aupick, the French minister 
at Constantinople ( and already there was talk of calling up the 
British fleet and appealing to the Powers. Yet he advised the 
Porte not to risk a quarrel with Russia so long as it could be 
avoided without loss or dishonour. This was in keeping with 
Palmerston's policy not to risk a war between Russia and Turkey 
while both Austria and France were incapacitated "by internal dis- 
putes from active participation.
Nevertheless by the time winter came on Russia had 30,000 
men in the Principalities, and the Tsar's attitude became more
VHA-XO-Ctxyv^J
difficult as he realised an unexpected opposition to his wishes 
at the court of the Sultan. He had practically proposed a work- 
ing alliance, and his proposition had not been accepted; the joint 
occupation of the Principalities had been refused, and his inten- 
tion to stamp out revolution there by military measures had been 
frustrated. He now began to realise the -3xisten.ee of the unwel- 
come influence of the British ambassador.
There is every evidence that at this time the Turk was in 
mortal fear of a Russian advance, and ; to insure against it, was 
pressing Canning to negotiate a defensive alliance with Great 
Britain at the very moment when the Turkish alliance was being 
sought by Russia. Even as early as July 1st, Canning was writing
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confidentially to Palmerston, bringing this proposal forward with 
his own personal approval.
"Rifaat Pasha has requested me with much earnestness 
to inform your lordship how anxiously the Porte desires 
to draw more closely than ever those ties of confidence 
and cordiality which subsist between the Sultan's govern- 
ment and that of her Majesty ....... He remarked that in
these times the Porte was exposed to much danger, and that 
he trusted the British government would be prepared to 
countenance, uphold and assist her in the hour of need .. 
.... It is evident that in the present unsettled state of
Europe the Sultan looks upon England as his sheet-anchor 
in tne event of the storm extending to his dominions ....
.... Your Iprdship will, I hope, think it worth while to
consider this overture vague as it is in terms,^and ( to 
make me acquainted with your sentiments respecting it "
(Lane-Poole, Vol. II, p
Canning was no doubt disappointed that Palmerston declined 
to adopt a definite step of this nature', though he urged that 
every step should be taken to keep Turkey firm in the English 
interest. IThat was to be feared was the acquisition of an exclu- 
sive influence in the Principalities,for in all his acts Nicholas 
aimed at a perfect equality with the Sultan. It needed all the 
ambassador's efforts to keep the Sultan from going over to the 
Tsar. On December 4th he writes to Palmerston:-
"In order to secure any permanent advantage from the 
counsels hitherto given to the Porte, a greater confidence 
must be established in the determination of friendly powers 
and particularly of Great Britain to throw their moral 
weignt into the scale, and to place an effectual restraint 
,on the undue pretensions of Russia, striving for objects 
exclusively her oivn and by a forced interpretation of the 
treaties'with the Porte, to substitute the rigfcts of pro- 
tection for the obligation of a guarantee."
(Lane-Poole. Vol.II, 183).
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It soon became evident that an early evacuation could 
not be expected for the Tsar was anxiously watching the struggle 
between Austria and Hungary ; and only waiting his chance to inter- 
vene .
In January 1849 Russia proposed a seven years occupation 
of the Principalities and we hear first of a convention round 
which the diplomatic struggle was now to centre. A further em- 
bitterment was created at the end of the month when the Porte was 
requested to permit the passage of Russian troops into Transyl- 
vania to act against the Hungarians. In defiance of the Porte's 
prohibition, the Russians marched against the Hungarian forces and 
were defeated. On February 19th, Canning made yet another at- 
tempt to win Lord Palmerston to his active policy.
"The Turk must prepare for the worst and'England 
must finally make up her mind'. The time has come for 
adopting a definite and decisive course of policy with 
respect to this country viewed as to its relations with 
Russia. A timely and effective demonstration of sup- 
port, especially if concerted with France, might be ex- 
pected to deter the Russian Cabinet from proceeding to 
extreme measures, or should it fall short in that respect, 
to save the Porte from being overwhelmed in a single and 
unequal struggle." (Lane-Poole ; Vol. II. p!84).
Canning was prepared at this point to anticipate war on 
the Turkish side, or as an offset to the Russian occupation, the 
usual countermove - the movement of the Mediterranean squadron as 
a naval demonstration to give support to the Turkish government.
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He wrote at this point to Lord Palmerston:-
"It requires no spirit of prophecy to foresee whither 
an unchecked excursion over a field so fertile in pretexts 
and opportunities for aggression will ultimately lead .... 
.... The moment is arrived when general understandings 
and general assurances must "be followed up vat 1 positive 
declarations and pledges not to be mistaken of sympathy 
and eventual support. (Lane-Poole, Vol.II, p.185)
Rejecting the plan of a naval demonstration, Palmerston 
decided on a protest against the necessity of occupying the Prin- 
cipalities. He believed that a permanent occupation was not in- 
tended and that the Tsar sought only to secure a base for ultim- 
ate assistance to be given to Austria. In the debate in the 
House of Commons on March 22nd 1849 he declared in the plainest 
terms that "he was confident that the Russian government had no 
intention of making a permanent encroachment on the Turkish 
Empire". He realised that it was useless to expect an evacuation 
till the struggle in Hungary could be brought to a successful 
termination,and we shall see later that he had determined on a 
policy of no protest against Russian intervention in that struggle, 
in the interests of the balance of power. Nor did he feel any 
great anxiety as to the permanent acquiescence of Austria in Rus- 
sian preponderance on the Danube (see a letter to Lord John Russell 
of April 9th in Ashley, Vol.11 p.94). It was obvious that the same
strategic advantage which the geographical position of the Princi- 
palities
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gave to a Russian invasion of Hungary would be equally potent in 
case of a Russian march on Vienna.
But at this point it was hardly to be expected that the 
Tsar would readily surrender his base of operations, He was in 
so awkward a position that he sent a special envoy - Colonel 
Grabbe - to bring the Sultan to terms. Once more he disclaimed 
all territorial ambitions, but his representative firmly declared 
that no one had a right to interfere between the Tsar and the 
Sultan in this dispute Russian intrigue made every effort to dis- 
credit the influence of the British minister. The Sultan was the 
weakest of monarchs. A large army was already within his fron- 
tiers. England was far away, and Canning could not offer any 
promise of material support in case of a definite rupture between 
Russia and the Porte. So after a lengthy struggle during the 
month of April 1849 the Tsar was successful in carrying most of 
his demands through the "Act of Balta-Liman" (Annual Register 
1854, p.476). Hospodars were to be nominated for seven years only, 
not for life as before, the assembly of elected nobles was sus- 
pended, and a joint occupation till complete pacification was 
secured. Canning's mortification was great and he could only 
prophesy fresh complications on the Danube (See his Memorandum in 
Lane-Poole, Vol.11, p.186), and urge the Porte to continue all
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preparations for self defence, in view of the fact that the 
Principalities in spife of expectations to the contrary were 
still being used for offensive operations against the Hungarians, 
whose cause was universally popular in the whole of the Turkish 
Empire ,among Christian and Mahommedan alike. The two great Pashas 
Reshid and Ali were openly on this side and this sympathy was to 
have important developments in the next stage of the conflict.
The incident of the occupation of the Principalities shows 
that the beginning of the struggle between Great Britain and Russia 
had its origin in a question that arose twelve months before the 
Russian intervention in Hungary. It reveals the character of our 
ambassador at Constantinople, and illustrates both the policy 
which Palmerston was adopting toward the Hungarian revolution, and 
the methods adopted by the Tsar as the apostle of reaction. The 
sole result of the peaceable Wallachian revolutionary movement was 
the withdrawal of the important liberties conceded by the treaty 
of Adrianople. The efforts of the Roumanians to escape the in- 
fluence and interference of Russia only ended in the increase of 
her means of legal action. It was this victory of the Tsar over 
the Sultan which encouraged Canning and others to see in every 
move of the Tsar a new progress in the slow conquest of the Balkans 
and a new step forward on the patient and continued march to
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Constantinople. It is worthy of notice that Russia was in no 
hurry to execute the new Act as far as the military occupation 
was concerned ,which lasted till April 1851. In two years more 
Russia was again in occupation of the Principalities.'
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7. THE RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY.
Meanwhile the revolution of 1848 had been raging in the 
Austrian Empire with unparalleled force. The crisis was compli- 
cated by the fact that the subjects of that Empire formed the 
most diverse population of any European State. The no»-Slavonic 
portion itself contained four "nationalities"; German, Italian, 
Roumanian and Magyar, while the Slavonic element was still more 
subdivided. Even among the opponents of Austrian rule there was 
no pretence at even a sympathy of feeling, while unity of action ; 
which would have been decisive in the struggle ; was made impossible 
by the divergent and self-centred ambitions of Magyar-Hungary.
The Crown of Hungary, with its dependencies Transylvania 
and Croatia, had been added to that of the Hapsburgs in 1526. 
Two centuries of struggle had freed them from the Turkish menace 
and now a spirit arose which stirred the Magyars to challenge 
German Austria. After 1830 a Liberal and National movement was 
instituted demanding a Hungarian administration, the meeting of 
the Diet in their own capital Pest, and the use of Magyar as the 
official language. Before 1848 nationalism had steadily gathered 
force under the inspiration of a remarkable literary revival, and
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of brilliant political leaders of whom Kossuth, a lawyer member 
of the Diet, was an orator of surpassing power.
The problem of Hungary was complicated by its relations 
with her Slav neighbours, and when on the outbreak of the Paris 
Revolution, Kossuth was successful in demanding the creation of 
a Hungarian ministry, the nationalist movement was captured by 
a violent form of jingoism which bitterly resented the national 
claims of all the neighbouring races and proclaimed its deter- 
mination to complete the Magyarisation of the whole of Hungary. 
The violent passions aroused on all sides by this frenzied pro- 
paganda were directly responsible for the way in which the revo- 
lution of 1848 developed in Hungary into a fierce racial war, 
ringing the Magyars round in a fence created by hostile nation- 
alities in arms, while they could truly claim to represent the 
fiause of constitutional liberty and progress, their folly in 
restricting such privileges to their own race rallied all their 
neighbours to the side of the dynasty. At first the practical 
dissolution of the Austrian Empire led to an almost complete sur- 
render to the Hungarian demands ,and by July their own assembly 
was elected. But a Slav deputation which came to congratulate 
Kossuth was told bluntly that nothing but force oould gain for 
their race equality of treatment with the Magyars. When the new
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)eror resolved to coerce Hungary, whose assembly refused to 
recognise him, he found his first weapon in the Slavs of Croatia. 
Yet for the greater part of 1848, and the first six months 
of 1849, the Hungarians were on the whole conspicuously success- 
ful f and by May they were for the second time in possession of 
their capital and advancing on Yienna. Already,in April,the 
Hungarian diet had declared the forfeiture of all legal rights 
over Hungary of the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine. The whole dynasty 
was foresworn, the tie with Austria denounced, and a republic 
formed with Kossuth as the Governor-President of what was claimed > 
to be a free and independent European state (see text of the Hun- 
garian decree in Annual Register 1849, p.331). Hungary's action 
was a challenge to every legitimate monarchy in Europe and the 
subject of special alarm to the Tsar. The helpless condition of 
Austria he would not tolerate,and in a manifesto of April 27th 
he explained the grounds of his intervention. He asserted that 
Polish emigrants, his subjects, forming whole army-corps were 
fighting in the Hungarian ranks under Bern and Dembinski, turning 
the revolution into a general Polish insurrection and encouraging 
the Moldavians and Wallachians in their resistance. The Austrian 
government had "formally requested" the Tsar to assist in the 
repression of the rebellion, and he had consented "lest the reaction
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of revolutions near him should tend to endanger his own safety, 
or the political equilibrium of the frontiers of his Empire". 
(Text in Annual Register 1849, p.334).
Undoubtedly if Hungary succeeded in the rebellion, it would 
not have been the only republic on the frontiers of the great 
Conservative Empire, and the disruption of the Polish kingdom 
might be expected. Yet if this was the official reason given for 
the intervention there were other motives which urged the Tsar 
to save the Austrian monarchy. Not the least was that grandcUse 
imperial generosity allied to a rather theatrical vanity, that 
was one of the autocrat's chief characteristics. He had made for 
himself the position of head of the cause of Authority, the 
guardian of the monarchical and conservative spirit in Europe. 
He was in his own way an idealist, and in addition,as we shall 
see later, it was always one of his tendencies to regard the 
affairs of nations as personal matters between reigaing houses 
and no one else. He therefore set on foot a large army, and 
raised no question.of any demand for repayment, even in the con- 
cerns of the Turkish Empire ;where Austria had been and might be 
again Russia's most considerable competitor. Perhaps, in addition 
he was minded to show the Slavs of the Austrian finpire as well as 
those of the Balkans to whom they had to look for protection in 
the hour of need.
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So in June the Russian army under Paskievitch entered 
Hungary through Galicia, and another under Lttders through Trans- 
ylvania, while General Haynau led the Austrians. This was the 
"Hyena of Brescia", a man justly odious for his barbarous crue 
whose very appointment showed the unmistakable temper of the 
Austrian government. The Hungarians could not stand against the 
combined attacks of the two Empires, and their hopes were ended 
with the surrender of Gorge! and their army on August 13th ; and 
the capture of the fortress of Komorn on October 1st. The revo- 
lutionary period in the Austrian Empire was at an end.
But the sympathy of the people of this country was unmis- 
takably and generally on the side of the Hungarians, as may be 
seen in the contemporary Reviews and in the debates in the Houses 
of Parliament. The spectacle of a people defending its ancestral 
rights^, and enlarged liberties was naturally of great interest to 
a nation that had won its privileges by force of successful arms. 
In addition the valour of the Hungarians raised hopes doomed to 
failure. A sonnet of Matthew Arnold "To the Hungarian Nation 
1848M , after celebrating the lack of heroism in Spain, England, 
France, America and Germany, ends with this fervent apostrophe:-
"Hungarians'. Save the world! Renew the stories 
Of men who against hope repelled the chain 
And make the world's dead spirit leap again I"
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As July passed and the Magyars with real heroism struggled 
against two Empires, the genuine British hatred of autocracy and 
tfee. sympathy with the weaker cause began to assert itself. To 
Englishmen the struggle could not be a mere national affair. It 
was one of principle - Hungary the isolated and constitutional 
against the deadening centralism and absolutism of Kuss'ia. Such 
a struggle, in order to afford a proper verdict, it was felt, ought 
to have been left to itself. Austria was not conquering by the 
vitality of her government or the energy of her soldiers. She 
had taken the unfair step of recourse to foreign aid. Such a 
victory was really a defeat with regard to the settlement of the 
principle concerned, and it left Austria with a heritage of un- 
popularity in England that was never lifted till her defeat in 
1866- The time was soon to.come when to be called an "Austrian" 
was the darkest of all political accusations. We must add that 
liberal opinion of the day was either blind to ; or ignorant of ; the 
unbridled nature of Magyar nationalism, at that very time denying 
the same political rights to others,which has been one of the 
greatest curses of Europe down to the Great War of 1914.
Contemporary opinion in England as to the Russian inter- 
vention may again be illustrated in the debate in the House of 
Commons on July 21st. In that debate, Bernal Osborne asserted the
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historical independenoe of the kingdom of Hungary as a free state
A-D-
since the year 1,000, described the development of her own insti- 
tutions, and showed how in 1790 Leopold took the oaths as. king 
declaring her to be free and independent, and how in 1849 the 
separate existence and free legislature granted in the previous 
year together with all previously acquired rights had been per- 
fidiously withdrawn. He refused to acknowledge the term "insur- 
rection" for the rising of a nation in defence of its rights. 
During this debate Lord Palmerston declared amid accaSmation that 
"there were enlisted in this struggle on the side of Hungary the 
hearts and soul of the whole people of this country". "The greater 
part of the people have engaged in what they consider a great 
national contest". At the same time he declared that we were not 
called on to interfere in any way that would commit this country 
to embark in those hostilities, beyond the expression of opinions 
and offers of mediations, and "opinions are stronger than armies".
Palmerston's attitude in this matter excited a great deal 
of speculation at the time and has been misunderstood since.
Something irreconcilable has been found in his well-known dislike
o<M>- of the Austrian government, wirtE his opposition to its rule in
Italyvand his supineness in the face of the Russian intervention 
in Hungary against which he did not even protest. At a meeting
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of Radicals at the London Tavern in 1850 protesting against the 
unchecked Russian invasion of Hungary, Cobden pointed out that 
Russia was allowed th march her armies across the territory of 
Turkey, through Wallachia and Moldavia to strike a deathblow at 
the heart of Hungary and yet no protest was recorded by our 
government against that act.
"It was our deliberate conviction as it was that of 
the nwst illustrious men engaged in the Hungarian struggle 
that if Lord Palmerston had made a simple verbal protest in energetic terms, Russia would not have invaded Hungary. 
The Tsar's ministers had begged him not to interfere in 
the struggle. Our protest would have been backed by the 
Ministry of the Tsar, if it had been made, and I believe it would have prevented that most atrocious outrage on the 
rights and liberties of a constitutional country.(Morley p.531).
More recently G-. M. Trevelyon in his Life of John Bright 
(p.188) considers that Palmerston let slip his best opportunity 
of doing something really valuable for the cause of liberty when 
he failed to make any protest.
The charge of inconsistency which the Radicals brought 
against Palmerston in his day, and which has been repeated by
*
the liberal historians and biographies, takes no account of what 
was the settled basis of his foreign policy - the maintenance of 
the balance of power. In his conunonsense view, the permanent 
peace of Eurgpe was of more importance than the realisation of a
particular national ideal, especially if this ideal conflicted
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with others equally urgent. His attitude to this double question 
of Austrian dominion in Italy and in Hungary was plainly declared 
in the debate of July 21st, from which we have quoted.
"Austria is a most important element in the balance 
of European Power. Austria stands in the centre of Europe, 
a barrier against encroachment on one side, and against 
invasion on the other. The political independence and 
liberties of Eur9pe are bound up in my opinion with the 
maintenance and integrity of Austria as a great European 
power and therefore anything which tends by direct or even 
remote contingency to weaken and to cripple Austria, but 
still mo.re to reduce her from the position of a first-rate 
power to that of a secondary state must be a great calamity 
and one which every Englishman ought to deprecate and try 
to prevent. 11 (Debate of July 21st).
The opinion so explicitly stated in Parliament is repeated 
again and again in his correspondence at this time. In a letter 
to the King of the Belgians of June 15th 1848, he says:-
"As to poor Austria, every person who attaches value 
to the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe must 
lament her present helpless condition ....... I cannot
regret the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy. I do 
not believe tnat it will diminish the real strength or the 
real security of Austria as a foreign power. Italy was to 
her the heel of Achilles and not the snield of Agamemnon. 
The Alps her natural barrier and her best defence."
(Ashley, Vol.11, p.82).
To Ponsonby he wrote on August 31st:-
"The real fact is that the Austrians have no business 
in Italy at all and have no real right to be there .......
North of the Alps we wish her all the success and prosper- 
ity in the world." (Ashley, Vol.11, p.90).
His correspondence is full of expressions of the same view.-
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"I hold a great and powerful Austrian Empire north of the Alps to be of the utmost importance for the gen- eral interests of Europe". "Austria is the pivot of the balance of power in Europe". (Ashley, Vol.II. pp. 64,83; 87, 88).
The Queen,of course, believed that he was animated by 
hatred of Austria pure and simple, and her letters both to him 
and to Lord John Russell are full of indignant remonstrances as 
to his attitude. (Letter of July 1st, 1848, Vol.11, 182; also 
186, 7).
But Palmerstons rooted antipathy to the Austrian rule in 
Italy was at anyrate based on a consistent policy, and in retro- 
spect, we must acknowledge its statemanlike quality. Geography 
more than anything else had made Austria a political necessity, 
and held together the areas inhabited by different races. But 
it had imposed on its government a cruel dilemma the solution of 
which makes Austrian history till the end of the 19th century. 
Did Austria look to East or lest? Did the future of Austria lie 
in concentrating and becoming a German state of Central Europe., 
or an Eastern state along the Danube to unify and amalgamate the 
Slav races? Palmerston anticipated the verdict of Bismarck and 
of history that the "Drang nach Osterv" must prevail. The work of 
Austria was to stand against the possibility of Russian aggression. 
He would have agreed with the Slav historian Palacky "If there 
were no. Austria, it would be necessary to create one". The part 
which it was Austria's duty to play in the states-system of Europe
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could not be accomplished by small states. This explains the 
difference in British policy with regard to the Italian and the 
Eastern Question. We accepted the national principle south of 
the Alps, but we rejected it at this time on the Danube. (See 
a paper read to the Historical Society by C. H. Firth in "Trans- 
actions, 1917").
It was therefore the fear of Russian preponderance and the 
necessity of a balance of power in Eastern Europe that made it 
essential that Austria should be strong, and should be ^re-estab- 
lished as a great Empire to form a barrier against Russia. In 
1849 the barrier was down ,and it would never be set up again by 
a group of small states of varying and conflicting nationalities. 
So Palmerston was prepared to see Austria turned out of Italy, 
to give up his interests in the Hungarian national rising, to re- 
main silent when Russian intervention gave him an unrivalled op- 
portunity, and give very little support diplomatically, and none 
materially to Canning's attempt to expel the Russians from the 
Principalities. As he wrote to Lord John Russell on April 9th 
1849:-
"It is unfortunate for Austria and for Surope that 
the Austrian government should place itself in this state 
of dependence on Russia, because it disqualifies Austria 
from being1 hereafter a check on Russian ambition and en- 
croachment ....... I have no doubt we shall get the Rus- 
sians out of the Principalities. Austria r be she ever so
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subservient to Russia,cannot submit to see her get pos- 
session of those military positions".(Ashley, Vol.1, p.94).
Again he wrote to Canning on May 7th 1849:-
"It is possible that Russia may not find her account 
in this intervention to the extent she imagines .........
We of course attach great importance to the maintenance 
of the Austrian Empire as an essential element and a most 
valuable one in the balance of power, and we should re- 
gret anything which should cripple Austria or impair her 
future independence." (Lane-roole, Vol.11, p.lo9).
Palmerston took care to have pointed out to the Austrian 
government the strage^ic perils which ensued from the Russian oc- 
cupation of the Principalities, but he found that Schwartzenbtfrg 
was equally sensible of them. (Lane-Poole, Vol.II, p.189). If 
the Austrian minister declared that his country would astonish 
the world with her ingratitude to Russia, Palmerston was confi- 
dent that her gratitude would astonish the world even more. 
Gratitude has seldom been a decisive factor in international re- 
lations, and permanent interests are rarely disposed of by feel- 
ings. So in: spite of his hatred of the court and ministry at 
Vienna, and of his sympathies with,and the things he said about 
the Hungarians, the cause of Hungary was sacrificed to the Russian 
menace. There was no change in our foreign policy, which was 
more than ever conditioned by this fear.
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VI. THE HUNGARIAN REFUGEES.
The revolutionary period in the Austrian Empire ended with 
the surrender of Komorn on October 1st, and absolutism triumphed 
everywhere. Centralism was established in the Austrian Empire 
and all constitutions were abolished on December 31st 1851. The 
struggle had been a bitter one and the passions it aroused were 
reflected in the attitude of the Austrian government in its treat- 
ment of its conquered rebellious subjects. Our English papers 
became filled with reports of the savage and degrading punishments 
meted out by the conquerors, of public floggings of ladies, and 
the ruthless execution of prisoners. The Magyar cause,now lost 
beyond all hope, was gaining converts and sympathisers all over 
Europe and especially in England. And now that Austria as a 
member of the European states-system was saved, Palmers ton was 
free to express his opinion of her government and people and this 
he did with great force, describing them as "the greatest brutes 
that ever called themselves by the undeserved name of civilised 
men". (See a very strongly expressed private letter to Ponsonby 
of September 9th in Ashley, Vol.11, p.105).
There was almost at once an opportunity for his outraged 
humanity to find a practical outlet. Within five months Great
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Britain was to be on the verge of a war with Russia, not this 
time on the ground of territorial aggrandisement, but in the 
cause of humanity, aad Thisjraised the question whether British 
or Russian influence should predominate at the Porte<w43!his was
it
the AouHle side of the question of the Hungarian Refugees.
Immediately after Gorge!'s surrender, about 5,000 Hun- 
garians and Poles sought safety by crossing the Danube into 
Turkish territory. Among them were the chief leaders of the 
Hungarian army including Kossuth, the very embodiment of the 
revolution, and the Polish generals Bern and Dembinski ,whose 
defiance of the Tsar had lasted since the Polish rising of 1830. 
Their presence was intolerable to the two Emperors and a joint 
demand was made on the Porte for their surrender,based on cer- 
tain definite treaty stipulations of each country with Turkey. 
Article 18 of the Treaty of Belgrade bound the Porte to punish 
evildoers and discontented and rebellious subjects of Austria, as 
well as robbers and brigands. Article 2 of the Treaty of Kuchuk- 
Kainardji bound each side to permit the extradition or expulsion 
of refugees from its territory. The question which arose was 
whether the representatives of a nation in arms for constitution- 
al right come under the terms of the treaty of Belgrade.
Canning ?who was of course consulted by the Turkish ministers
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adopted the attitude that the punishment of evildoers referred 
to, applied only to ordinary offenders in time of peace,and he 
advised the Sultan to adopt a humane and generous policy and to 
refuse to surrender those who appealed to his compassion. This 
policy was adopted all the more easily by the Sultan as sympathy 
in Turkey for the Hungarian cause was widespread.
But, as in the case of the Principalities, the decisive 
factor would not be the provisions of treaties, but the amount 
of support which the Sultan could look for from the British and 
French governments in support of their representatives. As before 
General Aupick acted with Canning ;and a final refusal to surrender 
the fugitives was given on August 30th, 1850. There followed at 
once a practical ultimatum from the Tsar demanding an immediate 
answer of "y es< or'no, on which the further relations of the two 
Empires would depend, the escape of a single Hungarian or Pole to 
be regarded as a declaration of war. ("Correspondence respecting 
Refugees from Hungary" No.3). Canning continued nevertheless to 
inspire the Sultan to refuse the Tsar's demand, and in pursuit of 
policy went so far as to assert in writing on September 15th with
*
General Aupick's assent,that in case of war resulting, it was to 
be presumed that England and France would not leave the Porte un- 
assisted. (Correspondence No.11). For this step ; of course,he 
had no authority ,but it was a matter where time was everything and
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in a letter to Lord Palraerston of September 17th he claimed the 
government's support on grounds of "obvious considerations of 
humanity, honour and permanent policy". (Lane-Poole, Vol.II,p.192). 
"Permanent policy" was implicate! in the matter because the old 
question of whose should be the predominant influence on the Sultan 
was thus raised. To Canning it was imperative that Turkish ac- 
quiescence in the demand should not be used to prews the Turk into
4further subserviency to Russia. This would be the result £f 
British influence with the Sultan and his ministers were to be 
completely and for ever lost through the home government's refusal 
to accept the responsibility for his promise. (Correspondence 
No.13).
The Sultan temporised with the ultimatum by sending a direct 
representative to the Tsar at Warsaw, while refusing to give the 
definite answer demanded, and the Russian envoys accordingly broke 
off communications ,as the Turkish ministers for once showed no 
sign of weakening. On September 17th the diplomatic relations 
between the Porte and the two Empires came to an end (Correspon- 
dence No.13). Six weeks of anxiety were to pass while Canning 
waited to hear whether his bold policy would be upheld at home, 
but during this period Sir William Parker commanding the Mediter- 
ranean fleet,and informed of the course of events at Constantinople, 
had sent a frigate with the news that he was cruising in _Lptvii>v,
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waters till his orders should arrive. Even this indication of 
the presence of British naval power helped to maintain the Porte 
in an attitude of unaccustomed strength.
The extremely serious nature of things on the Bosphorus 
and thfesi rupture of BUplomatic relations became known in London 
at the end of September when Parliament was not sitting, Pal- 
merston had no hesitation in committing this country to the sup- 
port of the Sultan against the Tsar. He instructed the British 
ambassador at Paris to secure the support of the French govern- 
ment in urgent representations to the two Emperors, and, what was 
more important, in the fateful step of ordering a combined squad- 
ron to take its place at the Dardanelles to give moral support 
to the Sultan, and to go to Constantinople if called for. (Ashley 
Vol.11, p.108; Lane-Poole, Vol.11, p.197,8). On October 2nd he 
was able to write to Canning that the Cabinet had decided to give 
moral and material support to the Sultan. He was urged however 
not to send for the squadron to enter the Dardanelles without real 
necessity because it might be turned to bad account by the Rus- 
sians afterwards, and it would have, in addition, the air of an 
open public menace. (Lane-Poole, Vol.11, p.198). This was in 
deference to a suggestion of Baron Brunnow, the Russian ambassador 
in London, who in conversation had warned Palmerston that "the
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fault of the Emperor is that he is very sensitive, and that any- 
thing like the language of open menace might prevent him from 
doing what he would otherwise feel inclined to do" (Ashley, Vol. 
II. p.109). Again Palmerston wrote to Canning on October 6th:-
"The government here haT-e resolved to support the 
Sultan at all costs, but we must be able to show to Par- 
liament that we have used all civility and forbearance, 
and that if hostilities ensue they have not been brought 
on by any mistakes of ours. There never was such un- 
animity in England upon a question not directly affect- 
ing the immediate interests of England" (Correspondence 
No.18).
Palmerston in fact thought that it was possible to evade 
a crisis if the Turks would exercise their right of expelling the 
chief refugees from their territory, and the Admiral was author- 
ised to offer ships to take them away (Correspondence, No.19, 20). 
He was also careful not to mention the Orders to the squadrons 
to the ambassadors in London so that no question of a threat might 
arise.
The sympathetic attitude of the whole British nation was 
so unmistakable that the Cabinet had no need to hesitate. It was 
felt that Abdul Me;)id did himself honour by refusing to give up 
political refugees. The Turk was a better Christian than the Tsar. 
TChat the Sultan had been, the Tsar was. We shall see that this 
defiance of European and civilised opinion, as well as of justice 
and humanity, by the autocrat of Russia was to have the most
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serious consequences on the relations of Great Britain and 
Russia in the near future. Palmerston reported to Canning on 
October llth:-
"There never was I think in this country so strong 
and so unanimous a burst of generous feeling as this 
demand of the two imperial governments has called forth. 
All men of all parties and opinions, politicians, sol- 
diers, sailors, clergymen, and Quakers; and all news- 
papers, Tory, ^hig, Radical, have -joined in chorus, and 
this outpouring of indignation must I think have a salu- 
tary effect at St. Petersburg and Vienna, and must raise 
our national character in the esteem of the world, and 
show that we are not so incapable of being roused to 
manly action as some speeches in Parliament and at peace 
meetings and congresses might have lead people to sup- 
pose." (Lane-Foole. tol.II, p.200).
Palmerstons welcome message came to Canning on October 
18th, and on November 1st the British fleet, followed by the 
French entered the Dardanelles. This demonstration 7added to 
the well-known expression of British feeling caused the Eraser-j- <-* / j.
ors to withdraw their demand. Canning reported this to Pal- 
merston on November 7th and that it was due t- o thaa, as the
f.te- 
Russian ambassador said, Apronounced expression of public feeling
in England. (Correspondence p.71). When the Turkish envoy, 
Fuad, had seen Nesse^rode on October 8th, he was informed that 
"if ft^ Foreign Powers pretended to interfere in the question 
at issue His Imperial Majesty would not listen to any terms of 
accommodation whatever". (Correspondence No.44.) Nevertheless
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on October 9th the Tsar ordered diplomatic relations to be es- 
tablished as soon as possible, but a copy of this order was 
refused to the British ambassador by Nessebrode "because he 
could never admit the principle of foreign interference in the 
relations of Russia and Turkey" (Correspondence No-48).
The Tsar came in for the odium of this action of the two 
Emperors, but Austria was perhaps the more insistent and even 
now was intractable, insisting that the Turkish government should 
keep the refugees interned according to her will. This was done 
in spite of Cannings efforts with the Sultan, and Palmerston's 
protests through Ponsonby (Ashley, Vol.II, p.121, 124, 125 and 
Lane-Poole, Vol.11, p.204). Palmerston was in great anger at 
the poor feeling of the Turk. M It was scarcely less derogatory 
to the Sultan to be jailer for Austria than to be purveyor to the 
Austrian executioners."
It was not till April that Austria gave way and resumed 
diplomatic relations with the Porte, and still the refugees were 
kept in confinement. Not till September 185"^ did Kossuth and the 
leaders leave Turkish territory. It is doubtful if this insis- 
tence did any good to Austria for while Kossuth was kept in con- 
finement he was a martyr and the subject of a never ceasing 
interest which culminated on his release in his reception in
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England and America.
This incident produced a great effect dn the imperious 
and sensitive spirit of the Tsar, following as it did his great 
successes in Hungary and dimming his pride. It is not too much 
to claim that in these events connected with the refugees we see 
another beginning of a course of events which ended in the 
Crimean "Tar. We find the same elements in the situation: the 
popular support of Turkey, the distrust of Russia, the outburst 
of public opinion, and the almost personal rivalry of the Tsar 
and the British ambassador at Constantinople. Even the later 
history of Kossuth in England was only to show more significantly 
what had been the effects of the Russian intervention and the 
Russian demand for the surrender of the fugitives on public 
opinion in this country.
Kossuth was released on September 1st, 1851, and embarking 
on an American man-of-war, he first landed at Marseilles where he 
had a great popular reception, but was forbidden by the IWet  
President to cross France. On October 23rd he landed on English 
soil, and at Southampton and other places addresses were presented 
to him, while he was officially entertained by the Lord Mayor of 
London. At each place he pleaded the cause of his unhappy country 
with great eloquence and a command of language unequalled by our
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greatest orators in our own tongue. (See Cobden's opinion in a 
letter to Bright in Morley, p.564). The enthusiasm created for 
the lost Hungarian cause was intense. On November 12th Cobden 
comments on Bright's speech at the meeting to welcome Kossuth 
at Southampton that if he had moved there and then "a declara- 
tion of war against Russia and Austria it would have been the 
resolution which would have most perfectly embodied the feelings 
of three-fourths of those present" (Morley, p.569).
Palmerston came in for a great deal of public applause at 
this timesl- votes of thanks for his services to the refugees were 
passed at the same time as resolutions of sympathy with Kossuth, 
though Cobden noted (Morley, p.565) that Kossuth himself avoided 
saying anything in praise of Palmerston no doubt because of the 
rejection of the claim to Hungarian sovereignty by the British 
government in 1848 and 1849 while the struggle was actually pro- 
ceeding. "Set Koocuth ogproQOod a dooiro to soo him and Palmer- 
ston agreed to receive him in person, at first at the Foreign 
Office and then at his own house. But Lord John Russell was in- 
formed that if the Foreign Secretary had any communication with 
the man who led a rebellion against the Emperor of Austria, the 
ambassador would be recalled. Strongly urged by the Queen 
(Letters, Vol.11, P.326). who was vastly displeased at the whole
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course of the Hungarian agitation, (See G-reville, Yol, VI, p.4£3:) 
and considered that a reception of Kossuth even at Palmerston's 
private residojice would be liable to offend her allies, Austria 
and Russia, the Prime Minister secured a unanimous vote of the 
Cabinet to cause Palmers ton to give way. But after Kossuth's 
departure from England, he admitted to the Foreign Office a 
Radical deputation from Finsbury and Islington to congratulate 
him on the release of Kossuth. Their address described the 
Emperors of Russia and Austria as "odious and detestable assassins" 
and "merciless tyrants and despots". The Queen was furious at the 
Foreign Secretaries failure to repudiate such language about 
sovereigns with whom she was on terms of peace and used every 
effort to persuade Lord John Russell to get rid of him. She even 
went so far as to decline to believe that he had not seen Kossuth 
after all (Letters, Vol.11, p.331). It happened that this incident 
occurred immediately after & serious dispute between the Queen and 
the Foreign Minister with regard to an official letter of apology 
to the Austrian government for the treatment which Field Marshall 
Haynau ("General Hyena") had received at the hands of a crowd of 
London draymen in return for his odious treatment of women prison- 
ers when stamping out the Hungarian revolution (Letters, Vol.11, 
p.269).
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The agitation which Kossuth's presence caused, though of 
no importance in itself, and having no immediate effect, kept 
alive public indignation at the tendencies of Russian policy and 
had a great deal to do with the persistence of anti-Russian feel- 
ing in this country especially among the Radicals, who were sup- 
posed to follow Gobden and Bright in a strict policy of non-inter- 
vention. On November 4th 1851, Bright wrote to Gobden:-
"I am expected to be at the meeting in the Free Trade 
Hall (to welcome Kossuth) and to speak. I am in a des- 
perate puzzle what to do, but certainly if I speak I shall 
go agsinst any notion of fighting for Hungary, or any other 
country. We had a warm discussion last evening at the 
League rooms on these points - Robinson and others in favour 
of naving a tussle with Russia some time to put an end to 
Cossack domination etc. I am very apprehensive that this 
Hungarian sympathy will breed a spirit which we have hoped 
¥as subsiding and will tend to fill the people's heart 
with pride and self-conceit and with a notion that it is 
our mission to become knight errants in the cause of free- 
dom to other nations, whilst we are forgetting how much 
we have, to do at home ....... I shall take another line at
all hazards and shall endeavour to show that by perfecting 
our own institutions and by promoting the intelligence, 
morality and health of our own. country, and by treating all 
other nations in a just and generous and cpurteous manner, 
we shall do more for humanity than by commissioning Palmer- 
ston to regenerate Hungary by fleets in the Black Sea and 
the Baltic." (Trevelyan, p.195).
This letter plainly foreshadows that division of Radical 
feeling which subsequently was to separate Cobden and Bright from 
their usual supporters when war actually.broke out. It gives us 
in epitome the policy which they followed, and it reveals the fact
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that their leadership in internal and economic questions did not 
extend to foreign policy. The whole Hungarian incident prepared 
the minds of many English liberals who cared nothing about the 
Turkish Empire to welcome the Crimean war fcrur years later as a 
war for freedom.
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VII. DON PAG IF ICO.
Palmerston's credit had been much advanced by the negoti- 
ations about the refugees, for in 1849 he had successfully resist- 
ed the intentions of the two great autocratic Emperors of Europe. 
But his next use of the British fleet was from the moral point of 
view, more questionable, and gave the Tsar a good opportunity for 
retaliation. In effect he used the naval power of England to com- 
pel the Greek government to meet the dubious claims of a Portu- 
guese Jew who happened to be a British subject. Another claimant 
for redress from the Greek government was the historian Findlay.
 
Reparation had been for a long time denied, not merely to the suf- 
ferers, but to the British minister and the last demand on January 
17th 1850 was followed by a blockade of the Piraeus by a squadron 
under Sir T7illiam Parker.
But Greek*2lependence, declared in IB2j>, had been guaranteed 
by three powers:-Russia, France and Great Britain, and the Greek 
government appealed to France and Russia^who naturally found it 
an affront to their protection that the negotiations should be 
carried on at Athens under the guns of a British fleet on the spot, 
ready to use coercion if the proposals were refused. Paljnerston 
was convinced that the French minister in Greece was encouraging
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the Greek king - "the spoilt child of absolutism", and a special 
favourite of the Tsar (Ashley, Vol.11, p.140). The Tsar, through 
Brunnow, made a protest against the coercion of small states by 
the maritime power of England, and the deliberate intention of 
England to disengage itself from all common obligations and to 
recognise against the weak 10 law but its own will, and ended with 
a guarded threat as to what would happen if such measures contin- 
ued. (Ashley, Vol.11, p.142).
This was turning the tables with a vengeance. But the 
effect of the recent embitterment of Russian and British relations 
was strikingly manifested when this despatch of the Russian 
Chancellor was published in the "Times". The language of the 
"G-lobe'; ' and the "Morning Post" with reference to the Emperor's 
acts and policy was such that the Russian ambassador wrote to 
complain of the tone of the London press. Palmerston's answer 
to Lord John Russell's enquiry is dated May 16th 1850:-
"Any articles in the newspapers to which Brunnow al- 
ludes were drawn upon the Russian government by the un- 
precedented publication of Nessebrode's despatch of March 
17th s and the threats made by the "Times" as to what Russia 
would do to put a stop to our proceedings in Greece ..... 
T7ith regard to the Russian despatch the feeling in this 
country has been but one and that one universal."
(Ashley, Vol.11, p.143).
However he sent a mild and conciliatory reply. Meanwhile 
a convention had been signed in London disposing of the whole
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dispute, but ignorant of this fact the British minister at Athens 
coerced the Greek government into yielding and paying at once the 
sums- demanded. This method of settlement led to the recalling of 
the French minister from London,and on May 1st Brunnow intimated 
the imminence of a similar act by the Tsar. The French Foreign
 
Minister went so far as to make a public accusation of duplicity 
on England's part and the two countries were on the verge of war. 
"The French deemed it incompatible with the dignity of the Re- 
public to have any longer an ambassador in London" reports Gre-
WM '7*- , 'frS~0
ville (Vol.VI, p.336). In his view this was "The greatest scrape 
into which Palmerston ever got, our government being charged with 
breach of faith and the violation of a compact", (p.339,). Palmer- 
ston went his way and carried his point, but the Russian, French, 
and Bavarian ambassadors refused to attend the usual diplomatic 
function on the Queen's birthday.
For a long time, the relations of the Foreign Minister both 
with the Court and the Cabinet had been strained to breaking point, 
of which fact the Letters of the Queen and the Memoirs of Greville 
teem with evidence. On February 14th 1850 Greville says:-
"The disgust at it (the Greek policy) is universal 
with those who think at all about foreign matters. It is 
past all doubt that it has produced the strongest feelings 
of indignation against this country all over Europe and 
the members themselves are conscious what a disgraceful 
figure they cut and are ashamed of it."
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As for the Queen and Prince Consort, they were only wait- 
ing for -the time when Palmerston's colleagues would resolve to 
get rid of him. On May 18th the Prince wrote to the Prime Llinis- 
ter that his own conviction and the Queen's grew stronger and 
stronger that "Lord Palmerston was bringing the hatred borne to 
him personally by all the governments of Europe upon England, and 
that the country runs serious danger of having to pay for the 
consequences" (Letters, Vol.11, p.243). The indignation, resent- 
ment, and bitterness with which they regarded the Foreign Minister 
is openly expressed in their correspondence. In the House of Lords 
a vote of censure on his conduct of this affair was carried. But 
this step v/as countered in the House of Commons on June 24th by 
the moving of a general resolution of support of the government's 
foreign -oolicy. Palmerston was thus enabled to come forward not 
so much as the vindicator of that ucivis Romanus" Don Pacifico, 
as the champion of constitutional liberty throughout the continent 
of Europe. In spite of the alliance against him of Gladstone, 
Peel, Disraeli, Cobden, Graham., Molesworth and Herbert, the motion 
was carried in his favour and his popularity increased a hundred- 
fold. Cobden and Brigjht, in fact, had great difficulty in recon- 
ciling their Radical constituents to their vote. (Treveltyan, p.191-5 
In view of the development of our relations with Russia, it is
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worth noting that Palmerston triumphed over Peelites, Protection- 
ists ,and "Manchester" men combinedjby his graphic appeal to the 
nationalist passion of Englishmen, and to the generous hatred of 
continental tyrannies now firraly characteristic of British opin- 
ion and one of the determining causes of later events.
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VIII. THE FALL of PALMERSTON.
The result of Palmerston's great triumph was to render 
him independent of the Cabinet and not bound to consult his col- 
leagues, provided he could justify himself before the House of 
Commons. He carried his independence of the Court to such lengths 
that the (^ueen, as a condition of his holding office, insisted on 
his acceptance of a memorandum dictating the proper procedure in 
sending out despatches. (Letters, Vol.11, p.264) In addition 
there was now open warfare between the two Ylhig chiefs, the Prime 
Minister and the Foreign Secretary and their natural rivalry was 
accentuated by the divergence of their opinions on the question of 
Parliamentary reform. Yet Palmerston held his own till ,in Decem- 
ber 1851 ;he expressed approval of the coup d'etat by which Louis 
Napoleon, Prince President of the French Republic, forcibly 
seized the government of France.
Palmerston had officially instructed the French ambassador 
in Paris to take the line of strict neutrality, resolved on by 
the Queen and Cabinet (Letters. Vol.II, p.340), but in private 
conversation with Walewski r the French ambassador in London, he 
expressed entire approval of Napoleon's step, and this conversa- 
tion,reported in Paris,led to a protest from our ambassador there
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at what seemed a double policy. The protest gave the Prime 
Minister and the Queen the opportunity long awaited, and great 
was the joy which the Queen expressed in her letters that at 
last the hated minister was no longer Foreign Secretary (Martin 
Tol.II,p-417). That the dismissal sooner or later was an event 
which had been long contemplated is shown in a letter from the 
Prince Consort to Lord John Russell. (Martin, Vol.11, p.418; 
Letters, Vol.11, p.343). The Queen had contemplated dismissing 
Lord Palmerston herself, but shrank from the use of the power of 
the Grown, and Lord John is congratulated that the opportunity 
was one in which all the right was on his side. A conversation 
with Napoleon III in 1354 reported in a memorandum of the Prince 
Consort tends to support the view that the Court saw in the inci- 
dent an opportunity,as well as an offence against the proper 
conduct of foreign relations (Martin, Vol.Ill, p.112).
In the history of our relations with Russia the incident 
is not without significance. For Palmerston gave his own ac- 
count of the incident in a letter to his brother of January 22nd 
1852 : -
!f lt is obvious that the reason assigned for this dis- 
missal was a mere pretext eagerly caught up for want of 
any good reason. The real ground was a weak truckling to 
the hostile intrigues of the Orleans party, Austria, Russia 
Saxony and Bavaria and in some degree also, of the present
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Prussian government. All these parties find their res- 
pective viev/s and systems of policy thwarted by the_course 
pursued by the British government and they thought if they 
could change the minister they would change the policy".
(Ashley, Vol.II, p.215).
He was certainly mistaken if he thought that the Queen and 
Prince Consort needed stimulus of any kind,or from any quarter, to 
encourage them to take this step. In fact it is impossible to 
read the correspondence on the matter without realising that our 
constitutional system in the sphere of foreign policy has not 
always worked with the smoothness usually attributed to it. How- 
ever disguised, here was a struggle for the control of foreign 
policy between the Court and the Minister responsible to Parlia- 
ment.
But Palmerston's version of the causes of his removal from 
office was adopted by the newspapers,who propagated the view that 
it was due to foreign intrigue revenging itself for his vigorous 
foreign policy, the-.action taken by Lord John was "a foregone 
conclusion", "the result of poison instilled into Ms mind by 
Russian-emissaries 51 (quoted in Liar tin Vol, II, p.422). The charges 
of Russian intrigue were such that the Russian ambassador once 
more addressed a protest to Lord John against the tone of the press 
(December 27th) declaring that "our representations have had no- 
thing to do with the change that has taken place in the Foreign
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Office". But this time the ^ueen was highly indignant that even 
the possibility of change in her government at the instigation 
of a foreign power should even be suggested, and regarded Brunnow f s 
letter as presumptuous (Martin, Vol.11, p.423).
Once more we find an illustration of the ease with which 
popular sympathy and the animosity of the press could at this 
time be roused against any action of Russia, real or supposed.
The incident is important for another reason. It directly 
led to the break up of the "Thig ministry, and well might John 
Russell look back in later life and regret the step he had taken 
in demanding Palmerston 1 s resignation (Recollections, p.258). 
For some months now the obscure and insignificant question of 
the Holy Places of Palestine had been raised by French action. 
The break up of the "Thig ministry enabled the Court to obtain, 
after a brief Tory administration, its long desired Coalition 
government, under Lord Aberdeen. At the close of 1852 the 
question of the Holy Places was settled in a French sense just 
as Lord Aberdeen'3 government came into power. And Lord Aber- 
deen was the friend of the Tsar, and the original depository of 
his confidences and of the memorandum of 1844 on the relations 
of Great Britain and Russia in the affairs of the East. Once 
more the Eastern Question was coming up for solution.
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IX. THE POSITION of the TSAR NICHOLAS in!852.
It may be well to pause here, before we proceed to the con- 
sideration of the fatal development o'f the antagonism between 
Russia and England, to note the remarkable ascendancy which the 
Tsar Nicholas had obtained on the continent in the year 1852. In 
many ways the issues of the history of Europe hung on the person- 
al character and the achievements of the Tsar, and at this moment 
he appeared to be the arbiter of Europe. If central Europe found 
itself at the end of the revolutionary period in 1852 in the state 
of 1815 it was to him she owed it. On all the western frontiers
»
of his Empire he had witnessed the disappearance or the weakening 
of his hereditary allies and the possible formation of states in 
their place which would have been his declared enemies. Yet in 
1852 absolutism was completely triumphant.
The policy of intervention which he adopted v/as due as 
much to idealist nations as to the interests of Russia. As in 
fighting Napoleon Russia had appeared to draw the sword for the 
liberation of the nations, so in these years the motive of fight- 
ing for law and order in Europe served also to secure the Tsar's
interests and security. V/e have examined the results of his 
armed intervention in the Danube Principalities and in Hungary.
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But this was not all. In-Prussia he used his personal ascendancy 
over Frederick 7/illiam the Fourth to compel him to get rid of the 
constitution he had granted, offering for his service troops 
which would unite with the still faithful Prussian corps, and 
finally extinguish revolution in Berlin. In Denmark he protested 
against the Prussian recognition of the rights of the Duke of 
Schleswig-Holstein,and later declared that the march of Prussian 
forces into the duchies was an act of hostility tc Russia. He 
preferred to negotiate with G-reat Britain and republican France 
a definite ruling on the Danish question, (the Treaty of London) 
which secured all its possessions to Denmark and denied the claims 
of German national feeling. His influence on the constitution of 
the BufA was equally powerful. Prussia had been his faithful ally 
and his practical vassal since 1814, while Austria had opposed 
and was likely to continue to oppose Prussian policy in the East. 
Yet the Tsar was resolved not to let Austrian power diminish to 
the profit of Prussia lest an aggrandised Prussia should be less 
manageable than the Prussia of 1814. It was the hope of German 
liberals to reconstitute the G-erman Empire on the basis of the 
exclusion of Austria. But from 1848-1852, Nicholas multiplied 
the opportunities for arresting Prussia, compelling her in the 
humiliating episode of Olmutz to abdicate all pretensions to G-erman
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hegemony. At the same time his influence was sufficient to pre- 
vent Austria from pushing her advantage to the extent either of 
forcing; her admission into the Zollverein, or the inclusion of 
her non-G-erman territories in the BurA,
Russian opposition was thus given to both attempts to 
constitute a great German Empire under either Austrian or Prussian 
headship. German unity was an impossibility while the Tsar lived. 
Bismarck cannot be accused of hostility to Russia,but he reports 
the Prince of Prussia as unable to get rid of the feeling of humil- 
iation suffered by Prussia at the hands of the iiaperor Nicholas, 
and this in spite of his great love for his Russian relations. 
(Reminiscences, Vol.1, p.103). Bismarck's own opinion was that 
during the reign of the Tsar Nicholas "we lived like Russian 
vassals". (Vol.1, p.300).
This apparent dictatorship of Nicholas in reality only 
remained till it should be tested. It proved to be at the mercy 
of the first experiment made upon it, just as the real military 
capacity of Russia was to be revealed by the simple siege of a 
fortress at one of the extremities of the .Empire. Yet till that 
time should come the Tsar's preponderance was undoubted- The 
peoples whose aspirations Russia had thwarted kept for her a dull 
hatred Tand even the states she had helped,such as Austria ; did not
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pardon her for revealing their weakness. As for the western powers 
Great Britain and France, they had little to fear from the direct 
attacks of Russian power. But with studied contempt Nicholas had 
refused to accord to the ruler of France,at first the recognition 
of his IUmp ire, then of his dynasty, and finally the courtesy which 
prevailed between crowned heads. France, whatever its government, 
was an object of what almost amounted to an obsession on the part 
of the Tsar. 7e have seen how the British people had for some 
time been increasingly impressed by the fear of Russian preponder- 
ance in Europe, suspecting her designs in India, ressnting her 
aggressive policy in the near and the far East, feeling her sense 
of humanity outraged by the harsh and brutal treatment of Poles 
and Hungarians, and distrusting her autocratic form of government. 
All these underlying causes were exercising a cumulative effect 
and uniting all parties. The Conservatives, fearing a gigantic 
imperial power with boundless ambitions, were at one with the 
Radicals who regarded it as the enemy of public freedom. The in- 
fluence of Russia was active in every court and a peculiar fear 
of her in every government. Nor was the fear, exaggerated as it 
may have been, without reasonable strategic and geographical ground.
*
Austria was exposed without a natural frontier on a vulnerable side 
and from the borders of Galicia her capital might easily be
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threatened. It only needed a permanent advance of Russia southward 
into the Danube provinces of Turkey to result in an almost com- 
plete encirclement. Prussia was faced on the East by the armies 
of Poland, and the fortresses of the Vistula, while her northern 
seaboard was at the, mercy of the Russian fleet stationed in the 
Gulf of Finland which was an equally powerful check to all the 
Scandinavian nations. The naval forcV'<?n the Black 3ea ;based on 
the elaborate fortifications of Sebastopol only just completed in 
1850,was absolute and complete. Gobden's argument was that Russia 
was strong defensively, and had no offensive force,but a great 
power occupying such a position ,and actively exercising such a 
sway fcould not be called weak for purposes of offence so long as 
the Tsar realised his strength and was allowed to use it. TJith 
his own capital geographically remote, it was possible for him to 
exert all his strength on his frentiers ; and threaten the leading 
capitals of continental Europe and the Near East.
This was the aspect of Russian power in 1852 ; and the re- 
maining portion of the record of these years can be summed up by 
saying that when the first attempt was made by Nicholas to secure 
some tangible profit from his position of ascendancy, a coalition 
against him based on all these disquiets and hates became a cer- 
tainty. -7e must realise the existence of such feelings or we shall
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fail to understand why the 7estern Powers were later to press for 
the destruction of Sebastopol even when the original cause of the 
dispute was settled and why such opposition was universally 
shown to Russian possession, real or disguised, of Constantinople,
so different from the general acquiescence in the possibility a 
hundred years earlier. Now, it was realised, it would not only 
add to the Russian dominion some of the richest provinces in 
Europe, and the absolute command of the Danube and the Black Sea, 
but cause her emergency as a .great naval power in the Mediter- 
ranean, and secure for these possessions an impregnability such 
as physical conditions had never before given to any Empire. In 
addition it was felt that the influence on Europe of such an 
Empire would be politically dangerous and oppressive, and its 
influence on morals and enlightenment equally perilous. Russia 
was considered a backward country very little in advance of Tur- 
key in the scale of civilisation. On all these aspects 3ir John 
MacNeill's "Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East" 
(1854)gives the contemporary opinion.
The truth with regard to British relations with Russia can 
only be realised in terms of the general situation of Europe at 
the time. It is easy, as Kinglake does, to enlarge on the trivi- 
ality of the circumstances connected with the Holy Places as the
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cause of a great European war, and to regard the result as due 
to unconscious blundering and ignorant miscalculation on the part 
of some of our statesmen, or the malevolence or intrigue of others 
But such an attitude does not give its proper weight to the poli- 
tical conditions of the Europe of the mid-nineteenth century, and 
is as discreditable to the Tsar Nicholas as to British statesmen 
and diplomatists. In fact, it lays disproportionate stress on 
the accidents of the political machinery in international relation- 
ships, and neglects the action and opinion of society at large 
which wal?'peculiarly strong in this question.
It is equally unjust to the Tsar Nicholas ;who in his own 
way was not devoid of greatness -or earnestness of purpose ; and 
we may close this section by considering what was the state of 
Europe and the East from his point of view. The events of 1848 
and the succeeding years had exposed the weakness of some of the 
most firmly established monarchies in Europe. Austria, Germany, 
France and Italy had been rescued with difficulty form the terrors 
of anarchy and dismemberment. He might well ask himself what 
would be the effect of the workings of the same spirit among the 
Christian population of a government which ha! been for a century 
on the verge of collapse. Vie need not wonder that the Tsar, con- 
fident even before of the certain dissolution of the Turkish
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Empire, now believed the moment had actually arrived. The edicts 
of reform (Tanzimat of 1839) now being put into operation through 
the insistence of the British ambassador, were themselves excit- 
ing alarm and practical opposition among the Sultan's sa-bjccts, 
Mahommedan subjects. The war of creeds was blazing more fiercely 
than evji^a-il each sect was appealing to its external protector: 
the Catholics to France, the Protestants to England, the Orthodox 
to the Tsar. In 1852 the Sultan was menaced, by Austria, by France, 
and by Russia while for ten years the Porte had seemed to have no 
opinion but that of the British ambassador. Even Austria had 
been successful in an intervention on behalf of Montenegro and by 
the sending of an extraordinary embassy to Constantinople on Jan. 
30th 1853. together with a mobilisation of an army on the Danube, 
had compelled the Sultan to recognise the secularisation and the 
independence of the Prince Bishopric, and the grant of privileges 
for the benefit of Christians in Bosnia and Herzegovaia. But it 
was the traditional privilege of the Tsardom to be the champiomn 
of the Slavs under Turkish rule and Nicholas had intended, irres- 
pective of the unexpected action of Austria, to make the Turks 
conclude peace. The prompt and vigorous action of Austria and the 
sudden acceptance by the Sultan of Count Leiningen's ultimatum 
seemed to reveal the imminent certainty of the death of the "Sick
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Man". This certainty was by now become one of the Sultan's fixed 
ideas, as his action was at once to prove.
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X. THE QUESTION of the HOLY PLACES.
The immediate cause of the crisis now approaching with 
regard to the Holy Places of Palestine was the effort of two 
powers - France and Phissia - to revive or expand eighteenth 
century treaties with the Porte, in the one case the Capitulations 
of 1740, in the other the Treaty of Kuchttk-Kainardji 'of 1774.
The Capitulations had been conceded by the Porte to Louis 
XIV in appreciation of the efforts of French diplomacy in secur- 
ing the Treaty of Belgrade (1739) which confined Austria to a 
frontier she failed to cross until her occupation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was permitted by the Treaty of Berlin. They recog- 
nised France as the protector of the Latin Church in Palestine 
confirming the right to the occupation and custody of the sacred 
shrines which the Boman Catholic, or Latin, and Orthodox, or 
Greek churches equally considered sacred. (The long list of these 
"possessions and prerogatives of the Latin Church in Palestine" 
is given in the Annual Register 1853 , p.230). The interest of 
France in the Levant goes back ranch further even than the Capitu- 
lations , which made additions to ,and gave confirmation of,definite 
rights which France had enjoyed since Suleiman had granted them
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to Francis I in 1535. These exclusive privileges of the "eldest 
daughter of the Church" were thus derived from a period rchen the 
Russian Empire was a thing unknown. The Revolutionary period, 
dominated by "pure reason" in the spiritual sphere, and including 
Napoleon's adventure in Egypt, caused the almost complete loss of 
French power and prestige, in the East ; though in the continual 
support given to the Pashas of Egypt in the first half of the 19th 
century we can see the first attempts to recapture it.
Meanwhile the Capitulations had been undermined by firmans 
granted to the Greek Church when France was either hostile to 
Turkey,or indifferent to ecclesiastical concerns. The duty of 
making a pilgrimage to the Holy Places is one of the precepts of 
the Greek Ohurch, and insensibly the privileges of the Latin cus- 
todians were devolving upon it. After a fire in 1808 which prac- 
tically destroyed the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the Latin 
monks were dispossessed of all administrative rights. A justi- 
fication was found in the 8th Article of the Treaty of Kainardji 
between Russia and Turkey which provides for the full liberty and 
safeguard of Russian pilgrims in the Ottoman Empire and, more 
questionably, in Article 7 which gives the right to the Russian 
government to make representations on behalf of the "new church 
in Constantinople" and its officiating ministers, while "the
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Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Christian reli- 
gion and its churches". (Annual Register 1854, p.464). This 
was a very slender basis for the Russian claims, and the fact was 
that France had the right given by treaties, Russia the ri^iit due 
to recent custom, and actual occupation.
It would be true to say that this was one of those questions 
which are never settled, due to the introduction into old condi- 
tions of a new and unexpected force - in this case the rise of the 
Russian Empire. The trivial disputes of Latin and Greek Christians 
were accustomed to culminate in riots at Easter, and be forgotten 
and neglected at other times. The claims of the rival parties 
sometimes came before the Forte as they did in January 1842 with 
regard to the repair of the church of the Holy Sepulchre, and on 
this occasion Canning advised the Turks to do the repairs them- 
selves. (Lane-Poole, Vol.11, p.233). The question reappeared from 
time to time, and by now appeared to be one of the necessary evils 
of the East,
But in 1850 General Aupick. the ambassador of the French 
Republic at Constantinople, raised the question of the rights 
usurped by the Greeks and demanded an execution of the Capitula- 
tions. In 1851, his successor, de Lavalette, continued the dis- 
cussion more warmly, and after long delay and infinite disputes
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on points connected with the shrines, on February 9th 1852 the 
Sultan conceded the French demand, this time to be faced v/ith the 
menace of the Russians Two typical pieces of Turkish double deal- 
ing followed,for the firman issued in Larch to give effect to the 
concession to the French reaffirmed the right of the Greeks to 
"a" key of the shrines and provided that "no change was to be made 
in the present state of the gate of the Church at Bethlehem". The 
firman thus satisfied the Russians who insisted on its public 
promulgation in Jerusalem, Nevertheless on December 22nd the 
French carried their policy, got their keys, and put up their com- 
memorative Star. The Russian government retaliated by massing an 
army corps on the border of the Principalities, the usual prelude 
to a Russo-Turkish war, to be followed, if precedent were a guide, 
by the occupation of the Principalities and next by a march on 
Constantinople, just as de Lavalette had made use earlier of the 
corresponding argument of the Western Powers - a threat to send 
for the French fleet to the Dardanelles.
9
It is the thesis of Kinglake's "Invasion of the Crimean" 
that Louis Napoleon was the instigator and cause of the war which 
followed. He "took up the forgotten cause of the Latin Church of 
Jerusalem and began to apply it as a wedge for sundering the peace 
of the world, when there was repose in the Empire of the Sultan
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and even the rival Churches at Jerusalem were suffering each other 
to rest". (Vol.1, p.44). Nearly every term of this indictment is 
false in spirit if not in fact. There was no repose in the Bnpire 
of the Sultan, for never had that Snpire been more disturbed by 
internal factions and struggles of sects, to say nothing of its 
international position; the rival churches at Jerusalem had never 
yet known rest, the "peace of the world" was the unnatural condi- 
tion of things secured for the moment by the Tsar's repressive 
efforts, and the cause of the Latin Church was far from being for- 
gotten and had been revived by General Aupick the ambassador of 
the Republic,
There was the tradition of three hundred years diplomatic 
activity behind the step. Prance had been committed to the de- 
fence of the Turkish Empire (as in 1739) long before the question 
had become vital for Great Britain. Nothing had contributed more 
to the downfall of Louis Philippe than the way in which French 
prestige had received the set back of- 1840 in a region where its 
existence was regarded as traditional. The Napoleonic name and 
heritage called upon the new ruler to act as the arbiter between 
nations and the champion of oppressed nationalities, by means of 
diplomacy if not by war.
But the strongest prop he had was the Conservative and
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Clerical party and he had to live up to the hope s /based upon his 
rise that the Empire would consolidate all that had been won by 
the Church since 1849. For the Catholic party was expecting France 
to be actively engaged in assisting in the restoration of the Papacy 
and the power of the Church throughout the world. The period was 
one of remarkable Church activity,and missionary zeal,especially 
in the East, together with the French support given to the Pope at 
Rome, pointed to a Christian and Catholic crusade of the 19th 
century which might rival the revolutionary and free-thinking
crusade of the 18th. Then on ray 21st 1850, G-eneral Aupick first 
claimed the old rights of the Capitulations, Catholic writers spoke 
of it not as a local squabble, but as involving the faith and creed 
of France, reminding her of the most glorious traditions in her 
history. Her prosperity, her policy.her rank among nations depend- 
ed up'JJi it. (Bourgeois, Yo.II, p.28). Easy as it is to ridicule 
the things in dispute as foolish,and the negotiations as trivial 
beyond all belief, yet the key and the silver star were merely 
outer signs of a contest that v/ent back to the separation of Greek 
and Latin ^Christianity in the 10th century, and no&Hook the form 
of a diplomatic dispute between two great powers. Nor were the 
claims -of the Roman Cstholic Church specially put forth by any one 
French ruler, for never were they more vigorously or more openly
- 98 -
pursued than by Louis Philippe. The <Alliance w the Church drew 
his successor to the Holy Land, and the curse of an anti-clerical 
policy is a weakening in national po?/er abroad. But it is only 
fair to Napoleon to suppose that the diplomatic victory which gave 
the Latin Church the three keys would have been satisfactory. His 
conduct to Russia was in fact moderate and conciliatory and the 
direct opposite of Kinglake's statement, (Vol.1, p.47) that it was 
pressed with greater vigour after the coup d'etat, is true,for 
the ambassador Lavalette was recalled because of his overbearing 
tone and unconciliatory manner of dealing with the matter.
But the vigour of the Catholic claims had awakened a cor- 
responding vigour in the Orthodox world. It seemed as if it was 
proposed to reconsider the progress made since the Treaty of 1774 ; 
which had thrown open to Greek pilgrims and monks the East which 
had once been exclusively under Latin influence. If the Tsar was 
not in a humour to yield to his international aversion France, 
neither were the Orthodox Christians prepared to see the Orthodox 
Emperor bow to a. Catholic policy. Tnen the French Catholics were 
making the most of their new opportunity for pilgrimage involved 
in the Sultan's original concession, they were met by an outburst 
of v/rath from Orthodox communities in Jerusalem, Constantinople, 
and Russia. Nicholas, whatever his private sentiments, would have
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been between two fires - the wrath of his own people if he failed 
to act, and conflict with Europe if he did. But Nicholas was as 
fanatically Russian in policy, as he was Orthodox in religious 
views. He had therefore to look for means of securing a restor- 
ation of that influence mith the Sultan which he had practically 
resigned ftiwthe Treaty of 1841 till 1848. As Canning had seen 
from the beginning f the question of the Holy Places was destined 
to develop into the large-rand more dangerous question of the rela- 
tions between Russia and the Turkish Empire.
It was at this point that Lord Derby's ministry came to an 
end. In view of later opinions as to what might or might not have 
happened if it had continued, we may quote here the Foreign 
Minister's opinion on the state of the affair;which, on quitting 
office, he sent to our ambassador at Paris (December 19th).
"Show Drouyn de Lhuys that the Holy Places Question, 
if roughly handled, is one that may bring on trouble and 
war. It is one of those points on which the moral poy/er 
of the Emperor of Russia rests, and I can as much believe 
that he would give up the despotic prinpiple and have a 
Russian House of Commons as surrender his prestige over the 
population of the Greek faith by an appearance 01 cession 
on this claim. It is giving Russia an opportunity of 
bullying and degrading the Porte. The Emperor (Napoleon) 
has done quite enough to satisfy the parti pretre without 
taking UP the cause of a minori'ty like the Latins in the 
East. rf ^ (Malmesbury, Yol I, p.376).
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XI. THE MISSION OF FRINGE MENSHIKOV.
The form of diplomacy which the Tsar nflnprM to secure the 
capitulation of the Sultan he adopted from the precedent set by 
Austria asS the Montenegrin question - the sending of an extraor- 
dinary embassage. and a simultaneous mobilisation on the Turkish 
frontier. The chosen ambassador was Prince Menshikov ;and in his 
mission and its conduct we can see one more illustration of the 
Tsar's characteristic dislike for the ordinary channels of dip- 
lomatic activity. The Russian Diplomatic Study to which we have 
referred earlier is a work of astonishing frankness. It tells 
us that Menshikov was selected rather than a diplomatist of ex- 
perience, on the grounds of his high rank and strong character ;
«
and because he was free frou the trammels of public service. He 
was answerable to no one but the Tsar himself for his success or 
failure^and he was entrusted with proposals which it was not the 
Tsar's intention to treat as matters for general diplomatic dis- 
cussion. Through Menshikov the Tsar intended to treat with the 
Sultan in a personal and direct manner without the interposition 
or even knowledge of his fellow sovereigns, their ministers or 
ambassadors. Thus Brunnow's communications, about the mission 
given to Lord Aberdeen were acknowledged to be salutary, moderate,
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as definitely concerned only with the Question of the Holy Places, 
and this was also the assurance given by the Russian ambassador 
Kisselef to Lord Gowley at Paris (Maxwell, Vol. II, p. 9). Yet 
meanwhile Menshikov was able to carry out not only this ostensible 
mission ; but to make secretly a further demand on the Sultan pre- 
cisely such as the signatories to the Treaty of 1841 had promised 
not to make.
The mystification which surrounded the mission was thus 
deliberately intended and among the deluded was the Russian am- 
bassador in London and perhaps even the Russian Chancellor Nesse- 
Irode. As the Diplomatic Study records: -
"This Nwas very grave.... ..The Information we gave him
(Brunnow) was incomplete and such was the mood of the 
rest of the English ministers that our ambassador did not 
dare to make tne same communication to Lord Clarendon,"
(Vol.1, p. 163).
There were thus two sets of Menshikovs instructions - one 
for political and one for diplomatic show. During the whole of 
March and April the English Foreign Minister continued to receive 
the most explicit assurances that the settlement of the question 
of the Holy Places was all the Tsar wanted, and that Russia would 
ask for nothing more. The communications were professedly complete 
and were believed by Aberdeen to be complete, accompanied as they 
were by an attitude of personal frankness to the British ambassador
- 102 -
.at St. Petersburg. The simplicity of the Tsar's diplomacy is 
particularly revealed in the fact fully avowed in the Diplomatic 
Study that the minister in London, even then with incomplete in- 
formation, had two different stories for two members of the same 
government - one for Aberdeen the friendly and one for the Foreign 
Minister, Clarendon.
For the Menshikov mission was to be accompanied by an equal- 
ly unconventional .and forcible attempt to secure the adherence of 
the British government to the plans contemplated by the Tsar, and 
immediately before the departure of the Prince, the Emperor held 
his famous conversations with Sir Hamilton Seymour the British 
ambassador to Russia. So far the British government had not been 
involved in the question. Canning had been told by Lord Palmer- 
ston to hold himself neutral in its early stages (Eastern Papers, 
Part I, No.12), and when he was not in Constantinople ; the British 
attache had been directed to adhere to the same attitude by Lord 
lalmesbury and "abstain from any direct or official interference 
in a question with which in itself, Her Majesty's Government have 
nothing to do". (3. P. Part I, No.52; Dec. 14th 1852).
Why then did the Tsar inaugurate his new policy by a con? 
fidential communication withteuBritish ambassador? Undoubtedly 
because Lord Aberdeen, a friend of peace and of Nicholas, had not
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had not long formed a Coalition government in which Palmerston 
was prevented from taking the foreign office by the antipathy of 
the Court. Aberdeen was a man of high character and strong prin- 
ciple, in many ways the exact opposite of Palmerston. At home he 
was a reformer, but in foreign policy he adhered to the settlement 
of the Treaties of 1815 and made the same mistake as the Tsar in 
clinging to sentiments of the past when political conditions had 
completely changed. To him the Tsar had unburdened himself on his 
visit in 1844,and to him,as Foreign Secretary/the colourless and 
correct memorandum on the Eastern Question had been sent. The 
Tsar was confident of Aberdeen's support, and in his second con-
«
versation with the British Ambassador made the extraordinary but 
characteristic statement that he was convinced that an understand- 
ing (in this the most difficult of international questions) on the 
basis of his specific proposal for Turkey's partition^could be 
come to if he could have but ten minutes conversation with Lord 
Aberdeen. This is not to suggest that there is any reason to doubt 
the Tsar's good faith in these overtures or his unbounded belief 
in his own good cause. TLthin his own lights and judgment he 
desired the good of Russia and his Church and he was sincerely 
interested in a. good understanding with England seemingly possible 
now that Palmerston's rooted distrust would not stand in the way.
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The aroDOsals he made showed a genuine desire to find a solution 
for a hitherto insoluble problem, but in spite of their
foresight and anticipation of the turn things would take in Egypt, 
they were based on a blind adherence to conditions now long £ast 
as far as Anglo -Russian relations were concerned. They were not 
published till a year later when they served only to increase 
British infuriation with the Tsar while wounding the Tsar's
k*JL
sensitiveness as he realised that he ^ carried a friendly overture 
too far. The Diplomatic Study suggests that if the Emperor played 
the part of principal speaker, the English ambassador played the 
part of attentive listener.
The conversations, with the answers of the 'British govern- 
ment j are recorded in the Annual Register 1853 p. 245-262 . and form 
part 5 of "Eastern Papers". ir/e can here only very briefly sum- 
marise their main ideas. They prove that the Tsar vras at last 
confident that the end of the Turkish Empire had actually arrived 
and convinced of the urgency of providing a future course of 
action. It was of the greatest importance that England and Russia 
should come to a perfectly good understanding and that neither 
should take a decisive step without the other's cognisance. He 
had abandoned the dreams and plans of the Empress Catherine but 
he had obligations to the Christian subjects of the Porte, which
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treaties as well as religions and national sentiment compelled 
him to fulfil. The Turkish Empire would fall to rise no more / 
and he was certain that it would be better to provide for the 
catastrophe than to incur the chaos, confusion and uncertainty 
of a European war ; which would be otherwise inevitable. He spoke 
of the matter as r'friend and gentleman" and he was indifferent 
what other powers should do or think. But England could never have 
Constantinople,and even if Russia occupied the city, she would 
not establish herself there, though circumstances might arise if 
nothing was prepared, which would make him carry out the occupa- 
tion. He would not permit a reconstruction of the Byzantine Em- 
pire ; or such an extension of Greece as would make her a powerful 
state, nor the breaking up of Turkey into little republics - 
asylums for the revolutionists of Europe. Rather than submit to 
any of their arrangements he would go to war, and continue it to 
the last man or musket. The Turkish Empire was a thing to be 
tolerated.not to be reconstructed. He would not permit the least 
attempt at reconstruction. As for the Principalities, they could 
continue as they were - an independent state under Russian pro- 
tection ,and Serbia and Bulgaria could become the same. To counter- 
balance these advantages to Russia, Great Britain might take pos- 
session of Egypt and Crete.
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The answers of the British government laid stress on its 
belief that Turkey still possessed the elements of existence, 
that England could be no party to any understanding however general 
that was to be kept secret from other Powers, and that the only 
means for effecting such a definite solution would be that of a 
European Congress- Thus a continuation of the policy of 1840 
was indicated. But the same mistake was made as in 1844. Instead 
of denouncing in the most unmistakable language any attempts, 
present or future,to interfere in the internal condition of Tur- 
key, the British government agreed with a .great deal of the Tsar's 
contentions and only disagreed with the question of the proximity, 
near or further removed, of an event which was accepted as certain 
some time or other f by both countries. In fact Lord John Russell's 
answer to the Tsar's first conversation spoke of the Russian pro- 
tection of Christians in Turkey as "Prescribed by duty and sanc- 
tioned by treaty" which was all the Emperor required as a recog- 
nition of his claim to special interference within the Turkish 
Empire^and which was the subject of the very disputes which were 
later to lead to war. Nicholas was dominated by the idea of the 
certainty of the end of that Empire, and though of course he could 
only understand the British reception of his communications as 
equal to a refusal of active support t he evidently was led by the
- 106 -
politeness of their reception to count at least on British 
neutrality. In fact, the very pacific nature of their reception 
by us caused Russian Diplomacy to over-reach itself, and the whole 
blame of the Russian "foreign Office was later to fall on Lord 
Aberdeen of all people, for not having seen the situation as it 
really existed, and for having continued to hold out hopes of a 
peaceful solution until there was no possibility of avoiding war 
except by a Russian retreat. (Diplomatic Study, Vol.1, p.292, 
300).
Ileanwhile the Tsar had pSssed on with his plans, and Llenshi- 
kov arrived at Constantinople on Larch 15th 1853, after a rather 
suggestive review of the Black Sea Jleet and the Russian forces 
in Bessarabia. His conduct at Constantinople revealed every in- 
tention of brow-beating the Sultan's ministers and ignoring all 
diplomatic interference from the ministers of other powers. In 
fact the French minister sent for the French fleet to Jalabvis ; 
and a similar summons to the British fleet was only countermanded 
by the home government, who instead sent a force far more potent 
even than the fleet to dominate the Sultan, to inspire the Turkish 
ministers with courage, and to resist Russian aggression - the great 
British ambassador, Stratford Canning, nonrLord Stratford de Red- 
cliffe. But before his arrival on April 5th ;lv;enshikov had secretly
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communicated to the Porte the real object of the new variety of 
diplomacy - which was not the settlement of the Holy Places dispute^ 
but a secret treaty recognising Russia as the military protector 
of the Turkish Empire, and an addition to the treaty of Kainardji 
as a reparation for the pa st and a guarantse for the future. In 
four days after Stratford's arrival he had heard of the new pro- 
posals and had adopted a plan to meet it. This consisted in per- 
suading Menshikov to separate the Question of the Holy Places 
from that of the Russian protectorate and solemnly giving Russia 
all satisfaction on the former point. Accordingly ; before the end 
of Apriljthe dispute as to the Holy Places was settled in the 
Russian sense, but,in spite of that fact,Menshikov was as menacing 
as ever.
In considering the new proposals, we must remember that 
while the actual crushing of all Turkish resistance by Russian
Y
ajpns was a distinct possibility, the peculiar conditions under 
which the Sultan ruled Christian subjects with community of 
language, religion and race with the Russian Empire, gave every 
facility for their painless absorption. According to a census of 
1844, the total population of Turkey in Europe was 15 millions, 
of which only 2 millions were of Ottoman race, 4 millions of the 
Moslem religion, 1 million Roman Catholic, and 10 million members
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of the Greek Church. (See statistical note in Annual Register 
1853, p. 263). For the Tsar to obtain a legal right of constant 
criticism, interference ,and ultimately of control over the inter- 
nal government of Turkey, could onlv in the end result in permanent 
submission to "Russia. The policy of Russia was therefore to deal 
with the Christian population so as to detach it altogether from 
allegiance to the Sultan, so that , without any great necessity for 
violent interference jtfeey would renounce the Turkish yoke,and,as
a matter of course be joined to the Christians under Russian rule. 
This was why no pains were being spared to establish Russian in- 
fluence, and to extend a protectorate which had continually in- 
creased in practise since the opening of the century. The natural 
agents of the Orthodox Emperor would of course be the Orthodox 
priests, and in a civilisation where an exact delimfetion of re- 
ligious and secular spheres was impossible, so long as he held the 
priesthood, he hell the Slav races. However we must notice that 
Russia's rights did not in reality depend on an old treaty of 1774 
whatever the interpretation of its provisions. It was in the in- 
sufficiency of the treaties as an instrument for his purposes which 
impelled the Tsar to further demands. The real causes for dif- 
ficulty and embarrassment* lay far deeper both in past history and 
in the existing foot conditions - in the nearness of her armies
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and the nature of her population. But at this time the Tsar pro- 
fessed to rest his demand on the existing treaty stipulations,and 
Asecure an act which would set the Russian interpretation beyond 
doubt, give a guarantee for its execution,and secure Russian in- 
fluence at the Porte.
Looking at the terms of the treaty of Kainardji (as we have 
done previously in section 10) we find that its privileges rela- 
tive to religious matters are all concerned with a particular builr 
ding provided for in articles 7 and 14, but article 7 is intro- 
duced "by the words "The Sublime Porte promises to protect con- 
stantly the Christian religion and its churches". These words 
must originally have only been a general engagement to exercise 
toleration toward the Christian faith. It gave no grounds for 
Russia to interfere with' the ordinary relations between the Porte 
and its Christian subjects ; or to act as arbitrator or protector. 
Except for the public church of the Greek rite in the street called 
Bey Oglu in the Galata quarter of Constantinople, Russia legally 
had no powers to interfere in those f religious matterw which in 
the end turn out to be political.
T7e can see the extent to which the stipulations of the old 
treaty had grown if we examine the proposals brought forward by 
Menshikov in the Secret Treaty. In the course of the negotiations
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,before his mission came to an end ; we can discover what was behind 
the Russian proposals,and how the Turkish ministers and Lord 
Stratford de Redcliffe regarded them. This negotiation is import- 
ant because there was at least one man, the ambassador, v/ho under- 
stood "the Question" and all its implications. The Clarendons and 
the Buols might be interested in diplomatic activities, in the 
construction of compromises and evasions, in the building of 
bridges over which one or the other side might find a road for a 
dignified retreat. But with Stratford the thing at issue was 
"the Question" - Russian aggression or Turkish reconstruction? 
The first article of the Secret Treaty (E.P. Part I, No. 
153) declared :-
"The Greek religion should always be protected in all the churches and thai Russia should nave the right as in times past to give orders to the churches, both in Con- 
stantinople ana in other places and towns, as well as to the ecclesiastics."
The second article gave Russia the right of watching elec- 
tions to the four great Patriarchates of the East and provided for 
their temporal as well as spiritual privileges.as objects of the 
Tsar's intervention and care.
The resfj&ace manifested by the Turkish ministers under the 
eye of Stratford led to a modification of its terms and this tine 
not a treaty but a Sened or Convention was demanded. At the same
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time ,Menshikov commanded the ministers to abstain from the ob- 
jectionable practise of consulting and act in- on the advice of the 
British ambassador (Lane-Poole, Vol.II, p.258). On May 5th this 
Sened for guaranteeinc; the status quo of the Eastern Church was 
very strongly insisted on. (5.P. Part I, No.179).
"No change shall be made as regards the righta, pri- 
vileges and immunities which have been enjoyed by or are 
possessed ab antique by the orthodox churches, pious 
institutions, and clergy in the domains of the Sublime 
Ottoman Porte which is pleased to secure the same to them 
in perpetuity on the strict basis of the status quo. ff
A second article stipulated that whatever advantages had 
been or should be conceded to other Christian rites should be 
conceded to the Greek Church. The suspicions of Stratford are 
set out in a. Memorandum to the Porte, (Lane-Poole, Vol.11, p.264) 
and are based on the vagueness of the terns, perhaps deliberate; 
the authority granted over the ecclesiastics with a corresponding 
vast increase of influence over the Greek population, and the 
doubt as to whether political or only spiritual influence would
 
be involved. It happened that by this time the question of the 
Holy Places had been settled and Menshikov had no grievance to 
complain of. On May 14th the Sened was refused and the Porte 
itself offered a form of words ; emanating from Stratford (E.P.Part I 
No.193) at the same time declaring it contrary to international 
right that one government should conclude a treaty with another
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involving its independence on very fundamental matters;-
"The orthodox religion of the East and its clergy 
as well as those of other Christian denominations shall 
continue as regards spiritual matters to enjoy under the 
sovereign protection of the Sultan the privileges and 
immunities which have been granted to t!':em at different 
times by the Imperial favour."
There was a consistent effort on Stratford's part,discern-
 
able here and throughout the negotiations ,to limit the privileges
ft
to "spiritual" and thus leave outside £& scope altogether all
dangerous ecclesiastical jurisdictions and political influences 
of the clergy, and also to omit words "ab antique" which implied 
the traditional nature of the Russian claims.
The result was the breaking of diplomatic relations ; and yet 
at the last hour Menshikov considered one last form of concession 
to be accepted at once without variation - neither a Treaiynor a 
Sened, but a simple Note. In default of its acceptance friendly 
relations with Russia would be at once ended. In the tlote (E.P. 
Part I. No.210) the objectionable parts of preceding proposals 
were repeated. The word "spiritual"(and the limitations it in- 
cluded) was1 omitted,and once more the words "ab antique" were 
inserted. The Turkish answer to the ultimatum was once more based 
on the words "exclusively spiritual privileges" and "granted under 
the Sultan's predecessors" (3.P. Part I, No.239).
On May 21st Menshikov f s mission came to an eni and he left
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the Turkish capital,while on Hay 31st Nessebrode demanded the 
instant acceptance of the last Sote, in default of which the 
Russian troops would cross the frontier - not to make war, but 
to secure material guarantees for the satisfaction of the Tsar's 
demands.
Meanwhile these proceedings had been watched with great 
misgivings bv the government at home who were still being assured 
that nothing beyond the Holy Places dispute was being claimed by 
Menshikov. This was the first of three pieces of fatal duplicity 
practised by the Tsar. The demands made by Menshikov when re- 
ported seemed to the British government wholly inadmissible, and, 
taken with the conversations of the Tsar with our ambassador, the 
subject of grave misgiving. Clarendon expressed entire approval 
of the action of the Sultan's ministers in a letter to Stratford 
May 31st 1853, which is an admirable summary of the position;-
"No sovereign having a proper regard for his own 
dignity and independence could admit proposals so undefined 
as those of Prince Menshikov and by treaty confer upon 
another and more powerful sovereign a right of protection 
over a large portion of his own subjects. However well 
disguised it may be, yet the fact is that under the vague 
language of the proposed Sened a perpetual right to inter- 
fere in the internal affairs of Turkey would be conferred 
upon Russia, for governed as the Greek subjects of the Porte 
are by their ecclesiastical authorities and looking, as 
these latter would in all things dp ; for protection to 
Russia, it follows that fourteen million Greeks would 
henceforth regard the Emperor as their supreme protector 
and their allegiance to the Sultan would oe little more
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than nominal while his OTQ independence would dwindle into 
vassalage."
»
To sum up, the Tsar had evidently resolved to retract from 
the position he had accepted in the Protocal of 1840 that the 
Eastern Question was a matter of European concern,not to be set- 
tled by the action, or in the selfish interests of any one power,
Unable to win the British government to joint action in 
the matter he had resolved to act alone and secure for Russia 
a protectorate of the Greek church - the one thing neither the 
Turks, or Stratford, or the British government, singly or in 
concert, would admit as justifiable.
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XII. THE EFFORTS to SECURE a SETTLEMENT.
When Prince Menshikovr arrived at Constantinople he was 
anxious to deny in advance all intention of hostile aggression 
even if his mission proved a failure. But two months later the 
breaking of diplomatic relations,coincident with his departure 
from- Constantinople,resulted in the Tsar's order to his troops to 
advance into the Principalities. This was the second example of 
that divergence between profession and action which was lending 
an air of double-dealing to the activities of Russia at this time. 
On the very same day May 31st, the British Cabinet, feeling it 
could not avoid taking precautions of some kind, came to the de- 
cision to move the fleet to Besika Bay, and put it at the disposal 
of Stratford. This was done with the specific instruction;-
"that the declaration of war against Turkey, the em-' 
barkation of troops at Sebastop9l, or any well established 
fact denoting intentions of unnistakeable hostility would 
in the opinion of the government, -justify him in sending 
for the fleet". (S.P.'Part I, p.194).
Clarendon had previously written to Stratford on May 16th 
that "it was indispensable to take measures for the protection 
of the Sultan and to aid him in, repelling any attack upon his 
territory" (Maxwell, Yol.II, p.13).
There is no doubt that this movement of the fleet was a
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critical step. Though it had the limited object of simply being 
near in case of sudden attack on Constantinople it was at the 
same time a "demonstration" that the Western powers were prepared 
to support the Sultan against a policy of violence on the part 
of Russia. VJith such a man as Nicholas, however, it was difficult
l8^t"to know which would exieM the greateTfc influence; the fear of 
danger or the fear of being supposed to have given way because of 
it. The confusion created by any policy of threat and counter- 
threat is well revealed in this incident, for Nicholas claimed 
that he was driven to execute the order for the occupation of 
the principalities by the movement of the combined fleets although 
in fact both orders were given on the same day, and it was im- 
possible for him to have known of the decision. On the other hand 
it was a standard criticism of the governments policy on the part 
of some of its critics, that a distinct threat for our fleet to 
pass the Dardanelles if theftutk were crossed, would have caused 
the Tsar to pause in his actions. Yet the passing of the Dardan- 
elles until war was declared upon Turkey would have been a viola- 
tion of the Convention of the Straits, i.e. of a portion of the 
very treaty of 1841 on which British government took its stand,and 
was in fact a subject of bitter Russian attack in December ; when 
the British answer could only be that the crossing of the Pruth
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had been equivalent to setting up a state of war ; thougji it had 
not been so recognised.
For Russia announced that the occupation was not intended 
as an act of war, but only as a "material guarantee" for the con- 
cession of the Tsar's just demands. But while offering this ex- 
planation it is possible that he was not greatly concerned as to 
its reception as he was confident that if he were to be really 
threatene i Austria and Prussia -.vould send an army to the Rhine 
and keep France in suspense. His confidence was misplaced, and 
he was now to fail to form a Northern League against the Western 
powers. Austria was particularly anxious about the Principalities 
and more ready to mobilise on the Danube, while,as for alliances, 
fear was impelling her to seek the French rather than the Russian 
alliance. However it was agreed not to treat the occupation as 
an act of war,and there was still hope of peace, while Aberdeen
with Liberal optimism accepted the theory that the Tsar had no
»
intention to make any declaration of war. Palmerstons policy was 
that the fleet should proceed to the Bosphorus and if necessary 
to the Black Sea (Memorandum to Aberdeen of July 4th 1853 in 
Ashley, Vol.11, p.274). But it is going too far to say as Herbert 
Paul does (Vol.1, p.311) that war at any price was his object, for
- 118 -
there is every evidence that he and Clarendon worked for peace as 
hard as Aberdeen, and the question at issue was how best to secure 
it. Aberdeen was all for moral influence, while neither Palmer- 
ston or Clarendon believed in it as either a check on Russia, or 
a support to Turkey,unless made by a power ready,and known to be 
ready ; to support it materially. From any such indication Aberdeen 
was averse and in a letter of June-7th to Clarendon he made first 
use of an expression afterwards famous:-
"As we are drifting fast towards war, I should think 
the Cabinet ought to see where they are going-. I do not 
object to the proposed draft provided that it is understood 
that no actual engagement to make war is adopted and that 
we are still free to take the last step or not as we may 
think proper."
Both Gladstone and the Duke of Argyll in their retrospect 
of the Cabinet discussions (Morley, Vol.1, p.36; Autobiography, 
Vol.1, p.458) deny the common theory that the Cabinet was divided 
into two set parties in favour of antagonistic policies - one for 
war and the other for peace- The object of all its members without 
exception was to discover the best means of maintaining peace. In 
the end it was f-ie resolution of the Cabinet to suspend all hostile 
actions till Hussia actually took the offensive in the Black Sea, 
thus providing for the defence of the Turks, while it left freadom 
to try to settle the question by negotiation.
So four months from the date of the occupation were to pass
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in unremitting exertions on the part of the four Powers to bring1 
about a settlement by negotiation, though the time was also oc- 
cupied in measures of preparation. Never was a declaration of 
war so delayed, or such opportunities for what amounted to arbit- 
ration given, but, as we shall see , the very delay only gave time 
for the war fever to get a firm grip not of one but of all the 
nations engaged ; proving that a time of reflection before the out- 
break of actual hostilities may, under some circumstances,itself 
serve only the more to endanger peace. In this case there was a 
laudable ambition on the part of the statesmen of all the powers 
to discover a formula which would yield the required solution,, 
only equalled by their disappointment when their efforts were not 
seconded. It is possible to discover no less than eleven such 
attempts, but here it will only be possible to trace the evolu- 
tion of one - the most famous of all, the Vienna Note.
It had its origin in the immediate attempt of the French 
Emperor to be first in peace if not in war, and he took up the
, /vX<9 0lA~4-A0
negotiation on June 27th. (E.P., Part I, No.295). As there ? 
included a definite mention of "spiritual privileges", and the 
agent for their maintenance was to be the Sultan, it was supported 
by the British government.
It was just at this moment that the Russian troops actually
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crossed the Pruth and the British and French ambassadors agreed 
to urge the Porte not to treat this as a necessary outbreak of 
war (See dispatch of July 3rd in E.P. Part I, no.321). Stratford 
in fact resolved on.a negotiation of his own with the representa- 
tives of the four powers at Constantinople and tried to work out 
a blending of Menshikov's note with Reshid's answer to keep the 
chance of negotiation open as long as possible ; but without sur- 
rendering the sovereign right of the Sultan (E.P. Part I,>p>321).
While these representatives of the Powers were wrestling 
with the scruples and the increasing enthusiasm for war of the 
Sultan's ministers, the Austrian government accepted the original 
French proposal of a month earlier as a likely basis and proposed 
a Conference in Vienna. Clarendon accepted by telegraph,and a note 
was issued e.t once, adopted by the four powers, and forwarded to 
both the Porte and the Tsar for their consideration and acceptance. 
It is worth noticing that this note was drawn up in entire neglect 
of Stratford's parallel negotiation with the Porte at Constantin- 
ople, and absolutely without any consideration of the opinion of 
the Turkish ministers, and ; much worse perhaps,without the great 
ambassador's approval. In fact the issue of his negotiation^-a 
Turkish ultimatum coupled with a declaration of the rights of the
Christians in Turkey to the Sultan's protection -had been simultane- 
ously
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sent to Vienna for transmission to St. Petersburg. It was simply 
suppressed - so much for the independence of the Porte I
The Vienna note declared (E.P. Part I, 331) among other 
things that:-
"The government of the Sultan will remain faithful to the letter and spirit of the Treaties of Kuchuk-Kainardji and Adrianople relative to the protection of the Christian religion and that his majesty considers himself bound in honour to cause to be observed for ever, and to preserve from all prejudice either now or hereafter the enjoyment of the spiritual privileges which have been granted by His Majesty's august ancestors to the Orthodox Eastern Church, and which are maintained and confirmed by him; moreover in a spirit of exalted equity to cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages granted to the other Christian rites by convention or special arrangement."
The note thus safeguarded the interests of Turkey by a limi- 
tation of the promise to spiritual privileges, and jSmitting the 
words "ab antiquo"; both of which concessions had been refused by 
Menshikov. There was a studied ambiguity as to what agent should 
secure these privileges, and there was a preliminary promise to 
remain faithful to the spirit and letter of the Treaty of Kainardj^ 
the very interpretation of which was the cause of dispute.
On August llth it was known that the Tsar had accepted the 
note,and with complete self-satisfaction the statesmen, conscious 
that the most difficult portion of the negotiation was over, waited 
for the inevitable acquiescence of the Porte. Gradually it became 
known as the month wore on that their efforts were being frustrated
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by some fatal influence, and as the current legend was that Strat- 
ford 'could do what he liked with the Porte, that influence could 
only be that of the masterful British ambassador. Neither the 
Queen, the Prince Gonsort, Clarendon or Aberdeen had any confidence 
in Stratford's desire for peace ; or readiness to obey their injunc- 
tions, suspecting him, as their correspondence shows, of implacable 
antipathy towards Russia and of a determination to settle the 
question once for all. The Queen thought that "Stratford's private 
letters exhibit clearly on his part a desire for war and to drag 
us into it" (Letters, Vol.11, p.460, also p.457, 469) Aberdeen 
prepared her for Stratford's resignation "which she would not at 
all regret" (Maxwell, Vol.11, p.17) Cowley reported to Clarendon 
the account of the French ambassador at the Porte that "publicly 
and officially Stratford had obeyed instructions and called on 
the Ottoman government to accept the Vienna Note, but lets it be 
seen that his private opinion is at variance with his official 
language and he does not bring that personal influence to bear 
which would have been so useful at the present time" (Llaxwell, 
Vol.11, p.18). The truth of course was that the statesmen respon- 
sible for the grand effort of Vienna exaggerated the acquiescent 
attitude of the Turkish ministers, were ignorant of the rising
feeling in Constantinople,and failed to realise Stratford's diffi- 
culties
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in wrestling with the numerous well-meant but confusing efforts 
of the Powers. It was perhaps too much to expect that his ruth- 
less intelligence,with its keen sense of the realities of the 
Question", would be fired with enthusiasm for the shifty or bung- 
ling evasion that had emanated from Vienna. At the same time, 
whatever his feelings may have been, and however they were express- 
ed, they could in the end have had little effect on the great 
question of peace or war- The demands of Russia were such as no 
Turkish minister could have accepted without abasing the Sultan's 
rule, and infuriating his people; and such as no ambassador, French 
or linglish, could have advised him to accept. A representative of 
less experience and personality than Stratford could have hastened 
the crisis, he could not for ever have stayed it, at least while 
Nicholas lived and continued his demands.
It was not till August 31st that the British ministers heard 
of the final vote of the General Council of the Sultan which re- 
fused to accept the note without certain modifications. It ob- 
jected, first, to the most-favoured-religion clause, (if we may 
borrow a term from the economic sphere), the equal rights of tol- 
eration granted to the Greek as had been granted to other rites. 
This was on account of the preponderant number of Greeks in Turkey, 
and the special arrangements concluded with Austria on behalf of
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the insignificant body of Roman Catholics. Secondly, it insisted 
on the addition to the phrase describing the protection of the 
Christian religion of the words "by the Sublime Porte". This ad- 
dition revealed in epitome the issue between Russia and Turkey,and 
implicitly repudiated the Russian claim to a general protectorate 
over the Greek Christians ;to be exercised by the Tsar. The Powers, 
though regretting the delay ; had to agree that the Turkish modifi- 
cations expressed their original intentions and recommended their 
adoption by the Tsar.
The Tsar's reply, both in matter and manner,shattered their 
complacency, as he claimed that;as he had accepted the note without 
modification,so must the Sultan. This was the very point on which 
British radical opinion was to split, and on his agreement with 
the Tsar's position here John Bright based his reasoned objection 
to the war that' followed. (Letter to Abraham Catkin, p.6). The 
question however was not exactly one of arbitration between two 
powers. The Sultan was the one whose interests and independence 
had been imperilled by the aggressive demands of Ivlenshikov's 
mission and its sequal in the flccupation. In reality, the po\vers 
were arbitrating not between Russia and lnrkey ; but between Russia 
and themselves, trying to extricate themselves from the necessity 
of expelling the Russian troops by force from the Principalities.
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The Tsar had nothing at stake except his obstinacy and his "honour" 
though neither of these was inconsiderable, together with the 
hopes excited among his subjects of a fresh Imperial and religious 
advance. Nicholas was all the more enraged as he regarded the al- 
terations as solely due to the hated ambassador, whom he called 
the "Padishah of the Sultan". Stratford.in fact, unappreciated 
by his rather jealous masters in the British government, occupied 
the very position of influence with the Sultan which it was the 
very height of the ambition of the Tsar to obtain. Beside such a. 
personal influence ^treaties and alliances could count as nothing. 
Great Britain possessed in fact what to Russia was still a sub- 
ject for envy, and it did not affect the position in the Tsar's 
eyes that we could not or would not take advantage of that position.
But what were the powers to do? Tvere they to put pressure 
on the Porte to accept a form of words acknowledged to be ambigu- 
ous? If so,what pressure was possible except the giving o*er of 
the Turkish Empire to the will of the Tsar? The situation from 
the point of view of the British government is well described in 
a letter of Clarendon to Sir G- C. Lewis of September 12th:-
"We can't press the Turks too hard about the Note - 1st, because public opinion at home would be against it, 
and 2nd, because otherwise Russia would be established 
at Constantinople in a twelvemonth. On tho othor hand, On the other hand, if they yielded and took the unmodified
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Note, there would be a revolution which would cost the 
Sultan his life and his throne. His brother who is al- 
ready intriguing against him would succeed to the throne 
and bring into office the most fanatical^i.rnorant war 
party Lliat has been known in Turkey for many years."
(Maxwell, 7ol.il,,p.20).
Nor would some of the members of the British Cabinet have 
tolerated such a step as the simple desertion of Turkey, and Lord
£U-aAe£&
John^ tmore warlike than Palmerston, declared he would resign 
office rather than consider it (Maxwell, Vol.II, p.23).
So Stratford was not recalled and was to receive a tardy 
but unacknowledged justification from an unexpected source ;which 
showed that he had rightly understood the interpretation which the 
Russians could and would put upon the note ; for Nesselrode had 
written in confidence to Meyendorf the Russian minister SS Berlin, 
that the interpretations the Porte was seeking to exclude were 
exactly those which Russia would insist on attaching to the note. 
The note then had to be given up^for it was impossible to ask the 
Porte to accept one interpretation when it was fully warned that 
another would be applied by the other party. The circumstances 
connected with the interpretation of the note gave opportunity, 
rather unjustly, for further accusations of Russian duplicity. 
At this time the war party at Constantinople succeeded in getting 
the upper hand and contrary to the advice of Stratford and the 
Turkish ministers, a great assembly of Muftis and Ulemas demanded
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the evacuation of the principalities, and the Porte declared war. 
The war spirit in Constantinople had now got out of bounds 
and to protect the Christian inhabitants of the Suitan and the 
Sultan himself from their fanatic spirit, the British and French 
fleets were ordered up the Dardanelles. It was a cruel dilemma 
for the Western powers - either to follow blindly in the wake of 
a Turkish Grand Council and cause a European Question to be guided 
by such a body, or to see the Russians, as was hourly expected, 
appear at Constantinople. The actual advice given to Stratford 
was to use the fleets in any way and any place he chose for the 
defence of Turkish territory against direct aggression. "If the 
Russian fleet were to come out of Sebastopol the fleets would as 
a matter of course pass through the Bosphorus" (into the Black 
Sea) (E.P. Part I,)pol33). This was the halfway house adopted 
by the British Cabinet between going all the way with the Turkish 
Grand Council and declaring war, thus turning ourselves into prin- 
ciples in the quarrelje# leaving the Turk to his fate. But as 
Clarendon wrote:-
"Peace has been my only object.I won't say at all 
cost, because the abandonment 01 the Turk would be dis- 
honourable, and a departure from our British and Euro- 
pean policy in the East would be utterly indefensible."(Maxwell, Vol.II, p.28).
Yet still there was hope of peace. Diplomatists who had
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spent the summer and autumn preparing Notes as a basis for avert- 
ing war, were now busy devising schemes upon which peace might be 
restored, before actual hostilities commenced. The Tsar declared 
that despite the Turkish declaration of war he would not take the 
offensive. The Conference at Vienna was still proceeding, and 
Aberdeen was still of opinion that peace was possible, though the
, o*»i <*ftau*r» a** &-&%
Prince Consort in a capable memorandum of September 25thAprotested 
against his policy of drift, and the fruitless attempt to settle 
the dispute by Notes and particular words and expressions designed 
to avoid the real ob'jects in dispute (Letters, Vol.11, p.452)l+5'1«) 
The Tsar himself took a hand in the effort to secure peace ; and at 
this time was conducting a personal correspondence with the <4ueen 
which once more reveals the view of foreign policy which he held 
as based on the sovereigns personal will tand the methods of diplo- 
macy he favoured. "In public affairs and foreign relations there 
is no more sacred pledge than the word of the sovereign with whom 
in the last word lie the issues of peace or war ...... For him to
recoil from danger or to break his word by wishing anything other 
than he had ever wished would be beneath him." The Queen quite 
properly answered that personal qualities are not sufficient in
international engagements, adding that the most attentive examina- 
tion 
of the 7th Article of the Treaty of Kainardji could not make it
t
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susceptible of the extension the Tsar wished to give it (Letters, 
Vol.11, 458, 459). The Tsar's appeal to the ^ueen to use all her 
influence for peace thus failed of any success.
The hope of securing the assent and co-operation of the 
German Powers in what was regarded as a European question was one 
reason for the determination to exhaust every hope of peace. After 
another month of frenzied negotiations }the V»Testern Powers and 
Austria came to an agreement on the terms which Russia should be 
asked to adopt. On November 29th Clarendon sent to Vienna on be- 
half of England and France the draft of a collective note and a 
Protocol of Conference to be signed by the four Powers placing on 
record the common policy of Europe. It was signed on December 4th 
and is of great importance as laying down the principle on which 
the war was ultimately to be fought. It states (E.P. 282) that : -
"The existence of Turkey in the limits assigned to her 
by treaty j is one of the necessary conditions of the balance 
of P9wer in Europe and the undersigned record with satis- 
faction that the existing war cannot in any case lead to 
unifications in the boundaries of the two Empires which 
might be calculated to alter the state of possession in the 
East which has been established for a length of time and 
which is equally necessary for the tranquility of all the 
other powers."
This was in fact a reaffirmation of the principles of 1841. 
For the moment,the moderation of the Russian government afforded 
the best of all the opportunities yet given for averting war.
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XIII. THE DECLARATION of 17AR.
But meanwhile there occurred the event which extinguished 
the last hopes of peace. The Turkish forces,heedless of the 
efforts still being made ;had attacked the Russian forces on the 
Danube with considerable success, and their ships moved about in 
open defiance of the great Russian fleet in the Black Sea, which 
on November 30th retaliated by entirely destroying the Turkish 
Squadron at Sinope. Although war had been declared for two months, 
immense indignation was created both in Great Britain and in
Prance - here,because it was considered as only another example
-ta 
orjviolent duplicity of the Tsar,since his word had been plighted
that the Turkish declaration of war would not be followed by any 
offensive measures on his part. In addition ;negotiations were 
in progress, and the Russian^ excuse ; that the squadron had been 
met at sea and was transporting troops, was untrue,for it was 
anchored in the harbour at Sinope and was there smashed to pieces 
in a "massacre". In France,there was equal indignationjbased
however, not so much on humanitarian sympathies W£ on the outrage
i 
inflicted on national honour and dignity, since the incident had
occurred in spite of the vicinity of the French squadrons, .and in 
spite of the assurance that there was no wish to commence an
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aggressive war (See Napoleon's personal appeal and remonstrance 
to the Tsar of January 1854 in Martin, Vol.Ill, p.6). It was 
realised in both countries that affective means must be taken 
against the recurrence of a similar disaster ; and to defend the 
territory of the Sultan against attack. (E.P. Part II, No.330). 
On January 4th the momentous step was taken of sending the com- 
bined fleets into the Black Sea to secure not only the territory 
of the Sultan but the complete and exclusive possession of that 
Sea by the '.Yestern Powers. The Russian ships were accordingly 
"invited" to retire to oebastopol.
But even yet the Western Powers were not at war with Russia
 
and this step was disguised as a mere protective measure ; not di- 
rected against the Tsar, though in the letter of Napoleom quoted 
above this position was neglected f for the French iSnroeror represent- 
ed the prohibition of all navigation in the Black Sea as a 
"material guarantee" to counterbalance that possessed by Russia 
in the occupation of the Principalities. But even with this 
opportunity for the definite policy of the '.Vestera powers in the 
form of naval coercion to have its weight, the hopes of diplo- 
matic success were few, though frenzied efforts were still being 
made by means of a. second protocol (January 13th) to influence
the Tsar by means of the united opinion of Europe, and considera- 
tion
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all powerful at this time. However the new proposals (E.P. Part 
II, No.403) were rejected by the Tsar for they arrived on the day 
after he heard of the new decision of the British Cabinet. This 
time, with a deliberate denial of the right of Europe to intervene 
in the negotiations between himself and the Porte, he ins is ted "M" 
negotiations should be carried on directly between Russia and the 
Porte either at headquarters or at St. Petersburg^ This was a 
definite rejection of the traditional policy of Europe ;and of 
Great Britain in particular, and with it ended all hope of pace. 
The Tsar in fact could not forgive the entrance of the naval 
fleets into the Black Sea, touching as it did the naval "honour" 
of Russia based on its never defeated course since the time of 
Peter the Great. On January 22nd he empowered his ambassador in 
London to ask for explanations and if these were not satisfactory 
to demand his passports, which he accordingly did on February 4th. 
On February 7th the ocoaoion the situation was further embittered 
by the publication of the Tsar's conversations of a year before 
in answer to the provocation of a Russian paper, which accused the 
British government of having changed its policy in the interval.
 
In this country the revelation of the Tsar's attitude to the 
Turkish Empire was of course accompanied by the usual outbursts 
of public indignation at his duplicity. In Russia the publication
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of the interviews was denounced as an unheard of outrage on inter- 
national and diplomatic d^j^^. It is amazing that Aberdeen 
could still "be able to write to Clarendon on the 12th that "war 
is not inevitable",(Maxwell, Vol.11, p.40) and in the House of 
Lords he still adopted a temporising attitude to the question of 
peace and war. On February Mth'^lanricarde pressed for infor- 
mation as to the mystifying relations of Great Britain and Russia, 
and the virtual state of war which existed since the rupture of 
diplomatic relations revealed on the departure of the Russian 
ambassador. "If we are at peace what is the peace? And what is 
the peace which is the object of the war?" In reply, Clarendon 
made an answer that has since become famous though it is nearly 
always misquoted:-
"The question has been asked ?/!.ether we are at peace 
or war. It is one that is very difficult to answer. ',7e 
are not at war, because war is not declared: we are not 
strictly at peace with Russia, the diplomatic relations 
are suspended. I consider that we are in the intermediate 
state: that a desire for peace is just as sincere as ever r 
but then I must say that our hopes of maintaining it are 
gradually dwindling away and that we are drifting towards
war."
War in fact was inevitable because neither the Tsar nor the 
united opinion of Europe would give way on the matter of the oc- 
cupation of the principalities,and peace was only possible if 
some influence could arise to make either Russia or Great Britain
retreat from the positions each had taken up.
The last step was now to be taken. On February 22nd 
Austria intimated that if the two Western powers would present 
an ultimatum demanding the evacuation of the Principalities and 
giving a time limit, she would support them. On February 27th 
accordingly,the two Foreign Ministers demanded the complete 
evacuation by April 30th. The Tsar refused to give any answer 
to the ultimatum and on March 27th the definite declaration of 
war was made. The Queen announced to Parliament that the nego- 
tiations with the Tsar had terminated and that she felt bound 
to "afford active assistance to her ally the Sultan". Next day 
the Declaration of "Tar was issued with a history of the steps 
that had led up to it. (Annual Register 1854, p.531).
- 135 -
XI7. THE INFLUENCE of POPULAR OPINION.
It is possible for a discussion of the origins of the war, 
based on the conduct of the intricate and long-protracted diplo- 
matic discussions which preceded it, to give the impression that 
they were its sole determining cause. Nothing could be further 
from the truth, for one of the most remarkable accompaniments of 
the period of negotiation was a popular opinion in all the coun- 
tries concerned which had an all-powerful influence on the actual 
result.
In Great Britain for months public opinion was dubious, and 
this is reflected in the attitude of the "Times" which Greville 
on July 12th 1853 accuses of inconsistency, its leaders and articles 
by turns leaning to one side or the other. But this was changed 
after the affair of Sinope. Before that event British opinion 
was perhaps accurately represented by "Punch" as a sleeping lion 
vainly prodded by the quills of insistent journalists. After 
Sinope,it is reflected in a cartoon representing the British lion 
straining at the leash while Aberdeen remarks plaintively "I'm 
afraid I must let him go". In fact before the violence of public 
opinion, the influences tending towards peace were overwhelmed.
- 136 -
An English deputation from the Society of Friends paid a visit to
St. Petersburg on February 10th to plead the cause of peace. But
they represented no one in England but themselves, and although
the Tsar received them in the most friendly manner it is incredible
f*
that either he or his Chancellor afeould have believed them to have
any influence on public opinion. The Diplomatic Study never sug- 
gests thatHfossians cherished the delusion often attributed to 
them afterwards that the British force in foreign affairs would 
be lessened by the influence of the Manchester School. The Rad- 
icals, of whom Bright and Gobden had hitherto been the leaders, 
were in fact full of enthusiasm for the war as a struggle for 
freedom, and for the right of the lesser states against the pre- 
ponderant Empire of the North. In their private correspondence 
there is evidence that Bright and Cobden, though they made a 
worthy fight for their principles, were aware of -the hopelessness 
of their task. Ten years later in connection with the Civil TIar 
Cobden declared in Parliament that at the time of the Crimean 7ar 
he made up his mind that should a war break out again he would 
never open his lips from the time the first gun was fired till 
peace was made. (Speeches, p.570). Writing to Bright in January 
1855, he pointed out that there was far more sympathy for their 
views in Parliament than in-the country.
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"I defy you from one extremity of the country to the 
other to find a mixed body of men in which you and I 
should be so well treated as we were on the last day of 
the session." (Morley, p.631).
It was in fact the total lack of support in the country 
that isolated them in the House. Gladstone and the Peelites 
though they had general leanings to non-interventions had failed 
to work out a policy that would have averted war, and in fact 
were in the Cabinet that was responsible for its declaration. 
Their ardour only cooled with their almost immediate resignation 
from the reconstructed Cabinet under Palmerston.
So the Court, the veterans of government and diplomacy, 
all the power of the Press and of business was in favour of the 
'Jar, and in addition the middle and industrial classes would 
have nothing to say against it. We have in the memoirs of G-reville 
a valuable testimony to the state of opinion at the time. On 31st 
January 1854, he records how at the opening of Parliament while 
the Queen and Prince Consort were well received in the streets, 
the crowd reserved all their enthusiasm for the Turkish ambassador^. 
On February 25th he writes:-
nThe rage for this war gets every day more vehement 
and nobody seems to fear anything but that we may not spend 
money and men enough in waging it. The few sober people 
who have courage enough to hint at its being- impolitic and 
uncalled for are almost hooted down and their warnings and 
scruples are treated with indignation and contempt."
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The military spirit of the country was roused as it had not 
been since the Great Peace had been made in 1815, as Cobden with 
his usual insight was aware. (Merely p.578). The feeling against 
Russia^however unbalanced,had its origin in a healthy dislike of 
despotism, but in addition we can discern an instructive desire 
almost to fight for its own sake in preference to the "love of 
peace that was full of wrongs and shams? Tennyson was at this 
time writing his poem "Maud", full of indignation at the "ourlwar" 
which was one aspect of the triumph of the Industrial Revolution. 
In a line afterwards cancelled he rejoiced "that the long, long 
canker of peace is over and gone"; that "God's just wrath shall 
be wreaked on a giant liar" (the Tsar)' "that the heart of the 
people beat with one desire And noble thought be freer under the 
sun". He protests against the possibility that "An infant civil- 
isation be ruled with rod or with knout" and is resolved "That an 
iron tyranny now should bend or cease". These and other lines 
form an admirable illustration of the state of general opinion. 
The prolonged negotiations instead of giving time for passions to 
cool gave time for all that resentment with which the people of 
England had watched the Tsar's actions in 1848 and 1849 to burst 
forth with an uncontrollable vehemence.
The war fever took many questionable forms among which was
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the Press attack on the Prince Consort which accompanied the last 
stage of the negotiations. It was imputed to the Prince that he 
was Austrian, and therefore took the Russian side in the Eastern 
Question, using his influence with the government and particularly 
with Aberdeen against Palmerston and the Turks. Here was a double 
misconception for as far as continental policy was concerned the 
Prince was German and not Austrian, and Austria was not in this 
matter Russian'.' Hatred for Austria was however universal, as she 
was still living in the odium of the Hungarian victory, while the 
Prince was paying dearly for the Court's momentary success in dis- 
missing Palmerston. He was hated by the Radicals for Palmerston 1 s 
sake ,and by the old Protectionists for his friendship with the 
Peelites and the organisation of the Exhibition of 1851, while he 
was universally suspected of carrying on a correspondence with 
foreign courts. In December he wrote to Stockman:-
"The defeat of the Turks at Sinope has made people furious: one almost fancies oneself in a lunatic asylum". 
"My being committed to the Tower was believed all over the country, nay even that the Queen had been arrested. People surrounded the Tower in thousands to see us brought to it." Martin, Vol.11, p.533, 562.
At the opening of Parliament, the governments declarations 
silenced but did not satisfy criticism as we can see from a curious 
incident recorded in Kartins Life. When Roebuck's committee wished
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to examine the Prince, the Duke of Newcastle was horrified to 
hear of the existence in the Committee of a belief in a deter- 
mination on the*part of the Prince that the Crimean expedition 
should fail. (Vol.Ill, p.219, 221). Yet the Prince could justly 
claim that he had given no cause for any imputation of a lack of 
sincerity and patriotism. Sir Theodore Martin tells us that the 
Prince's papers on the Eastern Question alone from 1853-1857 fill 
fifty folio volumes (Introduction to Vol.III) so that abundant 
testimony remains both of his influence and opinion on the war. 
From what is printed it is evident that the Prince shared the 
popular opinion of his day, and this is particularly worth notice 
in any discussion of British relations with Piussia, when we remem- 
ber his intense dislike of Palmerston, his personality, methods 
and policy. It is simply wide of the mark to represent the 
. Crimean "Tar as Palmerston's war, or Stratford's war. The Court 
itself had desired peace in the opening stages of the diplomatic 
struggle and its suspicion of Lord Stratford's desire to drag us 
into war has been quoted earlier. But once engaged in the war 
the Court became as deaf as t<^ c<ra^J--ry to all moderating influ- 
ences. For instance ; the Queen insisted that Lord Aberdeen should
explain away his answer to Lord Lyndhurst's attack on the govern- 
ment
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on June 19th. Lord Lyndhurst ; in course of the debate ; deolared 
that the Russian Empire had doubled itself in the previous fifty 
years<<-that no peace should be made before the destruction of the 
fleet and the fortifications of the Black Sea, and ended with 
words only quoted here as typical of many such speeches from Lord 
Derby and others:-
"I believe that if this barbarous nation, this enemy 
of all progress except that which tends to strengthen and 
consolidate its own power, this state which punishes edu- 
cation as a crime, should once succeed in establishing1 it- 
self in the heart ot Europe, it is the greatest calamity 
that would befall the human race."
Aberdeen answered in his precise and exact manner, and drew 
attention to the fact that,at the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829^when 
her armies were within fifty miles of Constantinople, Russia ac- 
quired not an inch of Turkish territory in Europe^nor had she done 
so in the subsequent twsity-five years. It is a valuable com- 
mentary on the feelings of the hour that this speech ran so counter 
to public opinion that the Queen wrote to remonstrate. It had 
caused her "very great uneasiness" and she was amazed to hear the 
"first minister of the Crown enter into an impartial examination 
of the Emperor of Russia's character and conduct, vindicating him 
from the exaggerated charges brought against him and his policy 
when there was enough in it to make us fight with all our might 
against it? (Letters, Vol.Ill, p.44; Martin, Vol.Ill, p.76).
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The war fever in England showed no signs of abatement when 
on August 2nd the Danube provinces were evacuated and the Hussian 
armies recrossed the Pruth, thus removing the "material guarantees" 
for the Tsar's claims7"»*£ the ostensible object of the war. The 
war went on as if nothing had happened because it seemed beyond 
discussion that Russia would make another attempt at a moment more 
favourable for herself. Prom the outset of the war it had been 
seen that to prevent such an event there would have to be a great 
effort to strike at the basis of Russia's aggressive power and 
this was considered to be the great fortified naval harbour, not 
long completed, at Sebastopol. It was in fact a month before the 
declaration of war that Graham,the first Lord of the Admiralty ; 
wrote to Clarendon (March lst)>-
''The operation which will be ever memorable 
and decisive is the capture and destruction of Sebastopol. 
On this my heart is set; the eyetooth of the Bear must be 
drawn: &till his fleet and naval arsenal in the Black Sea 
are destroyed, there is no safety for Constantinople - no 
security for the peace of Europe . Maxwell, 7ol.II, p.41.
Between the date of the evacuation of the principalities 
and the date when the fleet was ordered to the Crimea, Ufee public 
opinion was universally expressed in favour of this extension of 
the objects of the war. An article in "Times" of June 15th had 
a great influence on public opinion. (Cook, p.79).
"The broad policy of the war consists in striking at 
the very heart of the Russian power in the East and that
- 143 -
heart is at Sebastopol. To destroy Sebastopol is nothing 
less than to demolish the entire fabric of Russian ambition 
in those very regions where it is most dangerous to Europe. 
This feat and this only would have really promoted the 
solid and desirable objects of the war."
A memorandum of Lord Palmerston of the same day contains 
other arguments for this step. England and France/entered into 
war at great expense and for a great purpose ,"would lose caste 
 in the world if they concluded the war with only a small result. 
The mere evacuation of the Principalities would be a triumph rather 
than a defeat for Russia". Vie should have no security for the 
future and when next England and France were disunited, she could 
again attack Turkey. "It seems absolutely necessary that some 
heavy blow should be struck at the naval power and territorial 
dimensions of Russia,or the reputation of England and France will 
materially suffer." Russia should therefore te expelled from 
Georgia and Gircassia aaSTtne Crimea, the Turks to effect the former 
and the allied forces the latter. Nor was the usual appeal to 
economy lacking,for the capture of Sebastopol and the Black Sea 
fleet would "enable us materially and at once to reduce our naval 
expenditure and dictate the conditions of peace with regard to the 
naval position of Russia in the Black Sea." (Ashley, Vol.11, p.295) 
In view of theirlater attitudes it is worth noting that to a greater 
or less degree Aberdeen and Gladstone shared the same hopes. When
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the false news of the fall of Sebastopol arrived, Aberdeen wished 
it to be destroyed at once, (Maxwell, Yol.II, p.47) while Gladstone 
wrote to congratulate and to thank Palmerston for the manner in 
which he urged:-
"When we were amidst many temptations to far more em- 
barrassing and less effective proceedings, the duty of con- 
centrating our strokes upon the heart and centre of the war 
at Sebastopol." (Ashley, Vol.II, p.300).
One voice, in fact, alone was raised against this step. In 
the same month Bright wrote the effective and noble letter which 
must always be a memorial of his fame even to those who disagree 
with the policy he proposed on this question. "Bat against the 
opinion of his own day he could do nothing.
In fact the ground had now shifted to what Lord Stratford
 
had called in the letter that terrified Queen Victoria "a very 
comprehensive war on the part of England and France" and there was 
a determination that the Tsar must not only abandon his demands, 
but renounce all stipulations in former treaties on which his ar- 
rogant pretensions had been formed. In addition the most extrava- 
gant projects were put forward later to secure the permanent ex- 
tinction of all fears of the preponderance of Russia,in Europe,as 
well as in the East, lith every sign of popular support, Clarendon 
engaged in a treaty with Sweden directed against Russia with the 
ultimate object of another expedition to the Baltic to subject
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Cronstadt to the fate of Sebastopol (Argyll, Vol,I, fcUft, I, 
56*). The frontier territories of Georgia, Finland and the Cau- 
casus were to be separated and made buffer states, while Poland 
was to be reestablished. Well might Granville write to Argyll 
before the fall of Sebastopol:-
"The nation has been lashed by Parliamentary speeches , 
by public meetings,and by the Press,into the most extra- 
vagant expectations of what we were to attempt or what we 
were to achieve, so that the general feeling about peace 
was bound to be one of disappointment and mortification."
(Fitzmaurice, Vol.1, p.106).
We shall see later that after the fall of Sebastopol the 
enthusiasm for the war showed no signs of abatement and that it 
was only with difficulty that the Queen, the government and the 
people could contemplate the making of peace before an attempt 
to secure 'the "dismemberment" of Russia could be made.
The enthusiasm of the Russian people was equally great. 
From the inception of the dispute the Tsar had acted as the guar- 
dian and protector of the Orthodox Faith, its pilgrims, its holy 
places and its privileges in the Empire of the Sultan. In each 
step he had taken,he had been supported by the general enthusiasm 
of the Russian nation^which looked to an addition to his Empire. 
Retreat from the position which Menshikov had taken up, or fSTthe 
occupation of the principalities would have been extremely diffi- 
cult £er the Toar, but after the entry of the fleets in the Black
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with the avowed object of shutting up the Russian fleet in Se- 
bastopol, retirement on the part of the Tsar became impossible. 
A military and autocratic Empire which had been accustomed to 
strike, where she could, and when she could, against all who 
ventured to resist her, could not suffer the loss of prestige 
and pride then involved in giving way. It was denounced in Nessel- 
rode's letter to Brunnow (Annual Register 1854, p.501) as "an act 
of flagrant hostility" and "as a violence offered to our belliger- 
ent rights". It was in fact as decisive for war on one side as
u^fvvf cocLd
Sinope on the other and led to t&e equivalent to the Russian de- 
claration of war.
The information from aerambassador at St. Petersburg as to 
the state of feeling there at the beginning of 1854 made it obvious 
that even if the Tsar had been disposed to make concessions, the 
angry passions now aroused among his subjects were making it im- 
possible for him to recede. It was reported that Nesselrode 
exerted himself in the cause of moderation ;but that it was impos- 
sible to name any other Russian whose voice was raised in the same 
sense.
"It is to this very circumstance that is to be as- 
cribed the remarkable unpopularity which now attaches to 
Count Nesselrode and the intrigues which are on foot against 
him .......... I hold it to be certain that if peace still
exists, it is in great measure attributable to the Chan- 
cellor, and that the Emperor is infinitely more moderate 
than the immense bulk of his subjects .......... I long
since stated to your Lordship that a spirit would be evoked
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by the Russian policy which it would be found very diffi- 
cult to lav, but now that the spirit has come forth, so far from tne Emperor being amongst those most eager to 
obey its mandates, it is already very apparent that his popularity is shaken by the resistance which he offers to 
public opinion while the Chancellor is openly spoken of 
as an alien, a traitor.and a man bought by English gold."(liar tin, Vol. Ill, p.
On January 39th It is therefore not surprising that the 
Tsar rejected the personal overture made by Napoleon. His hatred 
of France had previously caused his rejecti n of the natural and 
geographical alliance of France and "Russia. The old Emperor hated 
the new and ended his answer by a declaration;- "Menaces will 
not induce me to recede. Russia will prove herself in 1854 what 
she was in 1812" (Martin, Vol. Ill, p.6). There was something 
singularly unfortunate about everything the Tsar did at this time, 
and if he had wished to turn the tide of feeling in France against 
himself, he could have found nothing more effective than this re- 
ference to the events of 1812. 7hile in England the nation pushed 
on the government, in France Napoleon only with difficulty led 
the people into war. As was soon apparent this answer of the 
Russian Emperor changed apathy into eager interest.
Both in the manifesto of February 23rd and in the declara- 
tion of war of April llth (Annual Register 1854, p. 533), the Tsar 
called on his subjects, as a divine mission, to fight for their 
co-religionists under Turkish rule . The Russians were taking up
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arms for their persecuted brethren professing- the Christian faith. 
England and France had ranged themselves by the side of Christian- 
ity against Russia fighting for the orthodox faith. So the war 
was embittered by the hatred of creeds ? for the Turks equally re- 
garded the struggle as a holy war. Pan-Slavism had at last 
awakened Pan-Islamism. Ffu»»±he time of the Vienna Conference there 
broke out a fierce expression of Moslem frenny and fanaticism, 
and even Stratford was to find them "out of hand" (Lane-Poole, 
Vol.11, p.306). The aggression of the Tsar awakened the long la- 
tent spirit of the Turkish warrior, and the high tone of the Porte 
found an echo in the Moslem assemblies, v/hich rose in open mutiny 
and protest against concessions to the infidels. The idea of the 
British government that the Turks were always negligible and ac- 
quiescent, and that their military strength was insignificant, was 
at any rate not shared by the Turks themselves. They were eager 
for war ,and certain of success. Soldiers from Egypt and the dis- 
tant provinces of the Empire came in answer to the manifesto of 
the Khalif of the "oslem world and their success against the 
Russian forces was later a bitter blow to Nicholas.
So in Turkey as in Russia religious enthusiasm once awakened 
made it impossible to maintain peace. In nine months of negotia- 
tion a peaceful settlement had been tried for. The policy of 
patience and control over the masses of all countries became more
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and more difficult to sustain. In the controversy of the Holy
Places,as we have seen, lay all the elements of a dispute v/hich
i 
in its religious bearings was as old as the division of Latin
and G-reek Christianity,and of which the political implications 
could only become prominent with the increasing advance of the 
Empire of Russia. But every instinct of religious and imperial 
ambition was wounded by the course of events in Syria. Mere 
settlement could not restore Russian equanimity, because all the 
circumstances about it had glaringly revealed the direct influence 
of the 'Jestera powers over a declining and expiring empire. Only 
a definite victory for Menshikovs mission could have averted war, 
and pride and obstinacy prevented an entire retreat which would 
have been conducted under the fixed regard of Europe and the East. 
The religious fervour of the Russian people, roused in defence of
* -
a crusade for the Orthodox faith, outweighed at last all sugges- 
tions of policy and prudence.
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XV. BRITISH POLICY WITH REGARD to the WAR.
We have examined in outline the course of the diplomatic 
negotiations which ended in the declaration of war, together with 
the state of public opinion at iv etime. we may now attempt to
l«r I
answer the question upon what principles did the British states- 
men act in their opposition to the Tsar's activities with refer- 
ence to the Turkish Empire?"
"England put her money on the wrong horse" Lord Salisbury's 
famous dictum of forty years later was based on the conception 
that we fought Russia on behalf of the Turkjopposed a Christian 
power in order to secure the Moslem Empire. But it is impossible 
to read the diplomatic discussions which led up to the war without 
realising that the expression ''the integrity and independence of 
the Turkish Empire" which played a great part in them was only a 
formula of diplomacy. As in 1840, so now ; it described not the 
actual condition of Turkey as a state, but the resolution of 
Europe with regard to it. The underlying tone of a great deal of 
the language of our statesmen reveals the feeling that Turkey had 
no real claim,such as a civilised power would properly enjoy^over 
the Ifaropean dominions she ruled. The Turkish State and government
came in for little practical consideration. At the Vienna negotia- 
tions
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it had no representatives. Its acquiescence in whatever the 
great powers should resolve was taken "for granted. Its ultimatum 
to Russia was unceremoniously suppressed. The terms on which 
its very independence was to rest were not accounted a matter for 
the consideration of the Sultan. Much that proceeded at Constan- 
tinople emanated from the influence of the Western Powers and 
their ambassadors. As for Turkish integrity, Europe had seen 
province after province taken from the Ottoman dominions, and the 
very year after the Treaty of Paris was to see the formation of 
a Roumanian state from a portion of its Empire. European support 
was in fact equally fatal to the integrity as to the independence 
of Turkey.
It would be nearer the truth to say that the motive behind 
our action was the desire for the transformation of the Turkish 
Empire by British Councils. The "Padishah of the Sultan" in fact 
exercised an influence over the Sultan and his government that 
would have completely satisfied the Tsar's ambition to maintain 
a weak Turkey in dependence on Russia. We may excuse Nicholas if 
he saw in this struggle the fable reversed,and tiie lion hunting 
in the ass's skin. "The Turkish Empire is a thing to be toler- 
ated, but not to be reconstructed" he had declared in his most 
emphatic manner in 1853. But through British influence, Christian
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states capable of self defence and of self government were certain 
to arise from its ruins in the end. If these countries succeeded 
in gaining emancipation from the Turk, their independence would 
certainly be as zealously asserted against the Tsar. From one 
point of view the whole issue lay in that declaration of Nicholas. 
A reconstruction of the Turkish Empire must have led at some time 
to a diminution in the rights of interference in the government 
of the Principalities undoubtedly secured to him in the Treaty 
of Adrianople.
Yet, unreformed or reconstructed, it was not the cause of 
Turkey that concerned our Cabinet. The Duke of Argyle in his 
retrospect of the Cabinet discussions of 1353 and 1854 records 
his deliberate conviction that there was not one single discussion 
on the Turks as a people, or as a government fit to rule over the 
Empire we were defending. (Autobiography, Vol.11, p.26). The 
British attitude was that the Russians must be kept out of Con- 
stantinople, not that the Turks were bound by the same consider- 
ation to be kept in. 'Alien the question arose as to whether we 
should abandon the cause of the Turks if they did not accept the 
Vienna Note, it was realised that such a course would be absurd, 
inconsistent,and practically impossible. The very essence of the 
British contention was that the defeat of Turkey in her resistance
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to the Russian demand would be the defeat of Europe and of Great 
Britain. To abandon Turkey, was to abandon our own position and 
policy.
The same policy may be seen in the British attitude to the 
Principalities. Our interest was not that these provinces should 
maintain their embarrassing and increasingly impossible connection 
with Turkey, as that they should simply not be Russian. Desirable 
as it was that they, together with Serbia, should for their own 
sakes obtain a definite political existence and constitution, yet 
the only certain interest of Europe was that they should not be 
Russian even if they fell from the grasp of Turkey. Their depen- 
dence on TurkeJ was justifiable because it formed their sole means 
of defence, and when we remember that they had scarcely ever en- 
joyed tan consecutive years of tranquility since the rise of the 
Russian Empire, we can understand Palmerston's rejection of the 
idea that the Christian races inhabiting Turkey could be the right- 
ful heirs of the Turk.
"There are no sufficient Christian elements as yet for 
a Christian state in European Turkey capable of performing 
its functions as a component part of the Eurouean system. J 
.......... A reeonstruction 01 Turkey means its subjection
to Russia, direct or indirect, immediate or for a time de- 
layed." (Ashley, Vo.II, p.287).
Napoleon III and Gladstone were later to support the contrary 
policy of constituting them as a barrier against Russia, but that
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was due to the possibilities created by the defeat of Russia in 
the war.
The attitude of British statesmen to the future of Turkey 
was in fact exceedingly diverse. There wwre those, and Palmerston 
was one of them, who believed that Turkey was a country not only 
qualified for independence but absolutely capable of progress in 
civilisation. Encouraged with wisdom and firmness/it might well 
form a substantial barrier against Russia. Turkey was in fact, 
not the dying man of the Tsar's imagination. (See Palmerston's 
notes on the Prince Consort's Memorandum iu Ash ley, Vol.II, p.286) 
TCe may contrast the view of Lord Stratford, based on unrivalled 
knowledge of the Turks. In 1821 he had wished as a matter of 
humanity that "the Sultan were driven bag and baggage into the 
heart of Asia". As a matter of policy however, his opinion was 
that Turkey would have to be maintained as a bulwark against 
Russia, yet his numerous outspoken dispatches,both to the Sultan 
and to the home government ; tell of the magnificent attempt which 
he inspired to reform the internal government of the Turkish 
dominions in Europe. This was the greatest side of a great man's 
activities, and he was to end his life realising that the climax 
of his efforts in the Firman of February 1856, had been to no 
purpose ,because of the lack of European interest in securing
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guarantees from Turkey for its practical adoption* Stratford at 
least was under no delusions as to the nature of the Turk.
The other opinion was that there was no vitality in the 
Turk, only ruin and decay; that its resources could never befde- 
veloped and must be virtually exhausted; and that it could last 
no longer as an independent state. This was the opinion of Aber- 
deen, Lord Grey, Cobden and Bright, Aberdeen, as the negotiations 
show, had no belief whatever in the improvement of the Turks. 
Their whole system was vicious and abominable and he could quote 
with effect the very despatches sent home by Lord Stratford, with 
their frightful picture of lawless oppression and cruelty. Gob- 
den's reasoned view of the state of Turkey is shown not only in 
his speeches but in his "Political Writings" (In the essay "Russia 
Turkey and England').
"We entertain no fears that our interests would be like- 
ly to suffer from the aggrandisement of a Christian power 
at the expense of Turkey even should that power be Russia. 
On the contrary we have no hesitation in avowing it as our 
deliberate conviction that not only Great Britain, but the 
entire civilised world will have reason t9 congratulate 
itself the moment when that territory again falls beneath 
the sceptre of any other European power whatever."
But important as this question is and great as its influ- 
ence was on the members of the government, this was not the point 
at issue. There may have been much hope of the regeneration of 
Turkey if it did not fall into the hands of Russia, but there was
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no belief in the regeneration of the Turks. It was the disposal 
of the Government, not the merits of demerits of the race ;which^ 
was the real object of Europe to solve. As the Prince Consort 
wrote, before the end of 1853, "it would be a war, not for the 
maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but for the 
interests of the Suropean powers of civilisation" (Martin. Vol.11 
p.527). ^e never really put our money on the Turkish horse.
TJhat then was the positive motive of Great Britain? It 
was that the Tsar had raised an issue which never lay between 
himself alone and the Turk along; that the interference single- 
handed of the northern power must be resisted; that it v/as not 
to be tolerated that Russia should work her will upon Turkey as 
an outlawed state. The Tsar rested his claim on his right and 
duty of protecting the Christian subjects of the Porte. But in 
that duty other powers would give no precedence to Russia. The 
British policy was to adhere to the principles laid down in the 
Treaty of 1840^which had been negotiated by Palmerston, and under 
our inducement had gained the adhesion of the whole power of 
Europe. That agreement we considered to contain the only prin- 
ciple compatible with peace - the denial of isolated action 
against "Turkey with a view to acquiring special rights and powers. 
As the British declaration of the causes of war (March 28th 1854)
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has it, the rejection of all^attempts ^to meeting the Tsar's 
demands was due to the fact^ that "security was not offered in 
the shane of a special and separate stipulation with Russia". 
That special and separate right was rejected not by Great Britain 
alone, but in three protocols by the united concert of Europe.
The history of the Vienna negotiations revealed this other 
difference, that while Europe required that the Christians should 
be protected by the Porte under whose government they lived ; 
Russia was obviously desiring to protect them against their sover- 
eign. No one power had done more to protect the Christian subjects 
against the corruption and religious fanaticism rife in Turkey 
than the British ambassador, and in all his attempts to secure 
the carrying out of the provisions of the Tanzimat of 1839 he 
had been opposed by the Russian agents. TTnat the alternative 
reconstruction of Eastern Europe by the Tsar meant could be infer- 
red from the condition of his own dominions. The British position 
was therefore that the regeneration of Turkey equally with its 
defence was the policy of a united Europe to be adopted on the 
principle of no selfish advantage to any one power.
So the positive course of the British government was to 
enlist the ready support of France, and to secure the active par- 
ticipation of Austria and Prussia in the policy of 1840; to en- 
courage the powers to resist any demand on the part of Russia
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tending to secure special rights,which, when added to her great 
preponderance of military power and geographical position of ad- 
vantage, would in the end make her the arbiter of the fate of the 
Ottoman Empire. There is therefore in all the discussions of the 
question from the British point of view an unceasing insistence 
on the European concert and on the vindication of 'the public law 
of Europe against a wanton disturber. Nothing is more striking 
in the discussions which not only preceded but accompanied the 
whole course of the war, then the development of this idea of a 
united Europe and a law of Europe. Perhaps inherited from the 
Pax Romana and the ideals of the Holy Roman Empire, a conscions- 
ness of a community of interests had been born out of the struggle 
against Napoleon and had been embodied in the treaties of 1815. 
It was still alive in the arbitration schemes which accompanied 
the Great Exhibition. These ideas, received a notable set back in 
their failure to operate during the course of the war,and in the 
disillusionment that followed it, but that they were present in 
British policy before the war broke out is undeniable.
Prom the time of the occupation of the Principalities, con- 
sidered asabroach in the public law of Europe, right down to the 
making of the peace there was an unceasing and remarkable effort 
to bring about a settlement by diplomatic methods and to this end
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to secure the active co-operation of Austria and Prussia in the 
cause of Europe. Nothing reveals this aspect of British policy 
more clearly than the series of letters which passed between 4b»
(/ce^ovla.Queen^and the King of Prussia in the opening months of the war. 
The King had appealed to the Queen to use her personal influence 
to prevent warlike measures against the Tsar, suggesting that 
Great Britain, ashamed of the motive cause of the war, the defence 
of the Thirk, was waging a war for an idea (ein Tendenzkrieg) con- 
nected with the preponderance of Russia and the restoration of 
the European balance of power. The King questioned whether such 
a "war for an idea" was morally justifiable - altogether a re- 
markable anticipation of the tendency of later opinion QJ. the war. 
(Martin. Vol.Ill, p.41).
The Queen's answer includes this passage:-
"I would understand this language if I heard it from 
the Kings of Hanover and Saxony. But I have hitherto re- 
garded rrussia as one of the Great Powers which since the 
peace of 1815 have been the guarantors of treaties, guar- 
dians of civilisation, defenders of the right, the ultimate 
arbitrators of the nations. And, for my part, I have felt 
the divine responsibility of this sacred office without 
undervaluing at the same time the heavy obligation, not 
unc9nnected with danger, which it imposes on me. If you 
abdicate these obligations you have also abdicated that 
position for Prussia and should such an example find imi- 
tators, then the civilisation of Europe would, be delivered 
up to the play of wd>nds ; right, will no l9nger find a 
champion, the oppressed will no longer find an Umpire."(Letters, Vol.Ill, p.18).
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The Queen adds that the most important clause in the con- 
templated treaty of alliance consisted of the promise by the 
Powers not to desire in any case to derive from the war any ad- 
vantage to themselves. The King's answer to this letter acknow- 
ledges that he "cannot and will not side with Russia because 
Russia's arrogance and wickedness have caused this horrible 
trouble", but he considers that Napoleon should thank God that 
his view of Russian policy and his fidelity to the '^ueen prevent 
him from making the Emperor begin this Turkish war on the other 
side of his own frontier. The ^ueen's answer points out that 
Prussia had acknowledged in Protocols (signed with Austria, France 
and England) that the preservation of the integrity of the Truk- 
ish Empire was a European interest^and that his policy seemed to 
leave England and France to defend this European concern with 
their wealth and blood while he reserved to himself only an un- 
worthy moral co-operation.
Nothing shows more clearly the existence of this appeal 
to the conscience of Europe. The European concert was never in 
active operation, but it was very nearly so } and the war was all 
but obviated by its efforts. Hitherto public enemies of Europe 
had been coerced by the efforts of one power or the united efforts 
of several, but now there was a serious attempt made to anticipate
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and achieve the work of war by substituting diplomatic concert 
for a mere military coalition, and usin^ moral instead of phy- 
sical force. And but for the backwardness of the German powers 
and especially of Prussia, upon v.rhose action that of Austria 
depended, the effort would have been successful. 'Thatever may be 
said about the "war-fever" in England, it was a wholly disinter- 
ested passion. Englishmen had nothing to gain by war and nothing 
to lose by peace. It was for no selfish object, but from motives 
of public right and moral indignation against a disturber of the 
peace, that we entered the war. It is an illustration of the ap- 
peal which resistance to Russia made at the time upon.minds of 
many different kinds that Molesworth,the representative in Aber- 
deen's Coalition of the non-interventionist Radicals became onei
of the greatest enthusiasts for war in the Cabinet and that 
Gladstone to the end of his life firmly maintained the justice 
and expediency of the war. (Morley, Yol.I, p.367).
For what alternative was there? There was but one^held by 
a most insignificant section of the country headed by Cobden and 
Bright. Their view was that the old doctrine of a balance of 
power was an antiquated superstition; that Russia's power was 
useless for offence; that Russia's despotic system would in time 
become freedom; that our policy was wrong from the beginning; and
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that we should not have interfered whatever the consequences to 
the Ottoman Empire. Bright was to declare in November 1854 that 
the English policy was one which in his conscience he believed 
to be as criminal before- God as it was destructive of the true 
interests of the country. But though backed by unswerving con- 
viction, by real moral passion,and by the greatest debating and 
oratorical art in the country at the time, it was impossible to 
convince anybody of opinion of the. truth of their contentions. 
A policy based on these convictions^though rational and consistent 
if announced before the diplomatic struggle, and persevered with' 
to the end ,would have met with the passionate condemnation of the 
British people,who considered such views as plainly inconsistent 
with national honour, national policy,and the safety and interests 
of larope. It is true that no article in any treaty bound us to 
the defence of the Turkish Empire. But its maintenance had long 
been an admitted principle of our policy and there was in addition 
a virtual obligation arising from our position in Europe. It is 
true that we could have avoided war at any time. 7e could have 
announced that we had changed our policy and did not intend to 
risk the enmity of Russia in 1853 as we had done that of France 
in 1839. V7e might have neglected every consideration of our duty 
of upholding the public law of Europe and played the part of
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Prussia. Nothing but the evasion of the issue was needed to avert 
the war, but it would have meant the loss of the influence of a 
great power - to our influence, not so much in the selfish sense 
as much as the legitimate influence and trust which the people of 
the day regarded as an advantage to the civilised world.
Did we drift into war? This historical misquotation of the 
expression of Aberdeen and Clarendon is common, and the idea be- 
hind it has the weight of Bismarck's opinion (Vol.1, p.211). The 
original expression was "towards war", and we drifted towards war 
because we had adopted a policy, adumbrated by Pitt, declared by 
Canning, and acted upon in 1840 by Palmerston from which we would 
not retract in 1853. The disguised rigidity of our policy.faced 
by the equal rigidity of the policy of the Tsar, caused both 
countries through the development of circumstances to drift to- 
wards a state of war. '.That uncertainty there was in the Cabinet 
it is well to remember, even in the case of Aberdeen,was never 
concerned with our ultimate policy but only with the intentions 
of the Tsar. The notion that the government drifted into war in 
the sense of moving involuntarily in that direction is wrong, and 
opposed to all the facts revealed not only in the diplomatic ne- 
gotiations of the time, but in the correspondence of the principal 
actors published since. Nor is it suggested for a moment in the
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Russian Diplomatic Study, which takes in fact the opposite view 
that England deliberately and consciously engaged in war to des- 
troy Russian prestige in Europe, bent on weakening Russia in the 
general interests of Europe, as understood by Palmerston and the 
British politicians, and weakening her above all in the East
*
where she was,though innocently, believed to entertain designs 
against Turkey. There is not a little to be said for this Russian 
view that the war was not made for Turkey, nor as a result of a 
policy of drift, but with a deliberate intention of sustaining 
the solid interests of our own country, in which,according to the 
Russian Foreign Office it was entirely successful.
In fact if anyone drifted into the war, it was the Tsar, 
who was led on ,step by step tunder the force of circumstances,to 
c'onsequences he never exactly" foresaw and measures he did not 
intend. The mission of Prince Menshikov, the occupation of the 
Principalities, the refusal of the amended Vienna note,and the 
affair of Sinope were a series of blunders which lost to Russia 
all chance of retiring from a contest which she ought never to 
have undertaken. Much of the cause was personal to the Tsar him- 
self, but the position of domination he had acquired in Europe in 
1852 had as its consequence that he could only maintain it by a 
renunciation of all plans of selfish advantage , \vhile his own
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dictatorial passion, the traditional ambition of his race, and 
contempt for the fancied weakness of the Turkish nation lured him 
to destruction.
It is interesting to note that this was practically the 
view of Count Orloff, expressed to Clarendon in a conversation 
at Paris in 1856 (Martin, Vol.III, p.446). It is not impossible 
that Prince Menshikov's mission was intended only to restore
i
Russian influence at the Porte,and to secure for it definite 
 stipulations and sanctions under law, and the facts of his mission, 
its secrecy, the changes in its extent and AScope and form of his 
demands go towards confirming the truth of Stratford's first im- 
pression that it was his object to avoid risking extreme conse- 
quences ; and that the policy of Russia was her common policy of 
gaining her ends by threat,without recourse to violence. The 
Tsar was at last to be faced by a united Europe, a prospect which 
might have made another man pause, but then it was too late for 
retreat.
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. THE PEACE.
It is not intended in this essay to consider the conduct 
of the war or the diplomatic discussions at Vienna which were a 
running commentary on its progress. Prom the time the British 
and French governments resolved to extend the sphere of opera- 
tions from the Danube to the Crimea, it was obvious that the war 
would be what Stratford had called "a very comprehensive one", 
and that peace v/ould never be made simply on terms of the status 
quo ante bellum. If the allies succeeded they would undoubtedly 
take some precaution against the necessity of similar efforts, and 
so before the expedition first landed in the Crimea, we hear of 
the necessity of making Russia give up even the once admitted 
claims to a semi-political protectorate in the Principalities'and 
over the Greek Church generally; her possession of the principal 
mouth of the Danube-and her capacity for aggression against the 
Turkish Empire consisting in the existence of her fleet and forti- 
fications in the Black Sea. Such a gigantic set-back in the course 
of Russian development for the past hundred years was unthinkable 
in the case of the greatest military power of the day, without 
very, striking disaster and defeat. So although attempts were made
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by the formulation of the Four Points in August 1854, and in the 
Vienna Conference in February 1855, in spite of the unexpected 
death of the Tsar on March 2nd 1855, peace was seen to depend 
ultimately on the results of the sdege of Sebastopol. So long 
as the fate of the great basis of Russian preponderance in the 
Black Sea was in doubt, insuperable difficulties would prevent
*
any satisfactory solution. "That the Russian attitude still was 
on March 20th 1855 may be seen from a conversation which Lord 
John Russell had with G-orchakov in the course of the abortive 
Vienna Conference,and which he reported to Clarendon.
"Russia .would not consent to limit the number of 
her ships; if she did she would forfeit honour. She 
would be no more Prussia. I might ask why she wanted 
a force in the Black Sea, he would tell me plainly that 
they did not want i'urkey and would be glad LO maintain 
the Sultan, but now thai was impossible- he must perish."
Maxwell, Vol.11, p.27.
The Allies, however, had committed themselves to the re- 
duction of Russian power in the Black Sea, not only in words but, 
in deeds in the Crimea. In addition their amour propre impera- 
tively demanded the fall of Sebastopol. In the end the French
n
triumph in the capture of the walakoff i^'ort ftogether with the
consolation to Russia/a-noitiiy? honour in the capture of Kars soon 
after,made peace a possibility. The fall of Sebastopol did not 
end the war, but it was its turning point. Peace had become a
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certainty for the war was now very unpopular in France, where it 
had always been,to a great extent, the Emperor's war, while in 
Russia the exhaustion and disorganisation was incredible. In 
fact although the French Emperor in the flush of enthusiasm after 
the war was full of granditse plans for the reconstruction of 
Poland as a constitutional monarchy, and a general revision of 
political conditions in Sarope (See Maxwell, Vol.11, p-97; Argyll 
Vol.1, p.583), the state of feeling in Paris demanded peace on 
terms far short of those for which the war was undertaken.
But in England public opinion was strongly in favour of 
continuing the war. Palmerston had truly reflected it when in 
August he had spoken of the consequences of the fall of Sebas- 
topol "Our danger will then begin - a danger of peace and not 
a danger of war" (Ashley, Vol.11, p.320). Having lived for a 
generation under the shadow of the northern autocracyj it was 
difficult to realise how enormous the defeat of Russia had been, 
and what incredible national weakness had been revealed in the 
total military incapacity of her generals, and of her machinery 
of supply either to defeat the i'urks on the Danube, or to defend 
a fortress at one extremity of her dominions, remote from the 
capital. But it was soon obvious that if the war went on, it 
would be \vithout French help,and on November 23rd he was forced
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to write a letter in his most direct style to Persigny declaring 
that Great Britain was quite able to carry on the war alone with 
the aid of Sardinia and Turkey. So when an ultimaturn,really 
concerted with France alone.was proposed on December 16th by 
Austria, to include a provision for the neutralisation of the 
Black Sea, he consented to its despatch^perhaps ;like the (iueen, 
expecting and hoping for its rejection, for she only looked for 
an' accession of Austrian arms as a result of it (Letters, Vol. 
Ill, p.52). '.Vhile the Tsar was considering his answer Palmers ton 
was writing to the British ambassador at Vienna that he was quite 
confident of obtaining better conditions in a twelvemonth having 
in view the exhaustion, internal difficulties and distresses of 
Russia. He was resolved to go on with the war till the necessary 
conditions were obtained. "The British nation is unanimous in 
this matter.' I say unanimous for I cannot reckon Gobden, Bright 
and Co for anything" Ashley, Vol.11, p.325. "Russia was not 
half beaten enough" was the universal opinion. So the approval 
from court, government and people, of the fresh peace proposals 
was very superficial. G-reville records the popular opinion 
that "it would prove quite easy to crumple up Russia and to 
reduce her to accept such terms as we chose to impose upon her"
<n;. Ifcft)
nuary ith 1856 On January 15th the wueen sent a letter to
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Clarendon which reveals the fact that a great cause of the dis- 
taste for peace was a lack of military glory due to the failure 
to hold the Redan fort in the last stage of the siege of Sebas- 
topol.
*
"Her feelings cannot be for peace now, for she is 
convinced that this country would not stand in the eyes 
of Europe as she ought and as the Queen is convinced she 
would after this year's campaign. The honour and glory 
of her dear army is near to her heart above almost any- 
thing and she cannot bear the thought that the "failure 
of the Redan" should be our last fait d'armes and it 
would .cost her more than words can express to conclude 
a peace with this as the end." (Letters, Vol.Ill, p.163).
She cherished the ideal of wishing for no peace that would 
fall short of rendering such a war for ever impossible, "England's 
policy had throughout been the same, unselfish and actuated by 
the desire of seeing Europe saved from the pretensions of that 
barbarous power Russia" against which she hoped for safeguards 
for the future. (Letters, Vol.Ill, p.169). Such opinions were 
not only those of the Court and the Cabinet, Qreville notes on 
January 22nd 1856:-
"rhe intelligence of peace at hand gives no satis- 
faction here and the whole Press is violent against it, 
and thundering against Russia and Austria, warns the 
people not to expect peace and invites them to go on 
with the war. Tne Press has succeeded in inoculating 
the public with such an eager desire for war that there 
seems a general regret at the notion of making peace."
\But the Tsar yielded ,in face of very strong opposition in
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in his own country led by the Grand Duke Constantine, and on 
January 31st the Queen's speech opening Parliament announced the 
preliminaries of peace, on which Greville remarks:-
would ever have thought that tidings of peace 
..____ produce a general sentiment of disaffection and 
disappointment in the nation'." (Jan. 31st 1854).
On February 1st, preliminaries were signed and Napoleon 
arrived at the height of his ambition. He had formed an alliance 
with Great Britain, had been received by the Queen in England ^ -J. 
had stood by her side at the tomb of Bonaparte. I\Iow Paris was 
to be the scene of the Peace Conference on February 25th. Clar- 
endon was the British representative and had the advantage of 
knowing the negotiations which led to the war from start to 
finish. The spirit in which he set out is shown in a letter 
of January 26th:-
"I make no illusion to myself as to what is will 
be my fate. No peace that is within attainable limits 
can satisfy the excited people of this country. John 
Bull will "be glad enough to put an end to the war, but 
he will be without mercy for the terms on which peace 
is made." (Maxwell, Vol.II, p.114%
When the peace Conference had begun at Paris it was Gre- 
ville 's opinion that if Lord Clarendon were to return and to 
announce that the failure of negotiations necessitated the con- 
tinuance of the war "he would be hailed with the greatest enthu- 
siasnf and the ardour for war would break out with redoubled 
force". (Feb. ty& 1856).
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Yet it was one of the bitter results of the war that in 
spite of all we had done for the cause of public law and the 
rights of weaker states, we had failed to win either the love 
or the gratitude of the world. On the day that Clarendon left 
for Paris the Prince Consort wrot§ to King Leopold:-
"We know very well that England is hated all over 
the Continent ....... All sorts'of charges are brought
against us - that we are actuated by excessive hatred 
against the Russians that peace in Europe does not suit 
our plans; that our object has been to use and make a 
tool of Prance for our own objects in the East, because 
of India etc." [Martin, Vol.Ill,'p.447).
The work of our representative at Paris was therefore 
not light. Great Britain was in fact isolated. The Emperor 
was all disposed to friendship with Russia, and in spite of 
personal letters between himself and the l^ueen, it was a dif- 
ficult situation. The Prance of two years ago no longer ex- 
isted and almost at once Clarendon had to write and advise the 
Cabinet to "prepare and consider what to do if Prance and Eng- 
land no longer hold together" (Maxwell,. Vol.11, p. 117). On 
March 12th he wrote:-
"The negotiations are a year too soon, and I $ave 
no doubt another campaign would have enabled us to im- 
" pose very different conditions on Russia, but Prance was 
determined on peace, and whatever Palmerston in his jaunty mood may say, v/e could not have done anything for 
we should have had all Europe against us at once and the 
United States would soon have followed in the T7ar".
(Maxwell, Vof.II, p.121).
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He repeated this suggestion of a Coalition of Europe against 
England in a letter to the Queen of March 30th (Letters, Vol. Ill 
p.184).
So after five weeks discussion the Treaty of Paris was 
signed on March 30th and was ready for ratification. There was 
no indemnity, and only the smallest cession of territory, which 
was contrary to all British hopes that Russia would be forced 
back beyond the Caucasus at least. It was only with difficulty 
that Ears was restored to Turkey, and to secure that, Bornarsund, 
the fortress on the Aland Isles which was the only thing we had 
to show for our naval campaign in the Baltic, had to be restored. 
But the future fortification of these isles, which command the 
Swedish capital, Stockholm,was prohibited in the treaty ; and 
strengthened by a separate Convention. Bourquenay the French 
delegate said that there was no visible indication who were the 
victors and who the vanquished from an inspection of the treaty. 
In England, neither Court. Press, Parliament or people were in- 
clined to disagree with him. The -oueen writing to congratulate 
Napoleon on Alril 30th confessed to "sharing the feeling of the 
majority of her people that this peace is perhaps a little pre- 
mature." (Letters, Vol.Ill, p.186; also to Palmerston, p.180 and 
Clarendon, p.185). Opposition was strong in Parliament, Lord
- 174 -
Derby in the House of Lords ended an attack upon it with the 
words "So much for the capitulation of Paris", and Lord Gran- 
ville on April 29th records the fact that the Proclamation of 
peace that morning was hissed at Temple Bar (Fitzmaurice, Vol. 
I, p.178).
History tells us however that no peace made in England 
since 1700, expect that of 1814, has ever satisfied the people 
of this country, all others being denounced at the time as ig- 
nominious and.premature. There was,in reality^no need for dis- 
appointment in this case,for we had accomplished in the course 
of the war the exact triumph of that policy for which we had 
taken up arms. The Treaty took under the Collective Guarantee 
of Europe, the independence of the Ottoman Empire, and ,separately
feat
^of the Danube Provinces and Serbia, and the neutrality of the 
Black Sea. This was in exact accord with that policy of 1840 
which had continued till the outbreak of the war. The conditions 
of peace were amply satisfactory to the best interests of Great 
Britain without being unduly oppressive to Russia. Yet the set- 
back Russia had received was enormous,and never again was Europe 
to live under the shadow of the Russian menace, real or fancied. 
Nicholas' Russia died in the war, and at home the consolation of 
many Russians was that "Russia had fallen not so much before the 
forces of the '.Vestera Powers, but as a result of Its own internal
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weakness". (See opinions quoted in the Oxford Russia, p.324). 
An epoch of Russian as well as European history ended with the 
death of Nicholas, and the destruction of his naval harbour. 
From the national point of view, never in her whole history had 
she signed such a treaty as this for never before had she been 
compelled to consent to the surrender of territory.
Nor was there lacking in the stipulations of the treaty 
adequate security for the future ; and Palmerston with character- 
istic understanding of the realities of the situation saw in 
it a "settlement that is satisfactory for the present and which 
will probably last for many years to come, of questions full of 
danger to the best interests of Europe". (Letters, Vol.Ill,
fej2nxA>v^0VOp.183). Granville claimed later that fee only expected a life of 
seven or ten years for the Black Sea clauses ,from which the Con- 
ference of London relieved Russia in 1870 (Horley, Vol.11, p.349). 
He probably would have agreed with Bismarck (Reflections, Vol.11 
p.114) that they were "politically absurd and therefore in the 
long run impossible." Enough for Palmerston if they served their 
turn.
The most obvious result of the treaty was the new oppor- 
tunity secured to the Ottoman Empire, now freed from all dictation 
and interference, to become a worthy member of the states-system
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of Europe. Its failure to make good use of that freedom was to 
cause the gradual "but inevitable creation of national states out 
of its Empire, while the complete abrogation of Russian preten- 
sions made their independence a possibility. Only after that had 
been secured could we place a living barrier between Russia and 
Turkey - "the breast of freemen". If the Sultan's heritage had 
been divided up in 1829, when Turkey was at its weakest, or in 
1853, the Balkan states could not have existed as they do to-day 
and the usual resolute policy of Russification must have turned 
them by the end of the century into Russian provinces like Fin- 
land and Poland. In fact what had been saved by the war was not 
the effete rule of the Sultan, but the future of nations as yet 
unknown. The best summary of the results of the war is the 
simple fact that the Eastern question so far as it has found a 
settlement, has found it on definitely non-Russian lines.
"Te may summarise the main provisions of the Treaty accord- 
ing to the questions which gave rise' to the struggle.
1. Independence and Integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 
Article 7. The Porte was admitted by the six powers to 
"participate in the public law and concert of Europe". 
The powers engaged to respect and guarantee collectively 
the "independence and territorial integrity of the Ot- 
toman Empire.
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2. Russian preponderance in the Black Sea. Art. 11-13.
The Black Sea was neutralised, "its waters and 
, ports opened to the mercantile marine of every nation" 
but "interdicted to the flag of war 1 '. i-Io arsenals, 
Russian or Turkish were to be established.
3. The Christian subjects of the Porte. Art.9.
The Sultan announced to the powers his intention 
to ameliorate their condition" without distinction of 
creed or race, "but the powers expressly repudiated the 
right to interfere" either collectively or separately 
in the relations of the Sultan with his subjects. This 
repudiation of all guarantee for the due observance of 
the Firman of February 21st 1856 was fatal, in the opin- 
ion of all who realised the true nature of Turkish rule. 
As Stratford said "It confirmed the right and contradict- 
ed the hopes of the Christians". (Lane-Poole, Vol.11,
p.442).4. Territorial Arrangements. Art. 3, 4, 20, 21.
Kars was to be restored to Turkey and the Crimea 
to Russia, x Russian territory was diminished by the 
Delta between the North and South mouths of the Danube 
and a strip of Bessarabia.
5. The Danube. Articles 15-18.
The navigation of the Danube was to be opened on
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equal terms to the ships of all nations, and regulated 
by an international commission.
6. The Principalities. Articles 21-27.
Russian renounced her exclusive religious and semi- 
political protectorate, and this was collectively fce. be 
undertaken by the Powers. Though under Turkish suzer- 
ainty they were to enjoy "an independent and national 
administration'', and a Commission and a national Conven- 
tion in each province wss at once to deliberate on their 
future organisation, according to the wi-shes and inter- 
ests of all classes of society.
7. Serbia. Articles 28-29.
A similar Collective guarantee was given to its 
"Independent and national administration". No armed 
intervention was to take place in either Principalities 
or in Serbia without previous agreement of the powers. 
These provisions were the most valuable positive stipu- 
lations of the Treaty and only need to be compared with 
the Organic Statute of 1829 and the Act of Baita Limau 
of 1849 to appreciate the advance^ towards independence. 
They were now rid both of the Russian and the Turk and 
the way was open for their inevitable union. 
Attached to the treaty were three Conventions. The first
forbids the fortification of the Aland Isles, the second reaffirm-
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"the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire", according to which the 
Straits are closed to foreign ships of war while the Porte is at 
peace. There was attached also the famous Declaration of Paris 
regulating the conduct of maritime war. An additional and 
separate treaty between Great Britain, Austria and France guaran- 
teed the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Snpire, its 
infraction to be a. casus belli.
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xni. CONCLUSION.
The passing years have brought the circumstances of the 
conflict between Great Britain and Russia - its inception, its 
conduct,and the peace with which it concluded,into what Glad- 
stone called "the abyss of odium". Retrospective criticism has 
tended to the view that if the war was not what John Bright 
called it - a crime, at least it was a blunder,and that it ought 
to have been,and could have been avoided. Sir Robert Korier 
writing in 1870 described it as "the only perfectly useless 
modern war that has been waged" (Memoirs, Vol.11, p.215). Lord 
Salisbury twenty years later still said that "England put her 
money on the wrong horse", Kinglake's history reveals GreatBrit- 
sin as the ignorant tool of an unscrupulous adventurer. The 
histories of Spencer Walpole and Herbert Paul follow him in every- 
thing but his appreciation of the Russian menace.To VJalpole "the 
sole result of the war was to set back the clock for fourteen 
years" (Vol.VI, ch.l). The lives of the great Liberals, Gladstone 
Cobden, Bright, Aberdeen, are marked byA detestation or doubt with 
which thes^ subjects regarded the war. On the other side the 
lives of Palmerston, Clarendon and the Prince Consort ,though full 
of interesting material,are written without irspiration or any
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considerable grasp of political principle. A political study of 
Palmerston ,in particular, at all commensurate with his importance 
and influence on the development of British Foreign Policy is 
still lacking. Lane Poole's masterly biography of Stratford is 
too long and bears the air of a vindication rather than that of 
an impartial study. On the whole it is almost impossible to come 
toi^a study of the Russian war and the events which led up to it 
without being at first influenced by the weight of adverse opin- 
ion.
Yet is that opinion all that can be said about the events 
of these years. The Duke of Argpll writing at the end of the 
century declared himself utterly unrepentant for the part he had 
' played in it. Gladstone ,in spite of. his great campaign against 
Turkish atrocities later, maintained to the end both the justice 
and the expediency of our action at the time. In fact we must 
agree with his opinion that just as feeling and not argument made 
the war papular, so it is feeling and not argument that regards 
it as "perfectly useless". There was not lacking cause in plenty 
for disillusionment with the diplomacy, the conduct and the con- 
clusion of the war, and it is possible to see in the failure of 
the Turks to take advantage of their opportunity with its tragic 
results ia the Christian population, together with the
of the Black Sea clauses ;a practical tearing up of the Treaty
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and a negation of the causes for which we fought. But if it is 
impossible to indict a whole nation, it is perhaps equally futile 
to indict a generation. The causes of the struggle between Great 
Britain and Russia were of the broadest kind and lay in the general 
situation of Europe at the time. No war was ever more popular. 
It was only reluctantly entered into by the government, but it was 
with greater reluctance still that the country could be brought to 
face its conclusion. V»as this a gigantic fraud with which Palmer- 
ston in London and Stratford in Constantinople deluded the nation? 
Was it simply due to a total lack of political insight as to the 
future of Russia and Turkey, or to a senseless national pugnacity? 
We can recognise the popular passion of the time and realise that   
war could have been averted at any tiise in 1853 and 1854 by a 
decent acquiescence in the plans of the Tsar. But it is only 
necessary to put the question "If Turkey was the wrong horse to
or*
back, was Russia the right one?" Support of one c£ the other was
involved in the situation. Non-intervention in the existing state 
of Europe was equivalent to the support of Russia, as its advocates 
at the time fully realised. Turkey was the right horse in 1853, 
if a vicious one .
To see the war in its proper perspective, we must consider
it as the inevitable outcome of a struggle that had lasted in a 
more or less disguised form since 1848 and even before. In the
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arrogant attitude of Russia to Europe since 1815 and in the ever 
increasing audacity of that attitude since the accession of the 
Tsar Nicholas, in the existence of a threatening military auto- 
cracy claiming Lo take the lead against liberty all over the 
continent ; is to be found the true explanation of the events of 
1854 and 1855. The revolutionary epochij of 1848-1850 had result- 
ed in a time of disquiet and alarm. It was the belief that 
animating all the peoples of Europe that the political concep- 
tions of 'Vestern civilisation were threatened which forced our 
fleets and armies to the Black Sea and the Baltic. And the later 
incapacity to realise what seemed the danger of JjJurope at the 
time is only a standing disproof of that view of the war which 
regards it as"perfectly useless 1 '. 1T/e gained no territory and 
obtained no indemnityjbut that was in accordance with one of the 
conditions according to T"hich we declared war. Apart from that, 
its great effects came indirectly and were momentous and powerful 
as nothing else was between 1815 and 1870. It is surely no ex- 
aggeration to claim that while Nicholas lived and Russia was un- 
defeated, not only would there have been no Balkan nations ; but no 
united Italy and no united Germany. The memory of 1830 and 1849 
suggests what would have been the influence of a dominant Russia 
in the reconstruction of Europe which could not have been delayed
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much longer. Y«hat was wanted to redress the position in Europe 
was not the defeat of some isolated claims, but the gonoro.1 over- 
throw of Russia's general attitude of iictatorship and pretension. 
OWnnilitary defeat, irrespective of the terms of peace served to
dtc/^t/UL <A-c^"
dofoctt the spirit of militarism of autocratic militarism? and re- 
vealed the rottenness of the sinister fabric of power with which 
the great Empire confronted Europe. Without our intending it, the 
siege of Sevastopol secured this fundamental necessity with as- 
tonishing completeness. The strength of Russian aggression 
against Turkey, as against Europe, lay not in treaties so much 
as in the facts and conditions of which those treaties were an 
almost unnecessary expression. So the great result of the war 
was effectually to alter the facts and conditions of Russia's 
position in Europe. When the time came for her next advance, all 
the conditions had changed ; and the overthrow of the territorial 
provisions of the peace and the safeguards in the Black Sea v\fere 
of slight importance in the modified outlook created by the open- 
ing of the Suez Canal. Ihen Lord Derby in 1870 declared that he 
would fight for the neutrality of Egypt but not for the neutrality
»
of the Black Sea, he expressed exactly the same British attitude 
to the Ottoman Empire which had been Palmerston's. Napoleon had 
said "Y?he is master of Egypt, is master of India", and into Egypt
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we stumbled in spite almost of ourselves, and yet fulfilling those 
uncodified principles of foreign policy which have never ceased 
to operate.
'7e may even accept Spencer Walpole's dictum that "the sole 
result of the war was to set back the clock for fourteen years" 
~7e may agree that Russie in that time regained her old frontier 
in Europe, denounced the treaty, added huge acquisitions to her 
As^ian territory, became master of Kars ;and had never ceased till 
the day he wrote to advance her frontiers till she should reach 
the outlet for which all nations strive - the sea. Passing over 
the obvious implication that the strength of Russia undefeated 
would have been all the greater and ther advance the more rapid, 
we can realise that setting the clock back can yet effect a great 
deal. In this case it gave time for Turkey to prove the anachron- 
ism of her rule in Europe, for the Christian states to arise one 
by one from her ruins, and above all for the formation of a United 
Germany. Impossible to contemplate while rlicholas lived, it be- 
came a practical possibility in the altered conditions due to the 
war. The final and complete end of Russian preponderance was an- 
nounced in the same year as the denunciation of the Black Sea 
clauses ; when the German Empire took upon herself for the next 
generation that task of creating the balance of Power in Europe
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for which,as we have seen^Palmerston had in vain looked to 
Austria.
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